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Preface
This PhD thesis comprises three chapters, all of which deal with financial frictions, especially
short-sale costs. The first two chapters also concern early exercise of equity call options. Although
chapter two builds on results from chapter one, each chapter can be read independently.
I would like to acknowledge support from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no.
DNRF102), the European Research Council (ERC grant no. 312417), the Elite Research Prize
awarded to Lasse Heje Pedersen, and the Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation.
Many people deserve thanks. First, my colleagues at the Department of Finance at Copenhagen
Business School provided invaluable comments, input, and conversations, though my primary su-
pervisor, Lasse Heje Pedersen, deserves special recognition for his keen academic insights, kind
encouragement, and constant willingness to discuss new ideas. Working with him has been an
enormous privilege. I am also grateful to my secondary supervisor, Jesper Lund, for his help and
contributions. I would also like to thank my fellow PhD students for their ongoing reflections and
important coffee breaks. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to family and friends for
their support throughout my studies.
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Chapter Summaries in English and Danish
This section contains English and Danish summaries of the three chapters in the thesis.
Chapter 1: Early Option Exercise: Never Say Never
English summary. An equity call option grants the owner the right, but not the obligation, to
buy a specific stock at a specific price no later than a specific expiration date. A classic result by
Merton (1973) is that, in the absence of frictions, an equity call option should never be exercised
early, only at expiration or just before the stock pays a dividend. Similarly, a convertible bond
should never be converted early (Brennan and Schwartz, 1977; Ingersoll, 1977). We show that
when frictions are severe enough, these rules breaks down, both theoretically and empirically. Not
just any friction, however, makes early exercise optimal. Option and stock transaction costs alone
cannot make early exercise optimal, nor can funding costs and short-sale costs only affecting the
option owner. However, once option transaction costs are combined with funding and/or short-sale
costs, early exercise can be optimal.
We extend the classic Black-Scholes-Merton model to include both funding costs and short-
sale costs. Applying this model to data on stock prices, short-sale costs, and funding costs makes
it possible to estimate when early exercise can be optimal. Data on call option exercises allow us
to test if the estimates match observed behavior. The model is able to explain 66–84% of all early
exercise decisions in our data, depending on how input variables are estimated. Statistical tests in
the form of regressions indicate that the model estimates have explanatory power for early option
exercise. We also document a number of early conversions of convertible bonds, especially among
bonds on stocks with high short-sale costs.
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Kapitel 1: Førtidig optionsudnyttelse: Aldrig sig aldrig
Dansk resume´. En købsoption på en aktie giver dens ejer retten, men ikke pligten til at købe
en bestemt aktie til en bestemt pris senest en bestemt dato. Et klassisk resultat af Merton (1973)
siger, at i fravær af friktioner skal man aldrig udnytte sin option førtidigt, kun ved udløb eller lige
før aktien betaler udbytte. Tilsvarende skal en konvertibel obligation aldrig konverteres førtidigt
(Brennan and Schwartz, 1977; Ingersoll, 1977). Vi viser, at når friktionerne er strenge nok, bry-
der denne regel sammen, både teoretisk og empirisk. Men ikke enhver friktion kan gøre førtidig
udnyttelse optimal. Options- og aktietransaktionsomkostninger alene kan ikke gøre førtidig ud-
nyttelse optimal. Det samme gælder for finansieringsomkostninger eller kortsalgsomkostninger,
der alene vedrører optionsejeren. Men hvis optionstransaktionsomkostninger er kombineret med
finansierings- og/eller kortsalgsomkostninger, kan førtidig udnyttelse være optimal.
Vi udvider den klassiske Black-Scholes-Merton-model til at inkludere både finansierings- og
kortsalgsomkostninger. Ved at anvende denne model på data for aktiekurser, kortsalgsomkost-
ninger og finansieringsomkostninger er det muligt at estimere, hvornår førtidig udnyttelse kan være
optimal. Data for købsoptionsudnyttelser gør det muligt at undersøge, om estimaterne afspejler den
observerede adfærd. Modellen er i stand til at forklare 66–84% af alle førtidige udnyttelser i vores
data, afhængigt af hvordan inputvariablene er estimerede. Statistiske test i form af regressioner
viser at modelestimaterne har forklaringskraft for førtidig optionsudnyttelse. Vi påviser desuden
et antal førtidige konverteringer af konvertible obligationer, især blandt obligationer på aktier med
høje kortsalgsomkostninger.
Chapter 2: Early Option Exercise Predicts Stock Returns
English summary. If a call option owner wants to reduce exposure to the underlying stock, this
might lead to early option exercise. In case the wish to reduce stock exposure is based on private
information, the exercise will be informative about future stock returns. This chapter shows that
after early exercise, the underlying stocks do in fact underperform relative to the rest of the market,
consistent with private information leading to early exercise.
Exercising a call option and selling the obtained stock reduces the stock exposure. If a wish
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to reduce stock exposure confronts the option owner with the choice of either exercising early or
starting to sell the stock short, high costs related to short selling can make early exercise optimal.
Shorting can be costly both due to short-sale costs and the funding costs associated with increased
margin requirements. When private information is the reason for reducing stock exposure and
hence choosing early exercise, the exercise will be a negative predictor of stock returns.
I perform various tests to determine the empirical link between early exercise and consecutive
stock returns, including: event studies; tests of returns for strategies selling stocks after early
exercise, and regressions of returns on indicators for previous early exercises. The results show that
early exercise is a negative predictor of stock returns, which is consistent with private information
among option owners leading to early exercise. According to my findings the information content
of early exercise does not significantly depend on whether the exercise is performed by a customer
of a broker, firm, or market maker.
Kapitel 2: Førtidig optionsudnyttelse forudsiger aktieafkast
Dansk resume´. Hvis en købsoptionsejer ønsker at reducere sin eksponering mod den under-
liggende aktie, kan det føre til førtidig optionsudnyttelse. I tilfælde af at grundlaget for ønsket
om at reducere aktieeksponeringen er privat information, vil optionsudnyttelsen være informativ
om fremtidige aktieafkast. Kapitel 2 viser, at underliggende aktier rent faktisk underpræsterer i
forhold til resten af markedet, hvilket er i overensstemmelse med, at privat information fører til
førtidig udnyttelse.
At udnytte en købsoption og sælge den opnåede aktie reducerer aktieeksponeringen. Hvis
et ønske om at reducere aktieeksponeringen stiller optionsejeren over for valget mellem enten at
udnytte førtidigt eller at begynde at sælge aktien kort, kan høje omkostninger, der relaterer sig
til kortsalg, gøre førtidig udnyttelse optimal. Kortsalg kan være omkostningsfyldt både på grund
af kortsalgsomkostninger og på grund af finansieringsomkostninger i forbindelse med krav om
forøget sikkerhedsstillelse. Når privat information er årsagen til at reducere aktieeksponeringen
og dermed valget om førtidsudnyttelse, vil optionsudnyttelsen være en negativ retningsgiver for
aktieafkast.
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Jeg udfører forskellige undersøgelser for at fastslå den empiriske forbindelse mellem førtidig
udnyttelse og efterfølgende aktieafkast, inklusive: eventstudier; test af afkast for strategier, der sæl-
ger aktier efter førtidig udnyttelse; regressioner af afkast på indikatorer for forudgående førtidige
udnyttelser. Undersøgelserne viser, at førtidig udnyttelse er en negativ retningsgiver for aktieafkast,
hvilket er konsistent med, at privat information blandt optionsejere fører til førtidig udnyttelse.
Ifølge mine resultater afhænger informationsindholdet i førtidig udnyttelse ikke signifikant af, om
udnyttelsen er foretaget af en kunde hos en mægler, en virksomhed eller en prisstiller.
Chapter 3: Short-Sale Costs Predict Volatility
English summary. Short selling allows investors to borrow and sell stocks they do not own and to
earn a profit if stocks decrease in value. In the shorting market, borrowers and lenders negotiate the
fee that the borrower must pay to borrow a particular stock, i.e., the short-sale costs. An increased
demand for short selling a stock can reflect an increased disagreement among market participants
about the value of the stock. The increased disagreement can also induce higher volatility in future
stock returns.
As a new test of models of differences of opinions, we study how shorting markets interact
with stock volatility. We identify positive and negative demand shifts for shorting stocks by ex-
amining simultaneous changes in short-sale costs and short interest. Consistent with an increase
in differences of opinions, a positive demand shift predicts, on average, a 2.8 percentage points
higher volatility over the next quarter. Similarly, an average negative demand shift predicts a 3.9
percentage points lower volatility.
We perform event studies to investigate how the volatilities of stocks behave both before and
after supply and demand shifts. The studies show that average volatilities of stocks hit by supply
or demand shifts are higher than for other stocks, and volatilities peak around the time of shifts.
Furthermore, we find that future volatility is positively related to both increases and the level of
short-sale costs and short interest.
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Kapitel 3: Kortsalgsomkostninger forudsiger volatilitet
Dansk resume´. Kortsalg tillader investorer at låne og sælge aktier, de ikke ejer, og tjene profit,
hvis aktier falder i værdi. I kortsalgsmarkedet forhandler lånere og udlånere den afgift, som låneren
skal betale for at låne aktien, dvs. kortsalgsomkostningerne. En øget efterspørgsel på kortsalg af
en aktie kan afspejle en forøget uenighed blandt markedsdeltagerne om værdien af aktien. Den
forøgede uenighed kan også føre til højere volatilitet i fremtidige aktieafkast.
Som en ny test af modeller med uenighed undersøger vi, hvordan kortsalgsmarkeder inter-
agerer med aktievolatilitet. Vi identificerer positive og negative efterspørgselsforskydninger for
kortsalg af aktier ved at finde samtidige ændringer i kortsalgsomkostninger og andelen af ude-
stående aktier, der er udlånt. I overensstemmelse med en forøget uenighed forudsiger en positiv
efterspørgselsforskydning i gennemsnit en 2.8 procentpoint højere volatilitet over det næste kvartal.
Tilsvarende forudsiger en negativ efterspørgselsforskydning en 3.9 procentpoint lavere volatilitet.
Vi udfører eventstudier for at undersøge, hvordan aktievolatiliteterne opfører sig både før og
efter udbuds- og efterspørgselsforskydninger. Studierne viser, at den gennemsnitlige volatilitet
for aktier ramt af udbuds- eller efterspørgselsforskydninger er højere end for andre aktier, og at
volatiliteterne topper omkring forskydningstidspunktet. Endvidere viser vi, at fremtidig volatilitet
er positivt relateret til både stigninger i og niveau af kortsalgsomkostninger samt hvor mange aktier,
der er solgt kort.
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Introduction
A call option on a stock is a common and widely used derivative. On an average trading day in
2015, more than 800,000 such options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the largest
options exchange in the United States. Each option grants its owner the right to buy 100 of a
specific stock at a pre-specified price, no later than a pre-specified date. For example, an option
can grant the right to buy 100 General Electric shares for USD 31 each no later than October 21,
2016. An interesting issue is determining when an option is optimally exercised. Merton (1973)
shows that in a world without frictions, a call option should never be exercised early, but only at
expiration or just before the underlying stock pays a dividend. Chapter one of this thesis shows that
sufficiently severe frictions can make early exercise optimal. Short-sale costs especially represent
an important driver of early exercise. Chapter two shows that when option owners exercise early, it
predicts stock returns, consistent with option owners acting on private information. Chapter three
does not include options but shows that demand shifts in the shorting market for stocks predict
the volatility of the affected stocks, which is consistent with increases in differences of opinions
among market participants.
Chapter one (with Lasse Heje Pedersen) deals with a classic result by Merton (1973), who
states that, in the absence of frictions, early exercise is never optimal. In a similar result, Brennan
and Schwartz (1977) and Ingersoll (1977) show that a convertible bond should never be converted
early. We show that frictions can in fact make early exercise optimal and we provide empirical
evidence of early exercise induced by frictions. In particular, we consider the following frictions:
short-sale costs, funding costs, and transaction costs.
The existing literature already links option prices to the aforementioned frictions. For example,
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Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs, and Karoui (2011) show that equity option prices are affected by
transaction costs, while (Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser, 2001) provide a similar result for currency
options. Both Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) and Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) link
short-sale costs to equity option prices, with the latter mentioning that short-sale costs can lead to
early exercise. Another topic of various studies (Bergman, 1995; Santa-Clara and Saretto, 2009;
Leippold and Su, 2015) is the connection between funding constraints and option prices. Frazzini
and Pedersen (2012) show how embedded leverage is a valuable component of options, while
Piterbarg (2010) and Karatzas and Kou (1998) provide a link between interest-rate spreads and
option prices. The literature also links convertible bond prices to financial frictions (Mitchell,
Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007; Agarwal, Fung, Naik, and Loon, 2011). Chapter one complements
the literature on how frictions affect option prices by showing that frictions also lead to option
exercises.
Regarding option exercise, various papers document irrational early exercise decisions (Gay,
Kolb, and Yung, 1989; Diz and Finucane, 1993; Overdahl and Martin, 1994; Finucane, 1997;
Poteshman and Serbin, 2003), while Pool, Stoll, and Whaleyn (2008) provide evidence of irrational
failures of exercise for call options and Barraclough and Whaley (2012) do so for put options.
Finally, Battalio, Figlewski, and Neal (2015) document early exercise of call options with options
bid prices that are below the intrinsic value, which is a necessary condition for optimal early
exercise. We show how frictions help explain why the option prices can be so low.
The chapter contains the following steps to show how early exercise is induced by frictions,
both theoretically and empirically. We provide the theoretical result that transaction costs alone
cannot justify early exercise, nor can short-sale costs and funding costs that only affect the op-
tion owner but leave other market participants unconstrained. If, however, the option cannot be
sold above intrinsic value and funding costs and/or short-sale costs affect the option owner, early
exercise can be optimal.
Next, we extend the classic Black-Scholes-Merton model (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton,
1973) for option pricing to include funding costs and short-sale costs, allowing us to give quanti-
tative estimates of when early exercise can be optimal by combining large data sets. Using Fama-
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MacBeth regressions, we show that frictions have explanatory power for early exercises. Our
model explains 66–84% of all early exercises, depending on how input variables are estimated.
We also use the temporary short-sale ban in September 2008–October 2008 of selected stocks as a
natural experiment. A difference-in-differences test shows that options written on stocks for which
short selling is banned are exercised with a higher propensity than other options, consistent with
our theoretical prediction. We also document early conversions of convertible bonds, especially
among bonds on stocks with high short-sale costs.
Chapter two shows that early exercise of call options predicts stock returns negatively, consis-
tent with option owners exercising based on private information. This chapter builds on the insight
from chapter one that early exercise can be optimal if frictions are sufficiently severe. In particular,
it utilizes the model from chapter one to show how a wish to reduce stock exposure can lead to
early exercise. If reducing stock exposure by selling stock requires the option owner to start short-
ing the stock, frictions related to shorting can make it optimal to exercise the option early and sell
the stock instead. If the wish to reduce stock is based on private information, early exercises will
predict future stock returns negatively. The chapter provides empirical evidence that early exercise
is a negative predictor of stock returns.
A vast literature exists on private information and option markets. Black (1975) conjectured
that traders with private information are more prone to trade options due to embedded leverage.
To name a few others, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) derive an equilibrium in which option
trades are informative about future stock prices, and provide consistent empirical evidence. Based
on observations of buyer- and seller-initiated trades, Pan and Poteshman (2006) show how option
trades predict stock returns. This result is closely related to my results, with the main difference
being that I focus on option exercises instead of option trades. Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2016)
use data from cases on insider trading to show that option-based measures for private information
are stronger than stock-based measures. Johnson and So (2012) provide evidence that the option to
stock volume ratio is informative about future returns. Fodor, Krieger, and Doran (2011) show that
recent changes in the call-to-put open-interest ratio have predictive power regarding equity returns.
To my knowledge, chapter two distinguishes itself from the previous literature by linking early
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exercise to future stock returns and private information. The private information content of early
exercise is detected by lower abnormal returns of the underlying stocks in the days after early
exercise. I identify abnormal stock returns based on both a one-factor capital asset pricing model
and a four-factor model with the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns, small market
capitalization minus big, and high book-to-market ratio minus low) and the momentum factor.
Returns on day of exercise and the day after potentially reflect public information that induced the
early exercise. To avoid endogeneity issues, I use abnormal returns from two trading days after
early exercise and later as evidence of private information.
Event studies show that the cumulated four-factor abnormal stock return for two to ten trading
days after early exercise is significantly negative, consistent with option owners exercising based
on private information. The corresponding one-factor abnormal return is negative, but insignificant.
The four-factor abnormal return stays significantly negative, even after adding a conservative (i.e.,
likely upward-biased) measure for short-sale costs. This is consistent with negative information
giving rise to early exercise. Trading strategies based on shorting stocks after an option written on
them has been exercised early also indicate private information. For the strategy in which stocks are
shorted two trading days after early exercise and the position hedged based on ex ante four-factor
loadings, a positive four-factor daily alpha of 0.05% is observed with a t-statistic of 3.38. The
yearly Shape ratio is 1.26. I also perform Fama-MacBeth regressions and show that early exercise
two and three trading days prior are negatively related to abnormal returns of the underlying stock.
I also test if the private information content of the average early exercise depends on which type
of agent (customer of broker, firm, or market maker) exercises, though without finding statistically
significant differences. In addition, I show that the results are driven by stocks with high or low
market capitalization only. Furthermore, I find that stock reversal cannot explain the abnormal
negative returns after early exercise. The empirical results provide evidence that early exercise
predicts stock returns because option owners exercise early based on private information.
In the last chapter (with Christian Skov Jensen), we investigate the relationship between the
shorting market and stock volatility. The main prediction of the paper connects two strings of the
existing literature: (i) increases in differences of opinions lead to a positive demand shift in the
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shorting market (Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2002), and (ii) higher differences of opinions
lead to higher stock volatility (Andrei, Carlin, and Hasler, 2014; Chang, Cheng, and Yu, 2007).
We combine these insights into the prediction that a positive demand shift in the shorting market
will reflect higher future predicted volatility for the affected stock.
The rich data set from Data Explorers allows us to identify both supply and demand shifts in
the shorting market. Inspired by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), we identify, e.g., a positive
demand shift when we observe a simultaneous increase in short-sale costs and short interest. We
can then match supply and demand shifts with stock volatility from OptionMetrics and investigate
their relationship. In our regression results, we find evidence consistent with the prediction that
positive (negative) demand shifts are positive (negative) predictors of volatility, reflecting that an
increase (decrease) in differences of opinions can lead to future higher (lower) volatility.
Various papers link short-sale constraints and volatility. Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), for in-
stance, predict that short-sale constraints increase stock volatility when the information asymmetry
is high. Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) show how short-sale costs and constraints can lead to short
sellers being forced to close their short positions and to increased volatility. Chang et al. (2007)
find empirically that volatility of the individual stock increases when short selling for the stock is
allowed. Based on yearly estimates of stock lending supply and stock volatility, Saffi and Sigurds-
son (2011) find that high short-sale cost levels are linked to high levels of stock volatility. Diether,
Lee, and Werner (2009) find that the fraction of stock volume that can be attributed to short selling
is positively related to contemporaneous volatility.
Differences of opinions and short-sale constraints are considered by Miller (1977), who shows
how short-sale constraints and differences of opinions can result in overpricing because limited
stock supply yields an equilibrium price where the marginal investor is more optimistic than av-
erage. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), who predict skewness in returns of stocks with short-sale
constraints, state that the overpricing is not sustainable in equilibrium because investors will real-
ize the effects identified by Miller (1977) and adjust accordingly. Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu
(2006) present empirical results supporting the hypothesis that stocks with both high short-sale
constraints and high differences of opinions are overvalued.
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Finally, volatility and differences of opinions are also linked in the literature. In a model with
differences of opinions, Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) show how overconfidence can lead
to increased stock volatility, while Karl B. Diether (2002) show empirically that dispersion in an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts is positively related to stock volatilities over the past period. Carlin,
Longstaff, and Matoba (2014) find that increased disagreement among Wall Street mortgage deal-
ers about prepayment speed is followed by higher levels of mortgage return volatility.
Our contribution is to link supply and demand shifts in the shorting market, changes in the
short-sale costs and short interest, and levels in short-sale costs and short interest to future stock
volatility. Based on daily data from 2006 to 2012, we obtain results consistent with changes in
differences of opinions driving changes in volatility and shorting markets.
Regression results show that positive demand shifts predict significantly higher stock volatility.
Likewise, negative demand shifts are significant negative predictors of volatility. To address the
concern that our results are driven by extraordinary circumstances during the financial crisis of
2007–2009, we test the prediction for three sub-periods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. For
all three sub-periods, we find that positive or negative demand shifts are significant predictors of
volatility. Event studies show that positive and negative supply and demand shifts are associated
with contemporaneous higher volatility of the affected stock, both relative to the same stock at
other times and other stocks. We also find that changes in short-sale costs have predictive power
for volatility, consistent with short-sale costs being related to differences of opinions (D’Avolio,
2002) and, thereby, volatility. Finally, we establish that the level of short-sale costs and level of
short interest are positively related to future volatility. Based on daily data, our results are similar
to those obtained by Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), who use yearly estimates.
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Chapter 1
Early Option Exercise: Never Say Never
With Lasse Heje Pedersen.
Published in Journal of Financial Economics: 121 (2016) 278–299.
Abstract
A classic result by Merton (1973) is that, except just before expiration or dividend payments,
one should never exercise a call option and never convert a convertible bond. We show theo-
retically that this result is overturned when investors face frictions. Early option exercise can
be optimal when it reduces short-sale costs, transaction costs, or funding costs. We provide
consistent empirical evidence, documenting billions of dollars of early exercise for options
and convertible bonds using unique data on actual exercise decisions and frictions. Our model
can explain as much as 98% of early exercises by market makers and 67% by customers.
1.1 Introduction: Never exercise a call and never convert a
convertible?
One of the classic laws of financial economics is that equity call options should never be exercised,
except at expiration or just before dividend payments (Merton, 1973) and, similarly, convertible
bonds should not be converted early (Brennan and Schwartz, 1977; Ingersoll, 1977a). Stock lend-
ing fees are similar to dividends and can therefore give rise to early exercise as is commonly
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understood.1 The fact that the financial friction of lending fees can lead to early exercise raises
several broader questions: Which financial frictions lead to early exercise? When should we ex-
pect to observe friction-driven early exercise? Do customers of brokers, market makers, and other
investors actually exercise early? Are actual lending fees and other financial frictions large enough
to drive significant early exercise decisions? If so, to what extent are actual early exercise decisions
driven by actual financial frictions?
We seek to address these questions theoretically and empirically. First, we show that early
exercise can be optimal when agents face short-sale costs, transaction costs, or funding costs,
and we characterize both a lower and upper bound for the optimal exercise policy under such
financial frictions. Second, we show empirically that investors indeed exercise equity options
early and convert convertibles when facing these frictions, using unique data on actual exercise
and conversion decisions.
To understand our result, first recall the famous arbitrage argument of Merton (1973): Rather
than exercising a call option and receive the stock price S less the strike price X, an investor is
better off shorting the stock, putting the discounted value of X in the money market, and possibly
exercising the option at expiration — or selling the option to another agent who can do so. How-
ever, this arbitrage argument can break down when shorting is costly or agents face transaction
costs or funding costs.
We introduce these financial frictions in a model. We first show that Merton’s no-exercise rule
holds even with “mild” frictions, meaning either (i) when short-sale costs and funding costs are
small (even if transaction costs are large), or (ii) when transaction costs are small and the option
price is above the intrinsic value (which can be driven by other agents facing low shorting and
funding costs). However, we show that early exercise is in fact optimal when frictions are more
severe such that the option price net of transaction costs is below the intrinsic value and the option
owner faces sufficiently high shorting and/or funding costs.
Finally, we show how the effects of financial frictions can be quantified in a continuous-time
model in which the parameters can be directly calibrated to match the data. Indeed, exercise is
1Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) mention that lending fees can in principle lead to early exercise and, more broadly,
the point may be common knowledge among option traders and researchers even if we did not find other references.
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justified when the stock price is above a lower exercise boundary, which we derive. The exercise
boundary is decreasing in short-sale costs, margin requirements, and funding costs. In other words,
exercise happens earlier (i.e., for lower stock prices) with larger short-sale costs, larger margin
requirements, and larger funding costs.
To intuitively understand our model and to illustrate its clear quantitative implications, consider
the example of options written on the iShares Silver Trust stock (the largest early exercise day in
our sample of options on non-dividend-paying stocks). Fig. 1.1 shows the stock price of iShares
Trust and the lower exercise boundary that we derive based on the short-sale cost (or “stock lending
fee”) and funding costs that we observe in our data. While exercise is never optimal before expi-
ration when there are no frictions, we see that the exercise boundary is finite due to the observed
financial frictions. Furthermore, we see that investors actually exercise shortly after the stock price
crosses our model-implied lower exercise boundary.
This illustrative example provides evidence consistent with our model, but does it reflect a
broader empirical phenomenon? To address this question, we collect and combine several large
data sets. For equity options, we merge databases on option prices and transaction costs (Op-
tionMetrics), stock prices and corporate events (Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)),
short-sale costs (Data Explorers), proxies for funding costs, and actual option exercises (from the
Options Clearing Corporation). Focusing only on options on non-dividend-paying stocks, we find
that 1.8 billion option contracts are exercised early (i.e., before Merton’s rule) in the time period
from 2003 to 2010, representing a total exercise value of $36.3 billion. Of course, the amount
of exercises before Merton’s rule would be larger if we included dividend-paying stocks, but for
clarity we restrict attention to the most obvious violations.
Consistent with our theory’s qualitative implications, we find that early exercise is more likely
when (i) the short-sale costs for the underlying stock are higher, (ii) the option’s transaction costs
are higher, (iii) the option is more in-the-money, and (iv) the option has shorter time to expiration.
These results are highly statistically significant due to the large amounts of data. Moreover, our
data allow us to identify exercises for each of three types of agents: customers, market makers,
and proprietary traders. We find that each type of agent exercises options early, including the
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Figure 1.1. Early exercise of call options before expiration: iShares Trust. The upper panel shows the daily closing
price of iShares Trust stock (Silver) and the model-implied lower exercise boundary based on the following
parameters: The risk-free rate is the Fed funds rate, the volatility is estimated as the 60-day historical volatility, the
short-sale fee is from Data Explorers, the funding cost is the LIBOR-OIS spread, and the assumed margin
requirements are 100% for the option and 50% for the stock. The lower panel shows the open interest and early
exercise of the option. Shortly after the stock price is above the exercise boundary, 84% of the open interest is
exercised in one day. Early exercises are also observed the following days. The closing bid-price of the option is
below closing bid-price of the stock minus strike price in periods with gray background.
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professional market makers and proprietary traders, and that each type is more likely to do so
when frictions are severe, consistent with our theory of rational exercise.
We also test the quantitative implications of the model more directly. For each option that
is exercised early, we estimate the lower exercise boundary by solving our model-implied partial
differential equation (PDE) based on the observed frictions. We find that 66–84% of all early
exercise decisions in our data happen when the stock price is above the model-implied exercise
boundary, depending on how input variables are estimated (and even higher if we exclude corporate
events). The behavior of market makers is most consistent with our model (their exercise decisions
coincide with the model-implied prediction in 86–98% of the cases), while customers of brokers
make the most exercise decisions that we cannot explain and proprietary traders are in between,
consistent with the idea that market makers are the most sophisticated agents facing the lowest
frictions while customers of brokers face the highest frictions.
Furthermore, using logit and probit regressions, we find that real-world investors are more
likely to exercise early when the stock price is above the model-implied exercise boundary. This
consistent evidence is both statistically and economically significant: The estimated probability
that an option contract is exercised early, cumulated over a 20-trading-day period in which the
stock price is above the boundary, is 20.7% (21.8%) based on logit (probit) regressions. The corre-
sponding probability when the stock price is below the boundary is 0.4% (0.4%), a large difference
across these two model-implied cases. The numbers also indicate that far from all options are ex-
ercised immediately when the stock price goes above our model-implied lower boundary (which
is not surprising given that it is a lower bound).
We also entertain alternative potential reasons for early exercise and examine the issue of
causality. Indeed, we find some early exercises that are not explained by our estimated model,
and, some of the largest of those are related to corporate events. Therefore, we repeat our analysis
in the subsample where corporate events are excluded and find similar results. To test for causality,
we consider the natural experiment of the short-sale ban of certain stocks in 2008 and conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis that supports the idea that short-sale frictions lead to early exer-
cise. Indeed, early exercise rose for options on affected stocks during the ban period relative to
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unaffected options.
For convertible bonds, we combine data on equities and short-sale costs with the Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD) on convertible bond features and actual conversions. We find
25.4 million early conversions, representing an equity value of $7.7 billion at conversion. The
early conversion rates for convertible bonds is increasing in the short-sale cost of the stock and in
the moneyness of the convertible bond, again consistent with our theory, but we note that this data
set is smaller and subject to potential errors and inaccuracies.
Our paper complements the large literature following Black and Scholes (1973) and Mer-
ton (1973). Option prices have been found to be puzzlingly expensive (Longstaff, 1995; Bates,
2000, 2003; Jackwerth, 2000; Ni, 2009; Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis, 2009) and sev-
eral papers explain this based on frictions: Option prices are driven by demand pressure (Bollen
and Whaley, 2004; Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman, 2009), are affected by transaction costs
(Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser, 2001; Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs, and Karoui, 2011), short-sale
costs (Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw, 2004; Avellaneda and Lipkin, 2009), funding constraints
(Bergman, 1995; Santa-Clara and Saretto, 2009; Leippold and Su, 2015), embedded leverage
(Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012), and interest-rate spreads and other portfolio constraints (Karatzas
and Kou, 1998; Piterbarg, 2010). We complement the literature on how frictions affect option
prices by showing that frictions also affect option exercises.
Turning to the literature on option exercise, several papers document irrational early exercise
decisions (Gay, Kolb, and Yung, 1989; Diz and Finucane, 1993; Overdahl and Martin, 1994; Fin-
ucane, 1997; Poteshman and Serbin, 2003),2 irrational failures of exercise of call options (Pool,
Stoll, and Whaley, 2008) and put options (Barraclough and Whaley, 2012), and irrational deliv-
ery decisions (Gay and Manaster, 1986). We complement these findings by linking early exercise
decisions to financial frictions, both theoretically and empirically, and by drawing a parallel to
convertible bonds. Early exercise therefore exists both for rational and irrational reasons. While
Poteshman and Serbin (2003) find that customers sometimes irrationally exercise early, we find
2Gay et al. (1989) study futures options, for which early exercise can be optimal even without frictions. They also
discuss transaction costs and after-hours exercise (where transaction costs in the underlying can be viewed as infinite),
but, as we show in Proposition 1, transaction costs are not sufficient to justify early exercise for equity call options.
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that market makers and firm proprietary traders also frequently exercise early and that most early
exercises appear to be linked to financial frictions. Battalio, Figlewski, and Neal (2015) also find
that option bid prices can be below intrinsic value, which is a necessary condition for optimal early
exercise, and our model helps explain why the option price can be this low.
Regarding convertible bonds, the literature has linked their prices to financial frictions (Mitchell,
Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007; Agarwal, Fung, Naik, and Loon, 2011) and examined whether the
companies call these bonds too late (often convertible bonds are also callable, see the literature
following Ingersoll (1977b)), while we study early conversions by the owners of the convertible
bonds due to financial frictions.
In summary, we characterize how frictions can lead to optimal early exercise of call options
and conversion of convertibles, and we provide extensive empirical evidence consistent with our
predictions. These findings overturn one of the fundamental laws of finance, providing another
example that the basic workings of financial markets are affected by financial frictions with broader
implications for economics.
1.2 Theory
We are interested in studying when it is optimal to exercise an American call option early, that
is, during times other than expiration and days before ex-dividend days of the underlying stock.
Such rational early exercises must be driven by frictions since they violate Merton’s rule. We first
consider a simple model to illustrate how early exercise can be optimal for an investor who is
long an option (Section 1.2.1) and next present a continuous-time model with testable quantitative
predictions for early exercise (Section 1.2.2).
1.2.1 When is early exercise optimal?
Consider an economy with three securities that all are traded at times 0 and 1: a risk-free security
with interest rate r f > 0, a non-dividend-paying stock, and an American call option with strike
price X > 0 that expires at time t = 1. The stock price at time t is denoted S t and the option price
31
Ct. The stock price S 1 at time 1 can take values in [0,∞) and is naturally unknown at time 0 . The
final payoff of the option is C1 = max(S 1 − X, 0).
All agents are rational, wealth-maximizing price takers, subject to financial frictions. Agent i
faces a proportional stock transaction cost of λi,S ∈ [0, 1] per dollar stock sold. Furthermore, agent
i faces a proportional transaction cost of λi,C ∈ [0, 1] per dollar option sold. If agent i sells the stock
short at time t = 0, agent i incurs a proportional securities-lending fee of S 0Li at time 1, Li ≥ 0. If i
is long the stock, agent i can lend out the stock and receive a proportional securities-lending fee of
S 0li at time 1, where li ∈ [0, Li]. Agent i also faces a funding cost of F i(x, y) at time 0 if the agent
chooses to hold a value of x ∈ R of the stock and y ∈ R of the option. This funding cost could be
due to an opportunity cost associated with binding capital requirement. Naturally, the funding cost
is zero if the agent takes a zero position, F i(0, 0) = 0, and increasing in the absolute sizes of x and
y.3
We are interested in whether early exercise can be optimal. We therefore analyze whether a
strategy is “dominated.” Inspired by Merton (1973), we say that a strategy is dominated if there
exists another strategy that generates at least as high cash flows in each time period and in every
state of nature, and a strictly higher cash flow in some possible state. Further, early exercise is
defined as being dominated if any possible strategy that includes early exercise is dominated. We
assume that there exists no pure arbitrage net of transaction costs because such a strategy would
trivially dominate all other strategies (or, said differently, all strategies are either non-dominated or
dominated by a non-dominated strategy).
We first show that, under certain “mild” frictions, early exercise is always dominated. This
result extends Merton’s classic no-early-exercise rule and shows that the rule is robust to certain
frictions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (No Exercise with “Mild” Frictions).
Early exercise is dominated for an agent i that has:
i. zero short-sale and funding costs, i.e., Li = F i = 0 (regardless of all transaction costs); or
3Stated mathematically, the funding cost function has the property that for x2 ≥ x1 ≥ 0 then F i(x2, y) ≥ F i(x1, y) ≥
0 for all i and y ∈ R. Similarly, if x2 ≤ x1 ≤ 0 then F i(x2, y) ≥ F i(x1, y) ≥ 0 for all i and y ∈ R, and similarly for the
dependence on y.
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ii. a sale revenue of the option above the intrinsic value, C0(1 − λi,C) > S 0 − X. A sufficient
condition for this high sale revenue is that agent i has zero option transaction costs, λi,C = 0,
and the existence of another type of agents j with zero short-sale costs, funding costs, and
stock transaction costs, L j = F j = λ j,S = 0.
The first part of this proposition states that transaction costs alone cannot justify rational early
exercise. The reasoning behind this is as follows: When the option is exercised it is either to get
the underlying stock or to get cash. In the case in which the option holder wants cash, exercising
early and immediately selling the stock is dominated by hedging the option position through short-
selling of the underlying stock and investing in the risk-free security. The transaction cost from
selling the stock after early exercise and from selling the stock short are the same so positive
transaction costs of the stock cannot in themselves make early exercise optimal.
In the case in which the option holder wants stock, early exercise is dominated by holding on
to the option, exercising later, and investing the strike price discounted back one period, X1+r f , in
the risk-free asset. Thereby the investor will still get the stock, but on top of that earn interest from
the risk-free asset. This strategy does not involve any direct trading with the stock and, hence, is
not affected by stock transaction costs. (Note that these two alternative strategies do not involve
option transactions and hence dominate early exercise even with high option transaction costs.)
The second part of the proposition states that early exercise is also dominated if the option
owner’s net proceeds from selling the option exceeds intrinsic value. In this case, the owner is
better off by selling the option than by exercising early. If there is a type of agents, j, who faces no
short-sale costs, no funding costs, and no stock transaction costs then these agents value the option
at strictly more than its intrinsic value (as explained above). Therefore, the option holder i prefers
selling to j over exercising early if no option transaction costs apply.
While it is important to recognize that frictions need not break Merton’s rule, we next show that
Merton’s rule indeed breaks down when frictions are severe enough. Specifically, a combination
of short-sale costs and transaction costs can make early exercise optimal.
Proposition 2 (Rational Early Exercise with “Severe” Frictions).
Consider an agent i who is long a call option which is in-the-money taking stock transaction costs
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into account, S 0(1 − λi,S ) > X. Early exercise is not dominated for i if the revenue of selling the
option is low, C0(1 − λi,C) ≤ S 0(1 − λi,S ) − X and one of the following holds:
a. the short-sale costs, Li, is large enough or
b. the funding costs, F i, is large enough.
The condition C0(1 − λi,C) ≤ S 0(1 − λi,S ) − X is satisfied if the option transaction cost λi,C is large
enough and/or the option price is low enough.
To understand the intuition behind how early exercise can be optimal, consider an option owner
who wants cash now (with no risk of negative cash flows at time 1). Such an agent can either (i) sell
the option, (ii) hedge it, or (iii) exercise early. Option (i) is not attractive (relative to early exercise)
if the sale revenue after transaction costs is low. Further, option (ii) is also not attractive if the
funding costs or short-sale costs (or those in combination) make hedging very costly. Therefore,
option (iii), early exercise, can be optimal.
Note that a low option price can itself be a result of frictions. For instance, the option price
is expected to be low if all agents face high short-sale costs and can earn lending fees from being
long stocks as we explore further in the next section.
1.2.2 Quantifying early exercise: Exercise boundaries and comparative stat-
ics
We next consider a model that is realistic and tractable enough that we can use its quantitative
implications in our empirical analysis. We solve for a lower bound of the optimal exercise bound-
ary in a continuous-time model in which all parameters have clear empirical counterparts. The
exercise boundary is the critical value of the stock price above which exercise is optimal — so we
can examine empirically whether people actually exercise when the stock price is above the lower
boundary.
The model solution also allows us to derive interesting comparative statics, showing how the
exercise decision depends on short-sale costs, funding costs, and margin requirements. To accom-
plish these quantitative results, we must assume that the stock has no transaction costs. Clearly,
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stocks have much lower transaction costs than options in the real world and we primarily included
stock transaction costs in the previous sections to show that they are not the main driver of early
exercise (Proposition 1).
The optimal exercise decision is closely connected to the rational valuation of American op-
tions in the context of financial frictions. Hence, we seek to joint solve for the value of the option
and the optimal exercise decision. We start in the classic Black-Scholes-Merton framework, in
which agents can invest in a risk-free money-market rate of r f > 0 and a stock with price process
S given by:
dS (t) = S (t)µdt + S (t)σdW(t) (1.1)
where µ is the drift, σ is the volatility, and W is a Brownian motion. The stock can be traded
without cost, but we consider the following financial frictions.
First, agents face short-sale costs, modeled based on standard market practices: To sell the
stock short, an agent must borrow the share and leave the short-sale proceeds as collateral. Agent
i’s short-sale account must have an amount of cash equal to S (t), which earns the interest rate
r f − Li (called the “rebate rate”). The fact that the rebate rate is below the money-market rate
reflects an (implicit) continuous short-sale cost of Li (called the “rebate rate specialness”). The
securities lender — the owner of the share — holds the cash and must pay a continuous interest
of r f − li. Since he can invest the cash in the money market, this corresponds to a continuous
securities-lending income of li ∈ [0, Li]. We allow that the securities-lending fees depend on the
agent i, and that lender earns less than the short-seller pays (li < Li) since the difference is lost to
intermediaries (custodians and brokers) and search costs and delays.4
The second friction that we consider is funding costs. In particular, there exists a wedge ψi ≥ 0
between the agent’s cost of capital and the risk-free rate. The agent’s margin account earns the
risk-free money-market rate, r f > 0, while the cost of capital is r f + ψi in the sense that using
his own equity for a risk-free investment is associated with an opportunity cost of r f + ψi. Such a
4The institutional details of short-selling and the over-the-counter securities-lending market are described in
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2002) who also discuss why not all investors can immediately lend their shares in
equilibrium.
35
capital cost can arise from costly equity financing and from a binding capital constraint.5 The cash
in the agent’s margin account must be at least Ki(x, y), depending on the number of stocks x ∈ R
and options y ∈ R+.
Based on these assumptions about the stock dynamics and agent frictions, we seek to determine
an option owner’s optimal exercise policy. Consider an owner i of an American call option with
expiration T and strike price X and his option valuation Ci. The option value is assumed to be
a C1,2 function of time t and the stock price S so we apply Itoˆ’s lemma to write the option price
dynamics as:
dCi(t) =
(
Cit +
1
2
σ2S 2CiS S
)
dt + CiS dS (t) (1.2)
where subscripts denote derivatives (e.g., CS S is the second order derivative of the option value
with respect to the stock price S ), and we assume the natural condition that CiS ≥ 0 for all i.
To derive bounds on the optimal exercise policy for any agent, we consider the strategies of two
hypothetical “extreme” agents, i and i¯ψ. First, hypothetical agent i has the most strict frictions,
leading to the lowest exercise boundary, B, and the lowest option valuation, C. To accomplish this
lower bound, agent i is always short the stock, has the highest funding cost (ψi := maxi ψi), the
highest short-sale cost (Li := maxi Li), and must have cash in his margin account equal to
Ki(x, y) = mi,S S |x| + (mi,C − 1)Cy (1.3)
where mi,S ,mi,C ∈ [0, 1] are margin requirements (and we recall that this margin account is in
addition to the proceeds in the short-sale account). Given that the agent also owns options worth
Cy, this expression corresponds to a margin equity of mi,S S |x| + mi,CCy. Hence, mi,S is the margin
requirement for the stock and mi,C is the margin requirement for the option. The required amount
on the margin account approximates the real-world margin requirements in a way that is tractable
enough for our analytical results. The real-world margin requirements differ across exchanges and
market participants and are very complex, see, e.g., Chicago Board Options Exchange (2000). All
5See Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011) for an equilibrium model with binding margin requirements in which such
implicit capital costs arise endogenously as ψi is the Lagrange multiplier of the margin requirement.
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other agents i have looser margin requirements in the sense that
Ki(x2, y) − Ki(x1, y) ≤ mi,S (x1 − x2)S for x2 ≤ x1 and ∀y ∈ R+
Ki(x, y2) − Ki(x, y1) ≤ (mi,C − 1)(y2 − y1)C for y2 ≥ y1 ≥ 0 and ∀x ∈ R .
(1.4)
The first condition says that a decrease in the number of stocks held increases the required margin
cash at least as much for agent i as for i. Likewise, the second condition says that an increase in
the number of options increases the required margin cash at least as much for agent i as for i.
To focus on the exercise strategy, we assume that agents cannot sell the option at or above C.
This assumption can be viewed as a large option transaction cost or as a result of low equilibrium
option prices arising from other agents facing the same frictions.
Consider the portfolio dynamics of buying one (additional) option at price C, hedging by selling
(additional) CS shares of the stock, and fully financing the strategy based on margin loans and the
use of equity capital. The value of this fully financed strategy evolves as according to:
(
Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S
)
dt + CS dS (t) − (1 − mi,C)Cr f dt − mi,CC(r f + ψi)dt
−CS dS (t) + CS S
(
mi,S r f − mi,S (r f + ψi) + (r f − Li)
)
dt . (1.5)
Let us carefully explain each of the terms in this central expression. The first two terms simply
represent the dynamics of the option (as seen in Eq. (1.2)). The next two terms represent the fund-
ing of the option. Specifically, (1−mi,C)C can be borrowed against the option at the money-market
funding cost r f . The remaining option value, the margin requirement mi,CC, must be financed as
equity at a rate of r f + ψi. The remaining terms stem from the stock position and its financing.
The first of these terms is the dynamics of the stock position, given the number CS of shares sold.
The last three terms capture the various financing costs. The stock sold short to hedge the option
increases the required amount in the margin account by CS S m
i,S which earns the interest r f . This
amount must be financed as equity at the rate r f +ψi. Agent i must deposit the cash from the stock
sold short, CS S , on a short-sales account earning interest r
f − Li.
We are ready to state the free boundary problem for the option value and the exercise boundary
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B(T − t), which depends on the time to expiration T − t. First, the stock position is chosen to
offset the risk of the option, so the stochastic terms involving dW(t) cancel out in (1.5). Second, as
the portfolio is fully financed and the change in value is deterministic, the drift must also be zero,
which yields the following PDE:
Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − (r f + mi,Cψi)C + CS S (r f − mi,Sψi − Li) = 0 , (1.6)
for all stock prices S < B(T − t). Whenever S (t) ≥ B(T − t), the option is exercised and the
following boundary conditions ensure that the problem is well-posed (Merton, 1973):
C(T, S ) = max(S − X, 0)
C(t, 0) = 0 t < T
C(t, S ) = S − X S ≥ B(T − t), t < T
CS (t, B(T − t)) = 1 t < T .
(1.7)
The first condition is the standard boundary condition for the value of the option at the expiration
date T . The second condition expresses that, if the stock is worthless, so is the option. The
third condition imposes that the value of the option is equal to its intrinsic value at and above the
exercise boundary. The fourth condition is the high-contact boundary condition (smooth-pasting
condition), stating that the delta of the option goes to one as the stock price goes to the exercise
boundary (both from above and below), which ensures that the exercise boundary maximizes the
option value (Kim, 1990). We note that the exercise boundary can take the value∞ if early exercise
is not optimal for any stock price at time t.
Likewise, to derive an upper exercise bound B¯ψ, we define a hypothetical agent i¯ψ in a slightly
more complex way: This agent is long the stock, has the lowest lending fee, and has extreme margin
requirement among agents with a given level of funding cost ψ as specified in the Appendix. We
derive the PDE for this agent’s valuation C¯ψ and exercise strategy:
C¯ψt +
1
2
σ2S 2C¯ψS S − (r f + mi¯
ψ,Cψ)C¯ψ + C¯ψS S (r
f + mi¯
ψ,Sψ − li¯ψ) = 0 , S < B¯(T − t) (1.8)
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subject to the same boundary conditions as (1.7) for B¯ and C¯. We see that the free boundary
problems are mathematically equivalent to that arising from the pricing of an American call option
in a Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model with a modified interest rate and a continuous dividend
yield. Specifically, in (1.6), the role of the interest rate is played by r f + mi,Cψi and the role of the
dividend yield is played by Li + ψi(mi,C + mi,S ) and similarly for (1.8).
To understand the intuition for this equivalence, note first that the implied interest rate corre-
sponds to a “weighted average cost of capital” for arbitrage trades, WACC = r f + mi,Cψi, since a
fraction 1 − mi,C of the capital can be borrowed at the rate r f while the remaining part mi,C of the
capital must be financed with equity with opportunity cost r f + ψi. In other words, the opportunity
cost of buying an option is WACC × C, corresponding to the opportunity cost of the risk-free rate
times the option price in the standard BSM model. The implied “dividend yield” is the opportunity
cost of exercising the option later rather than now. In the standard BSM model, this opportunity
cost is the dividend income you gain by exercising. In our framework, the opportunity cost is the
saved short-sale cost Li plus the extra earning ψi on the total amount of capital that is freed up by
exercising, mi,C + mi,S .
The equivalence with the BSM model with dividends means that our model can be solved by
traditional numerical methods for American options as we do in our empirical analysis. The solu-
tion includes the option values and optimal exercise boundaries. The following proposition partly
relies on results from Merton (1973), Kim (1990), and Dewynne, Howison, Rupf, and Wilmott
(1993).
Proposition 3 (Lower and Upper Exercise Boundaries).
(i) Any option owner i has a value of the option in [C, C¯ψ
i
]; exercise is dominated if S (t) < B(T − t)
and failing to exercise is dominated when S (t) > B¯ψ
i
(T − t).
(ii) If Li + ψi(mi,C + mi,S ) > 0, then the lower exercise boundary, B, is finite for all t ≤ T (i.e., early
exercise for agent i); otherwise, B is infinite for t < T.
(iii) Similarly, if li¯
ψ
+ ψ(mi¯
ψ,C − mi¯ψ,S ) > 0, then the upper exercise boundary B¯ψ(T − t) is finite for
all t ≤ T (i.e., early exercise for agent i¯ψ); otherwise, B¯ψ is infinite for t < T.
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Proposition 3 provides general results that apply to any agent about when early exercise is
dominated and when it is dominated not to exercise early. In the empirical section, we derive the
exercise bounds by numerically solving the PDEs, and we focus on the lower bound, B, for several
reasons: First, and most importantly, we are interested in whether the observed exercise decisions
can be rationally justified and this is the case when the stock price is above the lower boundary.
Second, the lower boundary applies to all agents, independent of ψ. Third, the lower boundary
depends on the lending fee L which we observe (while we don’t have data on the part l that accrues
to the owner).
It can be generally shown that the lower exercise boundary B is weakly decreasing in the
short-sale cost, funding costs, option margin requirements, and stock margin requirements.6 These
properties of the optimal exercise strategy are seen in the numerical example illustrated in Fig. 1.2.
In particular, we compute the exercise boundary for variations over the following realistic base-
case parameters for an agent who is long a call option and shorts the stock: the risk-free rate is
r f = 2%, the volatility is σ = 40%, the funding cost is ψi = 1%, the short-sale cost is Li = 1%,
the margin requirement for the stock is mi,S = 50%, and margin requirement for the option is
mi,C = 100%. For each set of parameters, we solve the PDE (1.6) and (1.7) using the Crank-
Nicolson finite-difference method and derive the corresponding optimal exercise boundary.
In each of the four panels, the time to expiration T − t is on the x-axis and the scaled exercise
boundary is on the y-axis. Specifically, we scale the exercise boundary B(T − t) by the strike
price X, which yields an intuitive number. For example, a value of B(T − t)/X = 1.6 means that
early exercise is optimal when the stock price is at least 60% in the money. Said differently, early
exercise happens when S (t) ≥ B(T − t) or, equivalently, when S (t)/X ≥ B(T − t)/X, and the latter
scaled measure is more intuitive. Clearly, a lower exercise boundary corresponds to an earlier
optimal exercise decision (i.e., for lower moneyness of the stock price).
The top left panel illustrates how higher short-sale costs correspond to a lower boundary, im-
plying earlier optimal exercise. This result is natural as short-sale costs make it costly to hedge the
option. The top right panel shows that higher funding costs also make it optimal to exercise earlier,
6Similarly, the upper boundary B¯ψ is weakly decreasing in lending fee and option margin requirement and increas-
ing in stock margin requirement. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1.2. The lower exercise boundary with frictions: Comparative statics. This figure shows theoretical
lower exercise boundaries for equity options with frictions for an agent who is short stock. The boundary is
a solution to the PDE (1.6)–(1.7) for a stock that pays no dividend. Each graph varies the parameters
around a base-case cost where the risk-free rate is r f = 2%, the lending fee is Li = 1%, the funding cost is
ψi = 1%, the volatility is σ = 40%, and margin requirements are mi,S = 50% for the stock and
mi,C = 100% for the option. Early exercise is seen to be increasing in lending fees, funding costs, option
margin requirements, and decreasing in volatility and time to expiration.
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namely, to free up capital. The bottom left panel shows that a higher option margin requirement
encourages an earlier exercise. Finally, the bottom right panel shows that early exercise is delayed
with higher volatility. To see why, recall that a higher volatility increases the value of optionality,
therefore making it less attractive to exercise early.
In all the graphs we see that the optimal exercise boundary decreases in the time to expiration.
In fact, it is a general result that the exercise boundary must be weakly decreasing in time to
expiration. To understand this result, note that, if it is optimal to exercise a longer-dated option,
then it must also be optimal to exercise a shorter-dated one (since you give up less optionality).
Finally, the figures provide quantitative insights into when we should expect early exercise due
to frictions. In the base-case, early exercise is optimal when the stock is 67% in-the-money three
months before expiration and 27% in-the-money ten days before expiration—hence, even if the
option is bought at-the-money six months before expiration, the stock price has a realistic chance
of crossing the boundary.
We next turn to the empirical analysis, where we also implement our model for each option in
a large data set and analyze whether the real-world exercise decisions occur when the stock price
is above the exercise boundary that we calculate.
1.3 Data and preliminary analysis
This section describes our data sources, provides summary statistics, and outlines our empirical
methodology. We start with the data and then turn to the summary statistics, which already show
large amounts of early exercises and early conversions both in terms of number of contracts and in
terms of dollar value.
1.3.1 Data
Our study combines a number of very large data sets as described in Table 1.1. For equity options,
we combine the OptionMetrics database on U.S. option prices and option bid-ask spreads with the
CRSP tape of U.S. equity prices and corporate events. We use data on the cost of short-selling
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stocks from Data Explorers, focusing on their Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), which is an
integer from 1 to 10 with 1 indicating a low cost of shorting and 10 indicating a high one.
We analyze actual exercise behavior using data originally from the Options Clearing Corpora-
tion (OCC).7 These data contain the number of contract exercises for each option series each day.
The daily exercises can be separated into three groups of market participants, namely, exercises
done by customers of brokers (e.g., retail customers and hedge funds), market makers, and firm
proprietary traders. The option exercise data run from July 2001 to and including August 2010.
The data are missing in the months of November 2001, January and July 2002, and January 2006.
We use the Mergent FISD on convertible bonds. This database provides time and amount of
conversions together with total outstanding amount for convertible bonds. Finally, we use data on
equity issues and mergers and acquisitions from Thomson One. This data set includes issue dates
and settlement dates for equity issues and announcement dates, effective dates, and withdrawals
dates for both acquiror and target in mergers and acquisitions.
1.3.2 Sample selection
To identify option exercises that clearly violate Merton’s rule, we focus on early exercise of options
on stocks that do not pay dividends. In particular, we exclude any option series if OptionMetrics
reports a nonzero forecast of future dividends during any day of the life time of the option. Further,
we exclude observations of option series on the day of expiry to focus on early exercise. Lastly,
we exclude options that do not follow the standard practice of having an expiration date on the day
after the third Friday in a given month (this excludes only a tiny fraction).
The data from OptionMetrics are merged with the exercise data from OCC on date, ticker,
option ticker, strike price, and expiry date. For each option series, we further merge the data with
that of the corresponding stock from CRSP and Data Explorers based on CUSIP.
We further clean the data in a number of ways. We exclude any option series (i) where the
underlying according to CRSP has ex-date for a distribution event (split, dividend payment, ex-
changes, reorganizations, etc.) within the observed life time of the option series; (ii) where the
7We are very grateful to Robert Whaley for providing these data.
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Table 1.1
Data sources.
This table shows the data sources used in our study, the variables that we use, the start and end date of each data
source, the number of securities, and the number of observations (which is the number of rows in the data).
Data set Data Start 
date
End 
date
Number of 
call options/ 
convertible 
bond series
Number of 
underlying 
securities
Number of 
observations
CRSP
1 Dividends, prices, corporate 
events
30-08-1985 31-12-2011 23,597 18,314,652
OCC Exercises
2 Exercises of equity options 01-07-2001 31-08-2010 821,052 5,727 7,852,739
OptionMetrics Option prices, open 
interests, volatilities, 
expected future dividends
01-01-1996 31-01-2012 3,949,199 7,509 355,259,334
Data Explorers3 Short-sale costs 19-06-2002 03-12-2012 41,188 55,139,348
Mergent FISD
4 Convertible bond features 
and conversions
30-08-1985 31-12-2011 4,501 1,721 14,144
Bloomberg LIBOR-OIS spreads 02-01-1990 22-01-2013 8,620
Thomson One5 Equity Issues, mergers and 
acquisitions
12-01-1963 17-09-2015 402,101 439,456
1
 CRSP data start in 1926, but we only use it when we have option and convertible bond data.
2
 Data for the months November 2001, January and July 2002, and January 2006 are missing.
3
 We focus on the Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), which is first observed from October 22, 2003.
4 Mergent FISD has earlier bond observations, but this is the first date a convertible bond can be observed.
5
 The number of underlyings and observations for Thomson One are based on the subsample from 2003-01-01 to 2010-12-31.
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underlying at some point according to OptionMetrics was expected to have an ex-dividend date
within the observed life time of the option series; (iii) which has records with different strike
prices for the same series, different underlying identifiers (Security ID or CUSIP), or different ex-
piry dates (indicating data errors or changes in the contract); (iv) which has no data available on
the last trading day before expiry (indicating some possible outside event); (v) which has several
records for the same day in OptionMetrics; (vi) for which another option series with same underly-
ing stock ticker, option ticker (root of option symbol for old option symbol and first part of symbol
for new Options Symbology Initiative (OSI) symbol), strike price, and expiry date observed on the
same day exists in the data; (vii) which has settlement special, e.g., AM-settlement; or (viii) which
for some day during its observed life time has no matching observation in the CRSP data for the
underlying stock.
We note that the OCC data only have records of exercises, meaning that option series that
never experienced an exercise (before or at expiry) are not part of that sample. Hence, by requiring
a match between OptionMetrics and the OCC data, our sample only includes options that were
exercised at some point. An alternative approach is to include our entire OptionMetrics sample
and assume that option series missing in the OCC data were never exercised. Since we do not
know whether the OCC data are complete, neither approach is perfect. To resolve this, we focus
on whether the observed early option exercises can be explained by financial frictions, not whether
people fail to exercise when they should.8
Convertible bond data are acquired through Mergent FISD. Our sample only includes convert-
ible bonds that at some point in time were converted (including at a dividend, at maturity, or as a
response to a call). If Mergent FISD has not been able to identify the exact day of a conversion
they set the date to the end of the quarter or even fiscal year (the latter seems to be the case only
rarely). This makes it difficult to identify whether the conversion happened on the day before ex-
dividend or not in these cases. To avoid problems related to these issues, we only include bonds
where the underlying did not have any distribution events (including dividend payments) during
the sample period, using data of distribution events from CRSP. We also exclude bonds where the
underlying is first observed in CRSP more than one day later than the offering date of the bond.
8Failure to exercise has been studied by Pool et al. (2008).
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Furthermore, we exclude bonds that at some point had an exchange offer or a tender offer, or where
the underlying is not either a common stock or an American depository stock. If Mergent FISD
data have no maturity date or conversion price of the bond, then it is also excluded. The original
conversion prices of the bonds are recorded in FISD and through the cumulative adjustment factors
provided by CRSP they can be updated to reflect any changes, e.g., due to stock splits.9 We only
include observations from days on which bond holders had the right to convert early. If CRSP data
for the underlying are missing starting at some point in time, we exclude the observations from
five days before this happened and onwards, to avoid inclusion of conversions related to some kind
of exogenous corporate event. If the day of the initial observation of the bond in Mergent FISD
is after the offering day of the bond, we exclude observations before this initial observation. If
the bond has been partly or fully called at some point in time, then we exclude all observations
which are less than three months earlier or three months later to this event. This measure is taken
to avoid inclusion of conversions that are a response to a call from the issuer (and hence not early
conversion initiated by the bond holder), though it is not guaranteed that we catch all such events.
Likewise, if the record shows any reorganization or exchange of the bond, observations from three
months before this event and onwards are excluded.
1.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for our final sample. We see a substantial amount of early
exercises and conversions. Panel A reports the total number of early exercises of equity options,
that is, exercises that violate Merton’s rule. Our data contain 1,806 million early exercises, repre-
senting a total exercise value of $36.3 billion or a total intrinsic value of $22.8 billion. Naturally,
the exercises are concentrated among in-the-money options, especially deep-in-the-money options.
Our data do contain a small fraction of exercised out-of-the-money options, which could be due
to measurement error or investors exercising to save transaction costs when they want the actual
stock. Measurement error may occur for instance when options are exercised during the day and
we measure the moneyness based on the end-of-day price.
9If, e.g., a stock is split in two, a convertible bond with this stock as underlying will have its conversion price
halved at the same time.
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Table 1.2
Summary statistics.
This table summarizes the number of early exercises and early conversions in the sample used in our study. It
reports the number of contracts exercised and bonds converted. The total numbers are broken into categories of
Moneyness, Expiration, and Agent type performing the exercise. Options are defined as “out of the money” if the
closing stock price is below the strike price, “in the money” if the stock price is 0–25% above the strike price, and
“deep in the money” if the stock price is more than 25% higher than the strike price. For convertible bonds the
definition is parallel with conversion price used instead of strike price. Option exercise data are from 2001–2010 and
convertible bond data are from 1985–2011 as seen in Table 1.
Panel A: Early exercises of equity call options in sample
Exercises
(number of 
contracts, millions)
Exercises
 (value of strike,  USD 
millions)
Exercises
 (intrinsic value, USD 
millions)
All 1,806 36,250 22,811
By moneyness
Out of the money 2 38 -1
In the money 480 14,170 1,942
Deep in the money 1,324 22,042 20,870
By time to expiration
Less than 3 months 1,720 35,422 21,199
Between 3 and 9 months 72 690 1,006
More than 9 months 13 137 605
By agent type
Customer 808 16,007 6,338
Firm 81 1,955 998
Market maker 916 18,288 15,475
Panel B: Early conversions of convertible bonds in sample
Conversions
(number of bonds, 
millions)
Conversions
 (principal amount, 
USD millions)
Conversions
 (value of stock, USD 
millions)
All 25.4 5,655 7,732
By moneyness
Out of the money 3.8 2,063 1,255
In the money 15.4 1,001 1,127
Deep in the money 6.3 2,591 5,350
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Table 1.2 also shows that early exercises are concentrated among shorter-term options. This
finding is consistent with our theory, since short-term options have less optionality, but it could
also be driven by the simple fact that there is a larger open interest of such options. Our formal
empirical tests therefore consider the number of exercises as a fraction of the open interest.
The final part of Panel A in Table 1.2 shows that all types of agents exercise early for billions
of dollars. Customers of brokers exercise early with a total strike price of $16.0 billion, firm
proprietary traders for a total of about $2.0 billion, and market makers for a total of $18.3 billion.
Panel B in Table 1.2 reports the total number of early conversions of convertible bonds. In our
data, 25 million bonds are converted early, corresponding to about $5.7 billion worth of principal or
$7.7 billion of equity value. A few conversions of out-of-the-money bonds are seen, which relates
to the definition of moneyness applied. A convertible bond is considered out-of-the-money if the
price of the underlying stock is less than conversion price, in-the-money if stock price is up to 25%
above conversion price, and deep-in-the-money if stock price is more than 25% above conversion
price. Conversion price is defined by the principal amount of bond that must be converted to get
one share of stock. Our definition of moneyness is not perfect: Indeed, the market value of a non-
convertible bond can deviate some from the face value, so it might actually be attractive to convert
even when it is out-of-the-money according to the above definition. While this adds noise to our
analysis, we see no reason that it would drive our conclusions.
Fig. 1.3 shows the evolution of relative share of early option exercise over time for the three
different agent types observed. The picture is dominated by Customers (which includes retail
customers and hedge funds) and Market makers. Interestingly, the share of early exercise for the
professional Market makers has increased over time. We next discuss how we use these exercise
and conversion data to test our theoretical predictions.
1.3.4 Variables of interest and methodology
We are interested in the fraction of options that are exercised and how this relates to our theoretical
predictions. For each day t and each option series i in our sample, we define the options that are
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Figure 1.3. Share of early exercises by agent type over time. This figure shows how the monthly relative share of the
number of total early exercises are distributed among the three agent types: Customers (retail customers and hedge
funds), Firms (proprietary traders), and Market makers. We see early exercises for all three groups and an increasing
share from Market makers over time.
exercised EX as a fraction of the open interest OI on the close of the day before.
EXit =
#exercised optionsit
max{OIit−1, #exercised optionsit}
. (1.9)
We take the maximum in the denominator to ensure that EX is between zero and one, including the
rare instances when the number of exercises is greater than the open interest the day before (which
must be due to options that are bought and exercised on the same day or data errors). Similarly,
in our logit and probit regressions, we compare the number of exercises to the number of “trials”
given by max{OIit−1, #exercised optionsit}.
For each daily observation of an option series, we measure the option transaction costs as the
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relative bid-ask spread constructed in the following way:
TCOS T it =
ask prices(i) − bid prices(i)
(ask prices(i) + bid prices(i))/2
. (1.10)
Here, the superscript i denotes the option series and s(i) is the corresponding at-the-money option
series with the same underlying stock and expiration, defined as the series with the smallest abso-
lute difference between stock price and strike price (where s(i) can be equal to i itself). We use
the at-the-money option instead of the option itself to avoid endogeneity issues. The possibility of
exercising the option early will itself affect bid and ask prices, especially for deep-in-the-money
options. The bid price will in such cases often go below, but not much below, the intrinsic value.
As a result, the bid-ask is endogenous and can be affected by the ı`price floorıˆ close to the intrinsic
value. Our focus is to test how the general level of transaction costs of an option series affects early
exercise in the first place.
We measure the short-sale fee, L, as follows. For each stock and each date, we observe its Daily
Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), which is an integer score from from one to ten. For the rare cases
where different DCBSs are observed for the same stock on the same day, we use the average DCBS
rounded to the nearest integer. We map this DCBS to a short-sale fee level by using the median
among all observations with this DCBS that have data on both their DCBS and their fee level. In
the analysis based on short-sale fees, we only include stock-dates with non-missing DCBS.
The model-implied optimal exercise boundary B j(T−t) for any option j on day t is computed as
follows. We numerically solve the PDE problem (1.6)–(1.7) that takes frictions into account using
the observed characteristics on any date t using the Crank-Nicolson finite-difference method. The
stock volatility σ is set as the 60-day average historical volatility. We use the historical volatility
as an objective measure of risk and note that we cannot use the standard Black-Scholes-Merton
implied volatility for two reasons: (i) in many of the interesting cases when options are exercised
early, option prices don’t satisfy Merton’s lower bound and, therefore, the Black-Scholes-Merton
implied volatility cannot be computed; and, more broadly, (ii) the Black-Scholes-Merton implied
volatility does not take frictions into account, so it should be a biased estimate of volatility when
frictions are severe. For the risk-free rate r f , we use the Fed Funds rate, the margin requirement
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of the stock is set to 50%, the margin requirement of the option is set to 100%, the short-sale costs
are as defined above, and the funding cost ψ is set as the LIBOR-OIS interest-rate spread based on
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011), that is, the spread between the London Interbank Offered Rate and
the overnight indexed swap rate. We measure the stock price S as the closing price on the given
day.
Similarly to the exercise measure EX for equity options, we are interested in the daily con-
verted bonds as a fraction of the total outstanding amount. We define CONVt as amount converted
on day t divided by the sum of amount converted and outstanding amount after the conversion.
(Equivalently, the denominator is the amount outstanding before the conversion.)
CONV it =
Amount convertedit
Amount convertedit + Amount outstanding after conversion
i
t
. (1.11)
1.4 Empirical results: Never exercise a call option?
We turn to formally testing the link between early option exercises and financial frictions. We
first sort the exercises by short-sale costs and transaction costs to analyze the connection between
early exercises and financial frictions in a simple way. Next, we test the model more directly by
considering whether the stock price is above or below the model-implied lower exercise boundary
at the time of exercise. Finally, we use multivariate logit and probit regressions to analyze how the
propensity to exercise can be explained by the model and how it depends on the joint effects of a
number of option characteristics.
Table 1.3 and Fig. 1.4 show how the fraction of early option exercises EX (defined in (1.9)
above) varies with short-sale costs. We see that the fraction of early exercise decisions increases
monotonically in the short-sale cost, consistent with our model. Among options with minimal
short-sale costs, the fraction of options exercised early is only 0.17%, while among options with
the highest short-sale costs, the fraction exercised is above 4%. As seen in the table, the difference
in these two extreme groups is highly statistically significant.
Table 1.3 and Fig. 1.4 further consider the exercises broken down by moneyness. Naturally,
there are virtually no out-of-the-money options that are exercised (which would clearly be irra-
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Table 1.3
Early exercise of equity options by short-sale costs.
This table shows the average number of early option exercises as a fraction of open interest on the previous day
for options sorted on the short-sale cost of the underlying equity. The table further classifies options by their
moneyness, expiration, and agent type. Options are defined as “out of the money” if the closing stock price is below
the strike price, “in the money” if stock price is 0–25% above strike price, and “deep in the money” if stock price is
more than 25% higher than strike price. We note that the number of exercises for each agent type is reported as a
fraction of the total open interest since our data do not include open interest by agent type. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The data cover 2003–2010 as seen in Table 1.
1
Low 
cost of 
shorting
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High cost 
of 
shorting
10-1
All 0.17% 0.31% 0.44% 0.58% 0.85% 1.21% 1.74% 2.57% 3.05% 4.28% 4.12%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.07%) (0.07%)
By moneyness
Out of the money 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%)
In the money 0.10% 0.18% 0.24% 0.28% 0.31% 0.32% 0.38% 0.41% 0.50% 0.63% 0.53%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%)
Deep in the money 0.31% 0.55% 0.78% 1.06% 1.51% 2.23% 3.13% 4.52% 5.75% 8.44% 8.13%
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.08%) (0.09%) (0.14%) (0.14%)
By time to expiration
Less than 3 months 0.28% 0.51% 0.71% 0.99% 1.49% 2.10% 2.97% 4.51% 5.32% 7.58% 7.29%
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.08%) (0.09%) (0.14%) (0.14%)
Between 3 and 9 months 0.02% 0.05% 0.09% 0.10% 0.21% 0.29% 0.48% 0.61% 0.88% 1.15% 1.13%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.07%) (0.07%)
More than 9 months 0.01% 0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.14% 0.23% 0.53% 0.40% 0.29% 0.28%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%) (0.05%) (0.05%)
By agent type
Customer 0.11% 0.19% 0.24% 0.32% 0.43% 0.56% 0.76% 0.96% 1.24% 1.76% 1.65%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.04%)
Firm 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 0.07% 0.11% 0.13% 0.17% 0.17% 0.16%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%)
Market maker 0.05% 0.11% 0.18% 0.23% 0.37% 0.58% 0.86% 1.48% 1.64% 2.36% 2.31%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%)
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Figure 1.4. Actual early exercise of equity options for varying short-sale costs. This figure shows the
empirical fraction of equity options exercised early as a function of the short-sale costs, 2003-2010. Panel
A groups the data by the moneyness of the option, Panel B by expiration, and Panel C by agent type.
Consistent with our theory, early exercise is increasing in short-sale costs, increasing in moneyness,
decreasing in time to expiration, and the exercise pattern is prevalent for all agent types including
professional market makers and firm proprietary traders.
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Table 1.4
Early exercise of equity options by transaction costs.
This table shows the average number of early option exercises as a fraction of open interest on the previous day
for options sorted on the transaction costs. Transaction costs for options are measured daily as the bid-ask spread
divided by the mid price for the at-the-money option with same underlying, expiration, and observation day.
Observations are grouped into quintiles by transaction costs. The table further classifies options by their moneyness,
expiration, and agent type. Options are defined as “out of the money” if the closing stock price is below the strike
price, “in the money” if stock price is 0–25% above strike price, and “deep in the money” if stock price is more than
25% larger than strike price. We note that the number of exercises for each agent type is reported as a fraction of the
total open interest since our data do not include open interest by agent type. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The data cover 2001–2010 as seen in Table 1.
1
Low 
T-cost
2 3 4 5
High 
T-cost
5-1
All 0.13% 0.16% 0.21% 0.27% 0.50% 0.37%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
By moneyness
Out of the money 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
In the money 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 0.11% 0.35% 0.33%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
Deep in the money 0.25% 0.34% 0.47% 0.62% 0.98% 0.73%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%)
By time to expiration
Less than 3 months 0.29% 0.31% 0.36% 0.42% 0.62% 0.33%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
Between 3 and 9 months 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.07% 0.03%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
More than 9 months 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.00%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
By agent type
Customer 0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.16% 0.35% 0.30%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
Firm 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
Market maker 0.07% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.12% 0.05%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
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Figure 1.5. Actual early exercise of equity options for varying transaction costs. This figure shows the
empirical fraction of equity options exercised early as a function of transaction costs, 2001-2010. The daily
data on option series are divided in quintiles based on their transaction costs, measured each day as the
bid-ask spread divided by the mid price for the corresponding at-the-money option series with the same
expiration and underlying stock. Panel A groups the data by the moneyness of the option, Panel B by
expiration, and Panel C by agent type. Consistent with our theory, early exercise is increasing in
transaction costs, increasing in moneyness, and decreasing in time to expiration.
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tional or due to measurement error), and the exercises are concentrated among deep-in-the-money
options, as we would expect. Splitting the data by expiration, the table and figure show that the
exercises are more frequent for shorter-term options. This is consistent with our theory as the ben-
efits of postponing exercising is smaller (smaller optionality) for shorter-term options. Again, we
see that the option exercises increase in short-sale costs within expiration group.
Lastly, we split the data by agent types, that is, across customers of brokers (retail customers
and hedge funds), market makers, and firm proprietary traders. We see that all types of agents ex-
ercise early and more so when the short-sale costs are higher. We note that the absolute magnitude
of the numbers should not be compared across groups for the following reason: Our data do not
contain open interest by agent type, so we measure the number of exercises by each agent type as a
fraction of the total open interest. Hence, the fraction of exercises by firm proprietary traders may
be low simply because this agent type trades few options relative to the total open interest. In any
case, the pattern of an increasing propensity to exercise as short-sale costs increase is consistent
with our theory.
Table 1.4 and Fig. 1.5 show how the fraction of early exercises varies with the transaction
costs. We measure transaction costs as the relative bid-ask spread of the at-the-money with the
same expiration (TCOS T ) as defined in (1.10) above. We assign all observations an integer score
from 1 to 5 (low to high transaction costs) based on this measure, using the full sample quintile
breakpoints. Further, observations are classified in three groups: out-of-the-money (with stock
price below strike price), in-the-money options (with stock price up to 25% above strike price),
and deep-in-the-money options (with stock price more than 25% above strike price).
We see that the fraction of options exercised increases monotonically with the transaction costs.
This pattern holds overall, for each moneyness group, and for each type of agent. The absolute of
numbers in Table 1.4 are smaller on average than the numbers in Table 1.3. This is because 81%
of the data have a short-sale cost code (DCBS) equal to 1 (as classified by Data Explorers) and,
as expected, the fraction of exercises is low in this group as seen in Table 1.3. In Table 1.4, our
groups by transaction costs are more balanced.
In summary, consistent with our model’s qualitative predictions, we have seen that option ex-
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ercises increase in short-sale costs and transaction costs and that these patterns tend to hold within
groups sorted by moneyness, expiration, and agent types. Next, we seek to test our model’s quan-
titative predictions. In particular, for each exercised option, we compare the model-implied lower
exercise boundary to the high of the stock price at the day of the exercise as seen in Table 1.5.
The table reports the fraction of exercises consistent with our model for each agent type and for
all agents (in each row of the table). We look at three different samples: full sample (Panel A and
Panel D), a sample excluding corporate events (Panel B), and a sample including only options with
more than nine months to expiration (Panel C). Panel D differs from Panel A by setting funding
costs to zero instead of the LIBOR-OIS spread when computing the exercise boundary. Each col-
umn of the table corresponds to a specific set of assumptions underlying the model, with increas-
ingly conservative assumptions going from left to right. In the left-most column, we estimate each
stock’s volatility based on the 60-day realized volatility. Given that volatility is mean-reverting,
the next column uses a lower estimate of future volatility, namely, the minimum of the current
60-day volatility and its median in the OptionMetrics sample (June 1 2001–January 31 2012). The
third column uses both the conservative volatility estimate and a conservative estimate of short-sale
costs, namely, the 90th percentile of short-sale costs within each group (rather than the median ob-
served cost). Finally, the fourth column has the most conservative boundary, which is 90% of the
estimated boundary from column three.
For all cases of model input assumptions, we see that the majority of option exercises happen
when the stock price is above the model-implied lower exercise boundary. The fraction of exercises
consistent with our model is highest for market makers, which could be because these agents face
the lowest financial frictions and are the most active market participants. Naturally, the fraction of
exercises consistent with the model increases in the columns with more conservative assumptions
(by construction). The model can explain 98% of the market makers’ exercises with the most
conservative assumptions, a very large fraction in light of the remaining noise.
Table 1.5 Panel B consistently reports higher numbers than Panel A, which shows that ex-
cluding corporate events disproportionately excludes early exercises not explained by the model.
Section 1.4.2 elaborates on this result.
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Table 1.5
Early exercise of equity options: Model-implied lower exercise boundary.
This table shows the fraction of the observed early exercise decisions that can be rationalized by our model for
our full sample (Panel A), a sample excluding corporate events (Panel B), a sample of options with more than 9
months to expiration (Panel C), and the full sample with funding costs set to zero (Panel D), 2003-2010. An early
exercise can be rationalized by our model when the daily high of the stock price, S , is above the model-implied
estimated lower exercise boundary, B. Here, B is computed as the solution to the PDE (1.6)–(1.7) based on the
estimated volatility, short-sale cost, and funding cost. The table reports this fraction for all agents and by agent type
(across the rows) and for four different implementations of the model (across the columns). The first column
estimates the volatility as the 60-day historical volatility and the short-sale cost as the median short-sale cost among
stock loans with this DCBS score. The second column uses a more conservative (i.e., lower) estimate of expected
future volatility. The third column also uses a conservative (i.e., higher) estimate of short-sale costs, namely, the 90th
percentile among stock loans of this type. The fourth column has the most conservative boundary, which is 90% of
the estimated boundary from column three.
Exercises w/ S>B Exercises w/ S>B, 
conservative volatility 
estimate
Exercises w/ S>B, 
conservative volatility  
and short-sale cost 
estimates
Exercises w/ S>B, 
conservative boundary
All 65.8% 75.1% 79.4% 84.2%
By agent type
Customer 41.3% 51.3% 58.2% 66.8%
Firm 64.2% 76.6% 79.7% 84.2%
Market maker 86.0% 94.4% 96.7% 98.4%
All 69.4% 77.3% 81.8% 86.4%
By agent type
Customer 45.0% 54.0% 61.3% 70.0%
Firm 70.4% 80.6% 83.9% 87.8%
Market maker 88.1% 94.9% 97.3% 98.9%
All 82.9% 88.4% 89.8% 90.1%
By agent type
Customer 53.0% 65.3% 69.2% 70.3%
Firm 72.9% 90.7% 91.1% 91.3%
Market maker 98.3% 99.5% 99.7% 99.7%
All 61.4% 71.8% 78.0% 83.2%
By agent type
Customer 35.8% 46.3% 55.8% 64.8%
Firm 60.2% 73.8% 78.5% 83.0%
Market maker 82.5% 92.5% 96.1% 98.2%
Panel A: Early exercises: full sample
Panel B: Early exercises: excluding corporate events
Panel C: Early exercises: more than 9 months to expiration
Panel D: Early exercises: full sample with zero funding cost
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Table 1.5 Panel C focuses on the exercises that happen with more than nine months to expira-
tion. This sample has a larger fraction of exercises (relative to the full sample) that are in line with
the estimated model. For market makers, the fraction of exercises consistent with the model are as
high as 98.3% to 99.7%, depending on the model inputs.
Table 1.5 Panel D reports that less exercises are explained when funding costs are set to zero.
Nevertheless, the model continues to perform reasonably well with zero funding costs, which
illustrates the importance of short-sale costs.
Next, we study the propensity to exercise in logit and probit regression settings. To do so, we
need in principle to compute the model-implied lower exercise boundary for each type of option
and each date, including days when no exercises are observed. The very large amount of data
combined by the numerical complexity in solving our model’s PDE makes such a complete analysis
unfeasible. To address this issue, we look at a subsample only consisting of one day per month,
namely, 17 days before option expiry (which is the day after the third Friday in every month). The
subsample analysis is sufficient to obtain statistically significant results and we have confirmed
that our model independent results hold up in the full sample (i.e., by regressing the propensity to
exercise on characteristics such as short-sale costs). For each of the selected 80 dates, we compute
the optimal exercise boundary for each option by solving the PDE problem (1.6)–(1.7) that takes
frictions into account.
If we run a pooled logit (or probit) regression using all options on all of the selected dates, then
we get highly significant results consistent with our model (not reported). However, such standard
errors would be heavily downward biased since investors usually exercise many options simulta-
neously, generating a strong correlation across options on a given date. To address this correlation
issue, we proceed as follows. First, we run a logit (or probit) regression for each subsample of
three dates (the last subsample has only two dates). This generates an estimated vector of param-
eters, θˆs, for each subsample s. Second, we estimate the full-sample parameters and their standard
errors based on the insight of Fama and MacBeth (1973) that each parameter can be viewed as
sampled from parameters’ distribution. In particular, we estimate the full-sample parameters as
the sample average, θˆ = 1/27
∑
s θˆs, and the standard errors based on the sample standard de-
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viation corrected for possible auto-correlation using Newey-West correction with automatic lag
selection with a Bartlett-kernel, Newey and West (1987, 1994). This estimation method is rela-
tively immune to cross-sectional correlation in option exercises and assumes that any time-series
correlation is captured by the Newey-West correction.
Table 1.6 reports the results, where Panel A is the logit regressions and Panel B is probit. The
first regression specification simply considers how the propensity to exercise depends on the indica-
tor that the stock price is above the lower exercise boundary (S > B). We see that the estimated co-
efficient for S > B is positive, consistent with our model, and the effect is highly statistically signif-
icant. The estimated probability of exercise on a day with S > B is 1/(1+exp(8.54−4.09)) = 1.2%,
while estimated probability on other days is 1/(1 + exp(8.54 − 0)) = 0.02%. Cumulated over
20 trading days in a simple way, these probabilities correspond to aggregate exercise probabil-
ities of 1 − (1 − 1.2%)20 = 20.7% when the stock price is above the exercise boundary and
1 − (1 − 0.02%)20 = 0.4% otherwise. We see that the exercise behavior is very different depending
on whether the stock price is above or below the exercise boundary.
The second specification shows a similar result, but where we allow the exercise probability to
increase in the distance between the stock price and the boundary using the variable (S − B)+/B.
The third specification shows that having a bid price for the option below the intrinsic value is
also a significant predictor of early option exercise, which is also consistent with our model (and a
basic trade-off between selling the option vs. exercising it). Of course, the option bid price is an
endogenous variable, so this regression does not address the deeper question of why option prices
can be so low that early exercise can make sense. The first specification based on our model is not
subject to the same issue since the exercise boundary is computed based on the observed financial
frictions.
The fourth specification includes all these variables jointly. We see that all three variables
remain positive and statistically significant, both with logit and probit. The fifth specification
also includes a number of control variables. Both of the model-implied variables continue to be
positive, and 1(S>B) remains highly significant in all specifications. Several of the other variables
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Table 1.6
Early exercise of equity options: Regression analysis.
This table shows logit (Panel A) and probit (Panel B) regressions for the determinants of early option exercises,
2003-2010. The dependent variable is one for every option contract that is exercised early and zero for every contract
outstanding at end of the previous day that is not exercised early on a given day. The independent variables are as
follows. The first variable is the indicator that the stock closing price S is above the model-implied lower exercise
boundary, B, and the second variable is (S − B)+/B. The third variable is the indicator that the option’s closing bid
price, Cbid, is below the intrinsic value given the strike price, X. Moneyness is S/X. Short-sale cost is the DCBS
score, where a higher score indicates a higher cost. Bid-ask spread is the relative bid-ask spread for the option closest
to at-the-money with same underlying and expiry date. Time to expiration is in 100 days. Historical volatility is
estimated based on the stock returns of the previous 60 days. The LIBOR-OIS spread is in basis points. We report
estimated t-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors that account for cross-sectional and time-series
correlations using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). First, the regressions are estimated in each 3-month
subsample. Second, the full-sample parameters are estimated as the sample means of the estimates and the standard
errors are estimated based on the sample standard deviation of parameter estimates across subsamples, using the
Newey-West correction.
Panel A: Logit
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(S>B) 4.09 1.84 1.19 1.06
(13.42) (9.84) (6.06) (4.09)
[(S-B)/B]+ 2.13 0.45 0.39 0.40
(5.98) (2.72) (1.30) (1.37)
1(C_bid<S-X) 5.23 4.46 3.92 3.96
(20.74) (17.93) (23.47) (29.31)
Moneyness 0.03 0.05
(0.32) (0.65)
Short-sale cost score 0.33 0.34
(10.25) (9.36)
Bid-ask spread 0.26 0.25
(3.19) (2.86)
Time to expiration -1.61 -1.61
(-6.20) (-5.99)
Historical volatility 0.73 0.71
(5.50) (5.36)
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.25 0.25
(0.99) (1.00)
Intercept -8.54 -7.75 -10.63 -10.70 -12.89 -12.87
(-81.10) (-36.70) (-53.54) (-50.09) (-6.25) (-6.22)
Funding cost LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS Zero
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
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Panel B: Probit
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(S>B) 1.29 0.62 0.42 0.38
(11.71) (9.54) (5.91) (4.15)
[(S-B)/B]
+
0.91 0.24 0.20 0.21
(5.81) (2.89) (1.78) (1.96)
1(C_bid<S-K) 1.45 1.22 1.15 1.16
(17.04) (17.85) (18.13) (21.07)
Moneyness 0.03 0.04
(0.82) (1.51)
Short-sale cost score 0.13 0.13
(9.88) (9.08)
Bid-ask spread 0.12 0.11
(6.44) (5.73)
Time to expiration -0.57 -0.57
(-6.00) (-5.75)
Historical volatility 0.24 0.24
(6.71) (6.59)
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.06 0.06
(0.79) (0.79)
Intercept -3.54 -3.35 -4.06 -4.10 -4.73 -4.71
(-128.80) (-58.35) (-85.96) (-79.33) (-7.19) (-7.17)
Funding cost LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS Zero
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
are also significant, suggesting that the precise probability of exercise is a complicated function
of the observable data. We expect differences across investors in terms of the frictions that they
face, the frequency with which they observe the markets, and their estimate of future volatility.
While some investors’ exercise decision may be captured by the distance between the stock price
S and the boundary B that we calculate, other investors may exercise based on their individual-
specific frictions, and this idiosyncratic variation may be partly picked up by the control variables.
Of course, economic models of individual behavior are always less precise than those of prices
(which aggregate individual noise) and, thus, these imperfections echo those in the literature on
individual investors’ refinancing of mortgage bonds. Still, our results support that early exercise
decisions are driven by frictions in most cases, especially for market makers.
Lastly, we compute the exercise boundary for zero funding cost and repeat the analysis with
the full set of control variables. This is done since using the LIBOR-OIS spread is an imper-
fect measure of funding costs, which does not vary in the cross-section. Our results continue to
hold qualitatively in this specification, indicating the robustness of our results and that short-sale
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frictions are important drivers.
1.4.1 A natural experiment: The short-sale ban of 2008
To further test the theory that early option exercises are caused by, and not only correlated with,
frictions we consider exercise behavior during the short-sale ban in 2008. After the market closed
on September 18, 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced an emer-
gency order that banned short-sale of certain stocks (SEC Release No. 34-58592). Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2013) provide a useful summary of the time line of the events. Initially, the ban applied
to a list of 797 tickers for financial stocks (c.f. SEC’s emergency order). On Sunday, September
21, SEC sent out an amendment to the emergency order (SEC Release No. 34-58611) by which
the exchanges became responsible for adding and deleting stocks to the list of banned stocks such
that the ban would include all financial firms, leading to around 200 additions and a few deletions.
The short sale ban serves as a shock to the short-sale frictions. Of course, the fall of 2008 was
a volatile period with many events, but the fact that the ban only applied to certain firms allows
us to control general events in this time period. Specifically, we compare the exercise behavior
before and after the ban for, respectively, affected and unaffected firms (a so-called difference-in-
differences approach often used to study causality). Our theory predicts that options on affected
stocks should experience an increase in early exercise relative to unaffected stocks.
For this natural experiment, we obtain data from Nasdaq allowing us to identify every stock
that was affected by the ban. We create an indicator variable for each option series taking the value
one for options written on Affected stocks. Further, we create a Ban period indicator variable for
the period when the ban was in effect (September 19 to October 8, both included).
To consider the effects of the ban on exercise behavior, we include these indicators and, im-
portantly, their interaction in the logit and probit regressions. To estimate standard errors, we
modify the Fama-MacBeth procedure used in Table 1.6 as follows. Focusing on September to Oc-
tober 2008, we randomly divide the sample into ten equal-sized subsamples of option-series/days,
each large enough to include several observations for all four combinations of stocks being fi-
nancial/nonfinancial and during/outside the ban period. We compute the model-implied exercise
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Table 1.7
Early exercise of equity options: Short-sale ban difference-in-differences.
This table shows logit and probit regressions that study whether the short-sale ban caused a rise in early option
exercises for affected stocks. The short-sale ban applied to US financial stocks and serves as a natural experiment.
The dependent variable is one for every option contract exercised early and zero for every contract outstanding at end
of the previous day not exercised early. The “Ban period” and “Affected stock” are dummy variables for the ban
period (Sep. 19 to Oct. 8, 2008) and the affected stocks, respectively. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, the
key variable in the interaction: The positive, statistically significant “Affected stock × Ban period” supports that the
short-sale ban increased early exercise for options written on affected stocks relative to options on unaffected stocks.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
1(S>B) 1.43 1.49 0.54 0.58
(11.21) (8.88) (14.09) (11.79)
[(S-B)/B]+ 1.09 1.32 0.58 0.67
(4.66) (4.98) (5.83) (5.81)
1(C_bid<S-X) 3.96 4.24 1.38 1.52
(9.64) (9.18) (10.46) (9.62)
Moneyness -0.16 -0.32 -0.11 -0.17
(-0.96) (-1.63) (-1.75) (-2.19)
Aug 08 short-sale cost score 0.31 0.31 0.12 0.12
(13.41) (13.22) (11.90) (11.64)
Bid-ask spread 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.09
(1.05) (0.92) (1.46) (1.26)
Time to expiration -1.58 -1.77 -0.59 -0.66
(-9.95) (-8.30) (-9.75) (-8.06)
Historical volatility -0.34 -0.28 -0.08 -0.06
(-2.30) (-1.90) (-1.51) (-1.21)
Affected stock 0.60 0.74 0.26 0.31
(2.04) (2.58) (1.88) (2.40)
Ban period 0.49 0.17
(3.12) (2.87)
Affected stock  Ban period 1.19 1.21 0.54 0.51
(2.95) (3.16) (3.34) (3.44)
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.00 0.00
(-1.21) (-1.39)
Intercept                Yes                No                Yes                No
Date fixed effect                No                Yes                No                Yes
Method                Logit                Logit                Probit               Probit
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boundary based on the ex ante short-sale costs measured at the end of August 2008 (and we also
use this ex ante short-sale cost as a control variable). We use this ex ante short-sale cost to avoid
having our results be driven by confounding effects due to the ban’s effect on the securities-lending
market.
Table 1.7 reports the results of the regressions. The key coefficient is the coefficient on Affected
stock × Ban period. The fact that this coefficient is positive supports that early exercise of options
on banned stocks increased during the ban period, relative to early exercise of options on non-
banned stocks. This serves as evidence that increased short-sale frictions causes an increase in
early exercises. We find this result both with probit and logit regressions and both with and without
date fixed effects.
1.4.2 Alternative reasons for early exercise
Lastly, we consider alternative potential drivers of early exercise such as corporate events. To
begin the search for alternative explanations, we first consider the top five observations where
market makers exercise options when the stock price is below the most conservative boundary,
ranked on the number of contracts exercised on a given day for a given series (recall that market
makers exercise is consistent with the model in 98.4% of the cases as seen in Table 1.5.A, so we
study the top five cases among the remaining 1.6%).
Interestingly, three of the five cases are associated with corporate events.10 Corporate events
10The option-date with the highest number of unexplained early exercises by market makers is January 7, 2004 where
they exercised 5, 957 option contracts written on Univision Communications Inc. with expiration January 17, 2004 and
strike price 35.00 USD. The Thomson One database for corporate events shows that, on the same day as the exercises,
Univision announced a Follow-On issue of the Univision stock of 600 million USD and that “the underwriter may engage
in activities that stabilize, maintain or otherwise affect the price” of the stock. Such stabilizing activities can limit the
expected downside of the stock and reduce the optionality value of in-the-money options, making early exercise induced by
frictions more attractive. Also, hedging activities from lead underwriters could lead to a temporary increase in short-sale
costs, enough to induce early exercise, but for a short enough period to not be observed in the short-sale cost data. The
option-date with the second-highest number of unexplained early exercises by market makers is Monday, July 26, 2010 for
options written on AmeriCredit with expiration August 21, 2010 and strike price 22.50 USD. Four days earlier, on July 22,
an acquisition of AmeriCredit by General Motors was announced to take effect October 1, 2010 at the price of 24.50 USD
per share. If the market expects the deal to go through for certain, the stock will act as a risk-free asset after the initial
price adjustment. In fact, the volatility of the stock did become tiny until the successful acquisition. Given a vanishing
volatility the observed frictions are large enough to justify early exercise by our model. Number five of the list is 2, 190
option contracts exercised with Autonation Inc. as underlying stock on April 11, 2006. Autonation had an outstanding
tender offer to buy back some of its own shares that expired April 12, 2006, which might have induced the early exercises.
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could be important for two reasons: first, they could simply affect the parameters of the model, e.g.,
lower the volatility, which would lead us to mis-estimate the exercise boundary. More worryingly,
corporate events could drive early exercise for reasons unrelated to the model. To address these
concerns, we have repeated our analysis in the subsample that excludes all option-days when the
underlying stock experiences a corporate event according to the Thomson One database. In par-
ticular, we exclude data around equity issues (from 30 days before to 50 days after or settlement
date, whichever comes first) and around mergers and acquisitions for both the target stocks and the
acquiror (from five days before the announcement until the offer is effective or withdrawn, or, if no
end date is observed, until 180 days after the announcement).
Table 1.5.B shows that our model explains the early exercise behavior better in the subsample
that excludes corporate events. Also, we have repeated our logit/probit regressions in the sub-
sample that excludes corporate events, and the results do not change qualitatively (available upon
request from the authors). Hence, it appears that corporate events could create noise as an al-
ternative driver of early exercise, but it does not appear to be driving our results (as an omitted
variable).
In addition to equity issuance and mergers and acquisitions, using shares for voting could be
a consideration. However, rather than exercising an option, shares can in principle be obtained in
the securities-lending market, and, therefore, the model should capture this effect via the lending
fees and short-sales costs. Further, Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2007) find that “the
average vote sells for zero,” suggesting that this is not a major driver of our results. Also, we expect
that a number of the important voting events are excluded by the filter applied above.
A final reason for early exercise could be that investors are not fully rational as shown by
Gay and Manaster (1986) and Poteshman and Serbin (2003). This could help explain why some
options are exercised even when the stock price is below the model-implied boundary. However,
irrationality does not appear to be the whole picture as seen from the model’s explanatory power
and the natural experiment of Section 1.4.1. Further, the fact that early exercise is also observed by
market makers who are professional investors likely to make rational decisions also suggests that
a number of early exercise decisions are driven by frictions.
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Gay et al. (1989) address transaction costs and the opportunity to exercise after the closing of
the futures market. They study options where exercise can be optimal even without frictions so, in
their case, transactions cost and market closure can change the optimal exercise time. We show that
transaction costs and closed stock exchanges alone are not sufficient to rationalize early exercise
of call options although transaction costs do play a role in combination with other frictions (cf.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2).11
In summary, there could be alternative reasons for early exercise such as corporate events, but,
within the limits of any empirical study, our results suggest that frictions constitute a separate
driver of early exercise.
1.5 Empirical results: Never convert a convertible?
We next consider how early conversions of convertible bonds are related to financial frictions.
Table 1.8 reports our results. We see that early conversions are more frequent among companies
with large short-sale costs for the equity, consistent with the theory.
The table breaks down the conversions by the moneyness of the convertible bonds. We consider
a convertible bond to be out-of-the-money if the price of the underlying stock is less than conver-
sion price, in-the-money if stock price is up to 25% above conversion price, and deep-in-the-money
if stock price is more than 25% above conversion price. As expected, we see that conversions are
concentrated among in-the-money and deep-in-the-money convertibles. We see a few conversions
of out-of-the-money bonds, which relates to the definition of moneyness discussed in Section 1.3.2.
More importantly, we see that conversion rates increase monotonically in short-sale costs for
deep-in-the-money convertibles, providing further evidence consistent with the theory. However,
we note that the difference across groups is not statistically significant due to the small and noisy
data set.
11Closed stock exchange corresponds to extreme stock transaction costs so that no positive value can be gained
from selling the stock. Proposition 1 shows that stock transaction costs are not sufficient to drive early exercise.
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Table 1.8
Early conversion of convertible bonds.
This table shows the average amount of early conversion as a fraction of the outstanding amount for convertible
bonds sorted on the short-sale costs of the underlying equity, 2003-2011. The observations are grouped into Low,
Medium, and High cost of shorting based on the DCBS score from Data Explorers. “Low” cost reflects a DCBS of 1,
“Medium” a score of 2–5, and “High” 6–10. The table further classifies convertible bonds by their moneyness.
Convertible bonds are defined as “out of the money” when stock price is below conversion price, “in the money”
when stock price is at or up to 25% above the conversion price, and “deep in the money” when stock price is more
than 25% above conversion price. The conversion price defines the amount of face value of bond that must be
converted to obtain one share of the underlying stock. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
1
Low cost of 
shorting
2 3
High cost of 
shorting
3-1
Panel A: All 0.09% 0.08% 0.16% 0.07%
(0.02%) (0.04%) (0.08%) (0.09%)
Panel B: By moneyness
Out of the money 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03%
(0.02%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.02%)
In the money 0.09% 0.08% 0.16% 0.07%
(0.05%) (0.08%) (0.13%) (0.13%)
Deep in the money 0.17% 0.19% 0.36% 0.19%
(0.04%) (0.10%) (0.22%) (0.23%)
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1.6 Conclusion: Never say never again
A classic rule in financial economics states that, except just before expiration or dividend payments,
one should never exercise a call option and never convert a convertible bond. This rule is ubiquitous
in option theory and taught in most introductory finance classes. We show that this rule breaks
down — theoretically and empirically — when financial frictions are introduced, just as frictions
break the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the Law of One Price, and other classic rules in financial
economics.
Our theory shows that early exercise of options can be rational in light of financial frictions
and, indeed, we would expect early exercise to occur. Consistent with our theory, the empirical
propensity to exercise equity options is increasing in the short-sale costs, transaction costs, and
moneyness, and decreasing in the time to expiration. We find that options are exercised by cus-
tomers of brokers, market makers, and firm proprietary traders and, for each group, exercises are
more prevalent when the financial frictions are more severe. Our model further implies that it
can be optimal to convert a convertible bond. We document a number of early conversions of
convertible bonds, especially among stocks with high short-sale costs.
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Chapter 2
Early Option Exercise Predicts Stock
Returns
Abstract
In a world with frictions, a call option owner’s wish to reduce stock exposure can induce early
exercise. If the wish to reduce exposure is based on negative information about the stock, then
early exercise provides a negative signal for future stock returns. Consistent with this idea, I
find empirically that early exercise predicts stock returns negatively. The information content
of early exercise is not found to significantly depend on whether a customer of broker, a firm,
or a market maker performs the exercise.
2.1 Introduction
Do any market participants have private information? If so, how is that information brought to the
market place? These fundamental questions arise in economics in general and finance in particular.
This paper shows that option owners possess private information and act on it in the form of
exercising call options early. Also, no significant differences are found in the information content
of early exercises by customers of brokers, firms, and market makers. To identify the private
information content of early exercises, the paper looks at the abnormal returns of the underlying
stocks in the days after options written on them are exercised early. Consistent with early exercise
being due to negative information about the stock among the option owners, these abnormal returns
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are negative.
Frictions can justify exercising call options early, i.e., before expiration and at times when the
stock pays no dividends (Avellaneda and Lipkin, 2009; Jensen and Pedersen, 2016). Jensen and
Pedersen (2016) provide the theoretical framework for the predictions made in this paper. If the
option owner is short the underlying stock, then the incentive to exercise is larger than if the agent
is long the stock. When selling a stock from a long position the seller forgoes potential income
from lending out the stock. When selling stock from a zero or negative position, the seller incurs
a short-sale cost. Both lending fees and short-sale costs can make early exercise attractive if the
option cannot be sold above intrinsic value. The stock obtained upon early exercise can generate
income by being lent out or reduce costs by covering a short position. However, the short-sale cost
often is larger than the lending fee due to costs paid to intermediaries and search costs (Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2002). Thus, an option owner who is short the underlying stock has a
larger incentive to exercise early than an option owner who is long the underlying stock.
To reduce exposure to the underlying stock due to private information, an option owner could
sell the underlying stock. If selling off the stock leads to the stock position becoming zero, or
if the stock position is zero in the first place, early exercise increases in attractiveness if further
reductions in stock exposure are wanted and the short-sale cost is larger than the lending fee. Now,
instead of forgoing the lending fee, a larger short-sale cost must be paid. The discontinuity in the
marginal cost of selling stock when the stock position is zero results in a shift in the incentive to
exercise early. Hence, if option owners want to reduce stock exposure due to private information,
early exercise can be informative about future stock returns.
Just like short-sale costs, funding costs can provide a link between private information and
early exercise. Suppose the interest rate earned on the margin account is inferior to the risk-free
return an option owner can obtain elsewhere. Then, posting margin becomes costly. Selling stock
increases (reduces) margin requirements if the option owner is short (long) stock. Similar to the
positive spread between short-sale costs and lending fees, a larger incentive exists to exercise early
if the option owner is short the underlying stock relative to long. Early exercise can be induced if
the option owner wants to reduce stock exposure based on private information. Instead of starting
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to sell the stock short, the option owner can choose to exercise early and sell the obtained stock.
This way, margin requirements and, thus, funding costs are reduced. Regardless of the channel
being short-sale costs, funding costs, or a combination of both, negative private information can
lead to early exercise.
Black (1975) conjectures that informed traders choose to trade in the option market due to
embedded leverage. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) support this idea, deriving a pooling
equilibrium for the option market and the market for the underlying stock in which option trades
are informative about future stock prices. Their empirical findings, as well as those of Kacperczyk
and Pagnotta (2016), are that option trades contain private information.
The private information content of early exercise is detected by lower abnormal returns of the
underlying stocks in the days after early exercise. Because an exercise observed on a specific
day might have happened after the stock exchange closed that day, endogeneity issues arise with
looking at the stock return one trading day after the early exercise. Hence, the focus is on the
abnormal return from two trading days up to ten trading days after. Abnormal returns are calculated
based on both a one-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and a four-factor model, both with
ex ante estimated betas. The four factors are the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns
(MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low
(HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)).
The abnormal returns are observed in event time with events being the 164, 846 unique stock-
days with early exercises. The cumulated four-factor abnormal return for two to ten trading days
after early exercise is significantly negative consistent with option owners exercising based on
private information. The one-factor abnormal return is negative, but insignificant. The four-factor
abnormal return stays significantly negative even after adding a conservative (i.e., likely upward-
biased) measure for short-sale cost. The negative abnormal return indicates that shorting the stock
after early exercise and hedging the exposures to the four factors is attractive, consistent with
negative information giving rise to early exercise.
To further test for private information, I construct calendar time strategies for the sample period
from 2003 to 2010. Stocks are shorted after options written on them are exercised early, and the
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exposures to the market factor or the four factors are hedged based on ex ante betas. For the strategy
in which stocks are shorted two trading days after early exercise and the position hedged based on
ex ante four-factor loadings, a positive four-factor daily alpha of 0.05% is observed with a t-statistic
of 3.38. The yearly Shape ratio is 1.26. After subtracting a conservative measure for short-sale
cost, the Sharpe ratio is 0.76. The attractive returns cannot be obtained in reality because market
participants cannot observe option exercises. But the attractive returns are evidence of private
information leading to early exercise.
The relationship between negative private information and early exercises is also validated
using Fama-MacBeth regressions in which the dependent variable is abnormal return of the under-
lying stock and the independent variables are dummy variables for early exercises on the previous
trading days. Also in this setup, I find significant under-performance of stocks two and three trad-
ing days after early exercise without seeing stock prices rebounding on consecutive days. This
pattern holds when abnormal returns are calculated based on both a one-factor CAPM and the
four-factor model.
Whether a customer of a broker, a firm, or a market maker performs an early exercise can be
determined. Utilizing this fact, three separate Fama-MacBeth regressions are run, in which the
indicator variable is one only if the given agent type exercised early. The regressions do not result
in significant differences between the three types. The only type for which the loading on the
indicator variable is significantly negative is customer of a broker. This is not surprising given that
the number of stock-days with early exercise for customers is more than double the number for
firms and market makers combined.
The stock-days with early exercise can also be sorted into groups based on the number of
contracts exercised. The stock-days are sorted into three groups: stock-days for which one to ten
contracts were exercised, stock-days with 11–100 exercises, and stock-days with more than 100
exercises. Dummy variables are created for each group. The dummy is one if the number of
contracts exercised is in the given interval on the stock-day and zero otherwise. Then, a Fama-
MacBeth regression is performed for each group. The dummy variables for the group with 11–100
contracts exercised have the most economically and statistically significant estimates for early
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exercise two and three trading days ago. The differences between the three groups is, however, not
statistically significant.
Robustness checks show that the results are not driven only by stocks with low or high mar-
ket capitalization. Also, option exercises are sorted by moneyness and time to expiration. The
trend seems to be that exercises of options with a longer time to expiration are stronger predictors
of consecutive returns. This is consistent with option owners requiring a stronger private signal
to compensate for the higher optionality lost through exercise. Finally, it is shown that stock re-
versal cannot explain the abnormal calendar time returns of the strategies used to test for private
information.
Several other papers explore the private information content of different derivative measures.
Pan and Poteshman (2006) provide evidence of informed trading in the put and call option markets
using data allowing them to directly distinguish between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Prior to
days with important news, option trades predict future underlying stock returns, as shown by Amin
and Lee (1997) for earnings announcements and Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) for announcements
of takeovers. Several other papers explore the relationship between information, trades, and prices
for options and underlying stocks. Stephan and Whaley (1990) provide evidence from intra-day
data that stock price changes lead option price changes, and Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) provide
evidence consistent with informed traders being active in the stock market, but not in the option
market. Johnson and So (2012) show that the option to stock volume ratio is informative about
future returns, and Fodor, Krieger, and Doran (2011) find that large changes in open interest have
predictive power for future stock returns, with their results being stronger for call options than for
put options.1 My paper, to my knowledge, distinguishes itself from the previous literature by ex-
amining how early exercise decisions (instead of trades or quotes) may reflect private information
about the value of the underlying stock.
1For further references, see, e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), O’Hara (1995), Easley et al. (1998), and Vayanos
and Wang (2013). Recent papers include Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), An, Ang, Bali, and Cakici (2014), Chang, Hsieh,
and Lai (2009), Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008), Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013), Doran and Krieger (2010),
Hu (2014), Choy and Wei (2012), Lin and Lu (2015), Ansi and Ben Ouda (2009), Hao, Lee, and Piqueira (2013), Ge,
Lin, and Pearson (2016), Blasco, Corredor, and Santamaria (2010), Chen, Diltz, Huang, and Lung (2011), Valkanov,
Yadav, and Zhang (2011), Sinha and Dong (2011), Kehrle and Puhan (2015), Battalio and Schultz (2006), Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang (2008), Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and Hong and Yogo (2012).
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2.2 Theoretical motivation
This section provides the theoretical motivation for the idea that private information among option
holders would make early exercise a negative predictor for future stock returns. Classic theory
by Merton (1973) says that one should exercise call options only on the day of expiration or on
the day before an ex-dividend date. Jensen and Pedersen (2016) show that this rule breaks down,
both theoretically and empirically, when frictions are severe enough. Jensen and Pedersen (2016)
provide the theoretical framework that yields the mechanism of my paper, namely, that early exer-
cise can be the optimal way to reduce exposure to the underlying stock. They introduce frictions
in the form of funding and short-sale costs of the underlying stock as well as option transaction
costs. Their theory provides the insight that it might be dominated to exercise early in some states
of the world and dominated not to exercise early in others if the option cannot be sold at or above
intrinsic value.2 Yet, the theory also leaves room for states in which the optimal decision depends
on the agent’s exposure to the underlying stock. If the agent is long stock, the critical stock price
at which the option is optimally exercised is the same or higher than if the agent is short stock. In
other words, an upper and a lower exercise boundary exist for the option, leaving a channel through
which private information can be conveyed. For an option owner who has a positive holding of
the underlying stock the non-dominated way to reduce stock exposure when the stock price is be-
tween the two boundaries is to sell stock. This dominates exercising the option early. But when the
option owner no longer holds any of the underlying stock, and if the option cannot be sold above
intrinsic value, a non-dominated way to reduce stock exposure is by exercising the option early
and selling the underlying stock. This early exercise strategy dominates reducing stock exposure
by selling short the underlying stock. Only after exercising the option position and selling the
delivered stocks, selling short stock is not dominated.
The difference between the upper and lower exercise boundary exists due to the difference
between being short and long stock. When the cost of borrowing and selling a stock short is larger
2Inspired by Merton (1973), a strategy A1 is defined as dominating another strategy A2 if the cash flow from A1 in
all states is at least as large as the cash flow from A2 and with positive probability a state is realized in which the cash
flow from A1 exceeds the cash flow from A2. A strategy is said to be dominated if there exists a strategy that dominates
it.
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than the fee obtainable from holding and lending out the stock, the upper and lower boundary are
different from each other. Also, funding costs can introduce the wedge between the boundaries.
When being long (short) stock, an extra stock increases (reduces) the margin requirement. An
increase (reduction) of the margin requirement is a cost (gain) to an agent with positive funding
costs, i.e., an agent who has alternative risk-free investment opportunities that generate a higher
return than the margin account. Fig. 2.1 illustrates a lower boundary that describes the optimal
exercise policy for an agent who is short stock, and an upper boundary that outlines the optimal
exercise policy for an agent who is long stock. In between is the region F in which the optimal
exercise policy depends on the agent’s position in the underlying stock. If the agent owns zero
of the underlying stock, exercising early and selling the obtained stock is not dominated if the
option cannot be sold above intrinsic value. The lower exercise boundary in Fig. 2.1 is based
on the modified Black-Scholes-Merton partial differential equation (PDE) derived by Jensen and
Pedersen (2016), here simplified to the case of one agent i with no funding costs:
Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − r f C + CS S (r f − Li) = 0 , (2.1)
where σ = 30% is the volatility of the underlying stock, r f = 2% is the risk-free rate, and Li = 2%
is the proportional continuous short-sale cost for agent i, all in yearly terms. S is the stock price, C
is the option value, and subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the given variable. The PDE
with the following boundary conditions is a well-posed free-boundary problem (Merton, 1973):
C(T, S ) = max(S − X, 0)
C(t, 0) = 0 t < T
C(t, S ) = S − X S ≥ B(T − t), t < T
CS (t, B(T − t)) = 1 t < T ,
(2.2)
where B(τ) is the optimal exercise boundary, with τ being time to expiration. The solution provides
the boundary and option value and is derived using a finite difference Crank-Nicolson method.
The upper bound is derived equivalently, the only difference being substituting the short-sale cost
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Li = 2% with the stock lending fee 1%.
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Figure 2.1. Lower and upper boundaries for optimal early exercise. When the stock price is in region G, exercising
the option early is never optimal. If the option cannot be sold at or above intrinsic value, not exercising the option
early when the stock price is in region E is never optimal. In region F, it is optimal to exercise early for an agent who
is short the underlying stock, and it is not optimal for an agent who is long the underlying stock. The boundaries are
derived as solutions to the free boundary problem in Eqs. (2.1)–(2.2) with the following parameters: strike price
X = 10, volatility σ = 30%, and risk-free rate r f = 2%. The boundaries differ through Li, which for the lower bound
represents a short-sale cost of 2% and for the upper boundary represents a stock lending fee of 1%. Region F consists
of the states in which a change in desired exposure to the stock by the option owner may optimally lead to early
exercise.
In this case, the funding cost is zero, which means that the positive spread between lending fee
and short-sale cost yields the entire difference between the exercise boundaries. Above the upper
boundary, the agent is better off exercising early even when long stock if the option can be sold
only below intrinsic value. The reason for this is that the earned lending fee from one extra stock
exceeds the cost of exercising early, which consists of both lost optionality and forgone interest on
the strike price X. Below the lower boundary, the immediate cash flow from hedging the option by
shorting the stock is higher than the intrinsic value of the option, implying that it is dominated to
exercise early. In between, the immediate cash flow from hedging the option by shorting the stock
is smaller than the intrinsic value, meaning that exercising early is optimal if the option cannot be
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sold above intrinsic value and the agent is short stock. But if the option is hedged by reducing a
long stock position, the immediate cash flow exceeds the intrinsic value, meaning that an agent
long stock should not exercise the option early. If an option owner holds no stocks and cannot
sell the option at or above its intrinsic value, and the stock price is in the region F between the
boundaries, then the option owner should exercise early and sell the delivered stock if he wants to
reduce the positive exposure to the underlying stock that the option entails. If the option owner is
satisfied with the positive exposure that the option entails, he should not exercise early. That the
early exercise decision depends on whether the option owner wants to reduce stock exposure or
not provides the mechanism through which early exercise can convey private information.
If an option owner changes the desired exposure to the stock when the stock price is between
the lower and upper bound for early exercise, early exercise can result if the change is negative.
Such a change may reflect private information that the stock from this point will under-perform in
the future. It could also happen due to a change in risk preferences by the option owner. Exercises
not motivated by private information add noise to the information signal of early exercise in the
empirical analyses.
Early exercise also may optimally happen at the two boundaries. An option owner who is
short stock and does not want to change exposure should optimally exercise the option at the
lower boundary if the option cannot be sold for the intrinsic value or more. The early exercise
could signal negative, private information about the stock, as it reflects that the option holder has
a negative stock position. However, this signal is conjectured to be weaker than the signal from
exercises in between the boundaries for two reasons. First, the choice of portfolio might not reflect
private information, but risk preferences, e.g., a wish to hedge the option. In that case, the exercises
just add noise to the analysis. Second, the time of the exercise does not reflect the time of change
of perspective on the stock, but the time when the stock price reached the boundary.
Likewise, for exercises at the upper boundary, the wish to keep the long exposure to the stock
might reflect positive, private information, but it might also just reflect risk preferences. Again,
the signal is conjectured to be relatively weak because the timing of the exercise is not related to
the private information. Further, per construction, the stock price at some point could be above
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the lower boundary without it ever going above the upper boundary, while the opposite never
happens. In such cases, no early exercises at the upper boundary, which might contain private
positive information about the stock, are observed, and exercises at the lower boundary, which
might contain private negative information about the stock, are possible. The upper boundary might
very well be far from the lower boundary, leaving a large room for early exercises coinciding with
the emerging of a wish to reduce exposure to the underlying stock. In the realistic case in which
the option owner has a positive short-sale cost but earns nothing from lending out the stock and has
no funding costs, the upper boundary would be infinite and the lower boundary would be finite.
Overall, the conjecture is that if early exercises reflect private information, the negative signal
dominates on average.
The existence of such a region between the boundaries does not depend on the modified Black-
Scholes-Merton model being true. The model simply makes possible to illustrate an example. As
long as frictions result in the net cost of shorting stock being larger than the net cost of selling off
stock from a long position, the driver that allows early exercise to convey private information is in
place.
Further, an interaction between private information among option owners and bid price of the
option can strengthen early exercise as a negative predictor of early exercise. Private information is
optimally reflected in early exercise only when the bid price of the option is not above its intrinsic
value. Otherwise, the option owner would be better off selling the option. At the same time, a
high level of private information in the option market can itself drive down the bid price (see,
e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). The intuition is that, in equilibrium, market makers protect
themselves against informed traders by a bid-ask spread, a spread that all else equal is increasing
in the average content of private information in the trades.
2.3 Data and methodology
This section describes the data sources, explains the sample selection, provides summary statistics,
and presents different measures for abnormal returns.
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2.3.1 Data sources
Data derive from five main sources: (1) data on option exercises from Options Clearing Corpora-
tion (OCC), (2) data on daily stock returns and distribution events from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP), (3) daily option data and information on expected future dividends for
stocks from OptionMetrics, (4) data on short-sale cost for stocks from DataExplorers, and (5) daily
returns of the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor are downloaded from Kenneth
French’s data library (KFDL).3
The OCC data with observations of option exercises contain the number of contract exercises
for each option series each day. The daily exercises can be separated into three groups of market
participants: exercises done by customers of brokers (e.g., retail customers and hedge funds), firm
proprietary traders, and market makers. The option exercise data run from July 2001 to August
2010. The data are missing in the months of November 2001, January and July 2002, and January
2006. The daily option data from OptionMetrics include a unique option identification, date of
expiration, underlying stock, and an indicator for options with special settlement. The daily data
from CRSP contain distribution events with ex-dividend dates and the daily stock returns. The data
on short-sale costs from DataExplorers provide an integer Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS)
from one to ten for a stock identified by CUSIP for a given period, with one indicating a low
short-sale cost, and ten a high cost.
2.3.2 Sample selection
The approach used by Jensen and Pedersen (2016) is replicated to create a sample of early exer-
cises of call options. Option series are excluded if OptionMetrics reports a nonzero forecast of
future dividends during any day of the lifetime of the option. Further, observations of option series
are excluded on the day of expiry to focus on early exercise. Lastly, options that do not follow the
standard practice of having an expiration date on the day after the third Friday in a given month
are excluded (this excludes only a tiny fraction). The data from OptionMetrics are merged with the
3I am very grateful to Robert Whaley for providing the OCC data on option exercises. For KFDL, see
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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exercise data from OCC on date, ticker, option ticker, strike price, and expiry date. Excluded are
any option series for which the underlying stock according to CRSP has ex-date for a distribution
event (split, dividend payment, exchanges, reorganizations, etc.) within the observed lifetime of
the option series; for which the underlying stock at some point according to OptionMetrics was
expected to have an ex-dividend date within the observed lifetime of the option series; for which
records exist with different strike prices for the same series, different underlying identifiers (Se-
curity ID or CUSIP), or different expiry dates (indicating data errors or changes in the contract);
for which no data are available on the last trading day before expiry (indicating some possible
outside event); for which several records are for the same day in OptionMetrics; for which another
option series exists in the data with the same underlying stock ticker, option ticker (root of option
symbol for old option symbol and first part of symbol for new Options Symbology Initiative (OSI)
symbol), strike price, and expiry date observed on the same day; for which settlement special,
e.g., AM-settlement, has been established; or for which some day during its observed lifetime no
matching observation has been made in the CRSP data for the underlying stock.
Short-sale costs are relevant to include when performing empirical tests for stock returns. The
short-sale costs are observed in the data from DataExplorers using the Daily Cost of Borrow Score
(DCBS) which is first observed on October 22, 2003. The focus of the study is on returns up to
ten trading days after an early exercise, so the sample is restricted to include exercise observations
only from ten trading days before October 22, 2003. Thus, the first day in the sample is October 8,
2003.
2.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the final sample of early exercises. Panel A reports the
number of contracts exercised early and shows that most of the early exercises are performed by
either customers of brokers or market makers. Panel B shows that in total 3,706 different stocks
experience being the underlying stock of an early exercise in the sample. Almost all of the affected
stocks, 3,646, experience being the underlying stock of an option exercised by the customer of a
broker. Panel C summarizes the number of stock-days with early exercise. For every early exercise,
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the underlying stock and the date of the exercise are combined. The total set of these combinations
with duplicates removed make up the set of stock-days with early exercise. The set of stock-days
can be observed both for all early exercises and for each of the three agent types. Stock-days
with early exercise are particularly relevant for the empirical study, as they are the events that
potentially reveal private information among option holders. In total, 164,846 stock-days have
early exercise, a number large enough to make comprehensive empirical tests. Agents who are
registered as customers of brokers have the most stock-days with early exercise, and almost half of
all stock-days with early exercise have ten or fewer contracts exercised early.
2.3.4 Calculation of abnormal returns and trading strategy returns
Daily returns for individual stocks from CRSP are used to estimate both one-factor and four-factor
betas. For every stock at the end of every month, the betas are estimated based on observed daily
returns for the previous year if more than 20 daily returns are observed for this period. The KFDL
contains daily data for excess market returns (MKT.RF which I call MKT in this paper), the small-
minus-big (SMB) factor, the high-minus-low (HML) factor, the momentum (UMD) factor, and the
risk-free return (RF). The excess stock return for an individual stock is observed by subtracting
the risk-free return from the observed stock return from CRSP. By ordinary least sqaures (OLS)
regression, the one- and four-factor betas are then estimated. The daily abnormal returns of the
individual stocks can now be estimated by subtracting from the stock return the expected return in
the one- and four-factor model, respectively, using the estimated betas from the previous month.
Flipping the sign of the abnormal returns, they can also be thought of as one factor–hedged and four
factor–hedged returns of a short trading strategy, respectively, because the returns can be realized
by shorting the stock and hedging the position according to the ex ante estimated betas.
A possible endogeneity issue arises from short-sale costs. These costs are a driver of early
exercise (Jensen and Pedersen, 2016) and they are associated with lower stock returns (Jones and
Lamont, 2002; Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw, 2004). Therefore, short-sale costs are taken into
account in several of the empirical analyses. To estimate the short-sale cost of the individual stock,
data from DataExplorers are used. The data contain a DCBS for individual stocks, which is an
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Table 2.1
Summary statistics for early exercises.
This table shows summary statistics for the sample of early exercises. The sample starts October 8, 2003, and
ends August 31, 2010, with data missing for January 2006. Filters are applied to exclude exercises at option
expiration or related to dividends. Panel A shows the total number of contracts exercised early, and the number is
broken down by agent type: customers of brokers, firms, and market makers. Panel B presents the number of
different underlying stocks, identified using PERMNO from the Center for Research in Security Prices, for which an
option at some point is exercised early. Panel C summarizes the stock-days, i.e., the set of unique combinations of
underlying stock and date that experience an early exercise. Both the total number and the numbers for the three
agent types are reported. The stock-days with early exercise are also grouped according to the number of contracts
exercised on the given day for the given stock. For Panel B and Panel C, the number for “All” is smaller than the sum
of the numbers for the three agent types because more types of agents may exercise options with the same underlying
stock on the same day.
All Customer Firm Market maker
Panel A: Number of early exercises
Contracts (thousands) 17,516 7,670 742 9,104
Panel B: Number of underlying stocks affected by early exercise
Stocks 3,706 3,646 1,960 2,085
Panel C: Number of stock-days with early exercise
Total 164,846 138,299 11,708 39,105
By number of contracts exercised
1–10 82,241 76,090 7,155 12,996
11–100 61,774 50,131 3,655 16,825
> 100 20,831 12,078 898 9,284
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integer score from one to ten, going from low to high short-sale costs. For a small fraction of the
sample, the same stock has two or more different DCBSs on the same date. For these cases, the
average is taken and rounded to the nearest integer.
To be able to match a DCBS with a short-sale fee, the subsample for which these fees are
observed is utilized. For each of the ten DCBSs, the 90th percentile of the short-sale cost is found.
Whenever only the DCBS, but no actual cost, is observed, the 90th percentile fee is used as a
conservative estimate. The fee is used if directly observed. If more than one fee is observed for
the same day and stock, the highest of the observed fees is used as a conservative (i.e., likely
upward-biased) estimate. Lit denotes the conservative estimate of the short-sale fee. The unit for
this short-sale cost is the percentage of the stock value that must be paid per year. To measure the
cost of shorting the stock from the previous trading day t− to the current trading day t, let Mt be
defined by
Mit := (1 + L
i
t−)
t−t−
365 − 1 , (2.3)
where t − t− is the number of calendar days between day t− and t. In the rest of the paper, when a
return is reported as including short-sale cost, Mit has been added to the return from day t
− to day
t, be it the raw observed stock return or the abnormal return. Thus, negative abnormal returns with
short-sale costs can be thought of as positive gains if the stock is shorted and the exposures to the
relevant factors are hedged.
2.4 Empirical results: How exercise predicts returns
Three main methods are used to test the predictions for performance of the stock after early exer-
cise: (1) event studies of the abnormal returns of the underlying stock after early exercise, (2) cal-
endar time returns of trading strategies based on previous early exercises, and (3) Fama-MacBeth
style regressions with abnormal stock returns as the dependent variable and dummy variables for
previous early exercises as independent variables.
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2.4.1 Event studies of abnormal returns after early exercise
Table 2.2 shows the average daily abnormal one-factor and four-factor returns of stocks in event
time after options written on them have been exercised early. Both abnormal returns are reported
with and without short-sale costs. The daily returns are measured from stock exchange close the
previous day to stock exchange close the present day. Not surprisingly, the average abnormal re-
turns on the day of early exercise are positive and highly significant. An increase in stock price
might be what triggers the early exercise, because the incentive to exercise early is increasing in
the moneyness of the option. For the first trading day after the day of early exercise, an endo-
geneity issue remains, as an option exercise on a given day could have happened after the close
of the stock exchange that day. If information relevant to the stock price becomes public after the
stock exchange closed, the option exercise may reflect the content of this information, not private
information. However, if the option owner exercises the option after the stock exchange closed on
a given trading day and sells the stock immediately, price pressure on the stock may be the result,
bringing reduced return the next trading day. Further, the early exercise might induce trading in
the underlying stock by the counterpart to whom the exercise is assigned. The net result of these
effects is not obvious, but using the abnormal return of the first trading day after exercise as evi-
dence of the early exercise revealing private information is hard. Table 2.2 shows that the returns
on this day on average are insignificant for three out of four measures, and they are significantly
negative when using abnormal four-factor returns including short-sale costs.
The most natural single day to look at to identify the possible private information content of
the early exercise is two trading days after the early exercise. This day is the closest to the early
exercise that is not subject to the endogeneity of possible early exercise after the close of the stock
exchange. And the price impact of the option owner selling the stock after obtaining it is present
only if the option owner waits one day extra before selling the stock. This would be hard to justify if
the motivation for exercising early is to reduce the stock exposure.4 Table 2.2 shows that the four-
4In some cases, regulation can prevent the option owner from selling the stock immediately after exercise. The
option owner might be able to postpone the payment of the strike price until settlement, which is three trading days
after exercise. Or the option owner might use unsettled funds to pay the strike price. In those cases, Regulation T might
prevent the option owner from selling the stock until the strike price is paid or the unsettled funds settle. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission provides some educational guidelines for Regulation T. See, for cash accounts,
which are more restricted than margin accounts, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/cashaccounts.pdf.
However, instead of exercising now and postponing payment into the future, the option owner would be better off
postponing the exercise to the same time in the future. By doing so, the stock can be sold just as early, and optionality
to not exercise is preserved which is valuable if the stock declines sufficiently in the meantime.
Table 2.2
Abnormal returns of underlying stock after early exercises in event time.
This table shows means and t-statistics (in parentheses) for abnormal returns of stocks for a varying number of
trading days after an option with the stock as underlying has been exercised early (event time). The abnormal returns
are calculated using a one-factor capital asset pricing model and a four-factor model. The four factors are the three
Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB), and high
book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)). Short-sale costs are
added to both to reflect the abnormal returns for an agent who follows a short strategy and incurs such costs. The
short-sale costs are estimated based on an observed Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) from DataExplorers.
Missing observations for DCBS mean that the samples with and without short-sale costs are not identical. The last
four rows show the means and t-statistics for the cumulative sums of abnormal returns over a range of days and
include only observations for which the abnormal returns are observed for all days within the range. Table 2.1
contains sample descriptive characteristics.
Event day One-factor alpha
One-factor alpha including
short-sale cost Four-factor alpha
Four-factor alpha including
short-sale cost
0 1.14% 1.15% 1.08% 1.09%
(89.25) (89.96) (85.08) (85.79)
1 -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% -0.01%
(-1.08) (1.06) (-3.81) (-1.70)
2 -0.04% -0.02% -0.05% -0.03%
(-4.50) (-1.81) (-5.58) (-3.05)
3 -0.02% 0.00% -0.04% -0.02%
(-2.53) (-0.53) (-4.74) (-2.69)
4 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% 0.00%
(0.93) (2.94) (-1.66) (0.24)
5 0.00% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01%
(-0.24) (2.25) (-3.60) (-1.09)
6 0.01% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01%
(1.25) (3.12) (-3.41) (-1.46)
7 0.02% 0.03% -0.03% -0.01%
(2.07) (4.18) (-3.76) (-1.30)
8 0.00% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01%
(0.23) (2.78) (-4.16) (-1.46)
9 -0.01% 0.01% -0.03% -0.02%
(-0.67) (1.28) (-4.22) (-2.01)
10 0.01% 0.03% -0.02% 0.00%
(0.96) (3.25) (-2.69) (-0.32)
2–10 -0.02% 0.16% -0.27% -0.10%
(-0.67) (6.51) (-11.39) (-4.05)
3–10 0.02% 0.18% -0.20% -0.08%
(0.95) (7.49) (-10.05) (-3.28)
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Figure 2.2. Cumulative returns for trading strategies in event time. This figure shows the average of the
cumulative sum of daily returns for different short strategies in event time. Events are the stock-days for
which one or more options written on the stock were exercised early. Two strategies are illustrated. In top
panel, after event, the stock is shorted and the market exposure is hedged based on ex ante estimated betas
in a one-factor capital asset pricing model. In bottom panel, the stock is shorted and the exposures to the
three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB),
and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)) are
hedged based on ex ante estimated betas. The cumulative sum of returns is reported both with and without
short-sale costs. The dotted lines are the average, plus or minus two standard deviations.
92
factor abnormal returns two trading days after the early exercise are significantly negative even
when including the short-sale cost. The one-factor abnormal return is also significantly negative,
while only borderline significant after including short-sale costs. This is evidence that private
information is contained in the previous early exercises.
A concern could be that the negative, abnormal return is due to price pressure stemming from
the previous exercises. Maybe an option owner has a large option relative to the liquidity of the
underlying stock and therefore gradually oﬄoads it by exercising some days in a row and selling
the shares in the market. This would lead to correlation between early exercises over time and
thus create correlation between exercises two trading days ago and negative price impact today.
To address this, the abnormal returns for up to ten trading days after early exercise are included
in the empirical analyses. If price impact is an issue, prices would be expected to recover after a
temporary drop.
The event study reports abnormal returns for each trading day up to ten trading days after the
early exercise. It also reports the cumulated sum of abnormal return (using a simple sum) for both
two to ten days and three to ten days after the early exercise. Big differences emerge between
the one-factor and four-factor abnormal returns. While the one-factor returns without short-sale
costs are not significantly different from zero for either two to ten days or three to ten days after
early exercise, the four-factor abnormal returns are strongly significantly negative. Once short-sale
costs are included, the one-factor abnormal returns become strongly positive, and the four-factor
abnormal returns stay significantly negative. The same pattern can be seen in Fig. 2.2, in which
abnormal returns are accumulated for the trading days after the early exercise for a hedged short
strategy, leading to an opposite sign. This difference reflects the overall pattern in the sample
in which both the abnormal one-factor returns and abnormal four-factor returns are significantly
positive, with the former being larger than the latter. The cumulative return has to overcome these
positive trends to get an overall negative return. This issue is addressed by the Fama-MacBeth
style regressions which also are suitable to reveal potential price impacts. The main source for
the difference between the one-factor and four-factor abnormal returns is the SMB factor, i.e., the
difference in performance of firms with small and big market capitalization.
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2.4.2 Calendar time returns of trading strategies based on early exercise
Is the private information content of the early exercises valuable enough to trade on? Table 2.3
reports the alphas and exposures of different trading strategies in which the underlying stock is
shorted after early exercises. Panel A considers strategies in which stocks are shorted if an option
written on them was exercised two trading days ago. The stocks shorted on a given day are equally
weighted. Three different hedges are used: (1) the stocks are shorted without any hedges and
the proceeds placed in the risk-free asset, (2) the stocks are shorted and the market exposures are
hedged using ex ante estimated betas from a one-factor CAPM, and (3) the stocks are shorted
and the exposures to the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor are hedged using
ex ante estimated betas. For each of the three strategies, the returns are reported both with and
without short-sale costs. The average returns of the strategies can be observed, as well as the ex
post alphas and betas of the strategies in both a one- and a four-factor model. Daily Sharpe ratios
are converted to yearly Sharpe ratios by multiplying by
√
N, with N = 251.67 being the average
number of trading days per year in the sample. Panel B reports the same numbers for which the
stocks are shorted on the third trading day after early exercises, and Panel C reports the strategy in
which stocks are shorted from two to ten trading days after an early exercise of an option written
on the stock.
The results show that the hedged strategies are attractive, especially the four factor–hedged
return that even after including short-sale costs gets as high as 0.76 for two trading days after
exercise (Panel A) with significant positive alpha in all three models. This is evidence of private
information leading option owners to early exercise. The four factor–hedged shorting strategy
for two to ten days after exercise (Panel C) has significant positive alpha without short-sale costs
and insignificant, positive alpha with short-sale costs. Both with and without short-sale costs,
the loading on SMB is significantly negative and the loading on UMD is significantly positive.
Notably, the mean is insignificant in calendar time (t-statistic 0.86, c.f. Table 2.3, Panel C, constant,
four factors with short-sale cost), and the event time return is significant (t-statistic -4.05, c.f.
Table 2.2, four-factor alpha including short-sale cost). Calendar time returns differ from event time
returns because the number of stocks held in the portfolio varies over time, meaning that stocks
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Table 2.3
Return and factor exposures in calendar time.
This table shows the abnormal returns of trading strategies in which stocks are shorted if an option written on the
stock has been exercised early two trading days ago (Panel A), three trading days ago (Panel B), or at least two but no
more than ten trading days ago (Panel C). The stocks shorted on a given day are equally weighted. Three strategies
are reported: the stocks are shorted and the proceeds invested in the risk-free asset (excess stock return), the market
exposure of the short stock position is hedged (one factor), and the exposures to the three Fama-French factors
(excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus
low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)) of the short stock position are hedged (four factor).
The returns after subtracting short-sale costs are also reported. The columns show the ex post average return (mean),
ex post alpha and beta for market exposure (one factor), and ex post alpha and betas in a four-factor model (four
factors) estimated by ordinary least squares regressions. Yearly Sharpe ratios are reported in the final column.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Constant
Strategy Mean Alpha MKT Alpha MKT SMB HML UMD Sharpe ratio
Panel A: Two days after early exercise
Short stock 0.02% 0.04% -1.15 0.04% -1.10 -0.70 -0.03 0.02
(0.49) (1.86) (-84.20) (2.41) (-80.84) (-25.93) (-0.93) (1.27)
Short stock with short sale cost 0.02% 0.03% -1.12 0.03% -1.08 -0.70 -0.02 0.02
(0.37) (1.56) (-82.63) (2.04) (-79.55) (-26.01) (-0.80) (1.01)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.04% 0.04% 0.05 0.04% 0.11 -0.64 -0.05 0.06 0.84
(2.19) (2.17) (3.61) (2.74) (8.30) (-24.11) (-1.80) (3.68)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.02% 0.02% 0.05 0.02% 0.12 -0.65 -0.05 0.07 0.44
(1.14) (1.11) (3.56) (1.52) (8.42) (-24.04) (-1.68) (4.19)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.05% 0.05% 0.01 0.05% 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 1.26
(3.28) (3.27) (1.34) (3.38) (2.64) (-0.48) (-3.86) (-0.91)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.03% 0.03% 0.01 0.03% 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.76
(1.98) (1.97) (1.28) (2.06) (2.49) (-0.46) (-3.60) (-0.84)
Panel B: Three days after early exercise
Short stock 0.01% 0.03% -1.19 0.02% -1.14 -0.74 0.92 0.03
(0.30) (1.43) (-84.26) (0.89) (-85.91) (-26.64) (0.41) (1.80)
Short stock with short sale cost 0.00% 0.02% -1.15 0.02% -1.11 -0.73 -0.59 0.02
(0.04) (0.84) (-81.95) (0.95) (-83.74) (-26.59) (-0.26) (1.15)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.03% 0.03% 0.01 0.02% 0.07 -0.68 1.00 0.07 0.54
(1.41) (1.41) (0.87) (0.82) (5.31) (-24.53) (0.44) (4.67)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.01% 0.01% 0.01 0.00% 0.07 -0.69 1.19 0.09 0.20
(0.51) (0.50) (0.66) (0.09) (5.41) (-24.55) (0.52) (5.38)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.04% 0.04% -0.02 0.05% -0.01 -0.05 -1.05 0.02 0.89
(2.31) (2.33) (-1.43) (1.87) (-0.50) (-1.93) (-0.49) (1.36)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.02% 0.02% -0.02 0.03% -0.01 -0.05 -0.69 0.02 0.45
(1.18) (1.20) (-1.56) (1.02) (-0.55) (-1.78) (-0.32) (1.53)
Panel C: Two to ten days after early exercise
Short stock -0.01% 0.01% -1.21 0.00% -1.17 -0.69 0.57 0.03
(-0.22) (0.38) (-120.00) (0.23) (-146.60) (-41.78) (0.42) (3.56)
Short stock with short sale cost -0.02% 0.00% -1.20 0.01% -1.16 -0.69 -0.81 0.03
(-0.40) (-0.17) (-118.62) (0.51) (-143.98) (-41.02) (-0.59) (2.63)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.01% 0.01% -0.01 0.01% 0.05 -0.63 0.44 0.08 0.29
(0.77) (0.77) (-0.70) (0.61) (6.11) (-35.79) (0.30) (7.99)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.00% 0.00% -0.01 0.00% 0.06 -0.64 0.57 0.09 -0.02
(-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.62) (-0.13) (6.70) (-36.50) (0.39) (8.97)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.02% 0.02% -0.03 0.04% -0.01 -0.04 -1.61 0.04 0.81
(2.11) (2.15) (-4.07) (2.31) (-1.56) (-2.56) (-1.18) (4.24)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.01% 0.01% -0.03 0.02% -0.01 -0.04 -1.50 0.04 0.33
(0.86) (0.89) (-3.92) (1.45) (-1.29) (-2.71) (-1.11) (4.53)
One factor Four factors
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shorted in times with few events get a relatively higher weight. As a trend, the number of stocks
with early exercise is increasing over time in the sample.
The main difference between the one-factor and four-factor abnormal returns is the loading
on the SMB factor, i.e., the factor representing the long small firms short big firms portfolio.
Apparently, the short-strategy involves shorting stocks that on average are highly exposed to this
factor. After ex ante hedging for the four factors, including the SMB factor, the ex post loading on
the factor gets close to zero, being insignificant both two and three trading days after early exercise.
The cumulated sums of four-factor abnormal returns over calendar time are illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
In the first part of the sample, the strategy with short-sale costs can even temporarily be above the
return without short-sale costs because excluding observations with missing short-sale costs makes
the sample slightly smaller. Over time, the differences become clearer and short-sale costs matter
increasingly as they are accumulated.
Fig. 2.3 also illustrates the daily number of stocks that experience early exercise. The trend
appears to be an increase over time and what seems to be a strong seasonality. This is not surprising
given that early exercise is decreasing in time to expiration of the option and that all options
expiring the same month expire the same day, namely, the day after the third Friday in the month.
The returns for the strategies in which the stock is shorted between two and ten trading days
after early exercises are lower than the returns when the stocks are shorted only two or three trading
days after early exercise. This reflects that the stocks are equal-weighted and that the relatively
larger abnormal gains two and three trading days after early exercise are watered down by the
relatively lower gains four to ten trading days after early exercise. A natural question would be
whether the returns four to ten trading days after early exercise are lower, not relative to the returns
two and three trading days after early exercise but to the rest of the overall sample.
2.4.3 Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on previous early exercises
Until now, event time and calendar time studies have been used to identify how early exercise
predicts stock returns. To measure abnormal stock returns, a one-factor CAPM and a four-factor
model (the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor) have been estimated. Although
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Figure 2.3. Cumulative returns for trading strategies in calendar time. This figure shows the cumulative
sum of daily returns of trading strategies in which stocks are shorted if options written on them have been
exercised early two trading days ago (top panel), three trading days ago (mid panel), or at least two but no
more than ten trading days ago (bottom panel). The stocks shorted on a given day are equally weighted.
The strategies hedge the exposures of the short stock position to the three Fama-French factors (MKT,
SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD). The cumulative sums of returns both before and after
subtracting short-sale costs are illustrated. For each date in the sample, the number of stocks that
experience early exercise of an option written on them (i.e., number of events) is illustrated with a gray bar.
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these models do capture much of the variation in the returns, both the one- and four-factor abnormal
returns are significantly positive on average, with the former being larger than the latter. Therefore,
the strategies considered so far might not fully capture the predictive power of early exercise for
future stock returns.
The Fama-MacBeth regression setup presented in this subsection takes care of this problem in
at least two ways. First, it compares the abnormal returns after early exercise not to zero, but to
the abnormal returns of the rest of the stock universe from CRSP. Thus, a potential general trend
not captured by the one- and four-factor models does not bias the result as long as it has, within
the same month on average, the same effect on the stocks that have recently experienced early
exercise and those which have not. Second, the Fama-MacBeth procedure allows for changing
deviations in the abnormal returns over time and corrects for possible serial correlation in these
deviations. While one-factor and four-factor abnormal returns are significantly positive in a classic
calculation of the t-statistics, both become insignificant in the Fama-MacBeth regression setup.
The Fama-MacBeth setup is flexible enough to capture the serial correlation of the deviations from
the models to a point where the deviations from zero become insignificant. Thus, if early exercise is
still a significant predictor of future stock returns within this setup, it provides important evidence.
The Fama-MacBeth regressions are performed in the following way. The abnormal returns for
all stocks in the CRSP data are subdivided into groups consisting of returns for each of the months
from October 2003 to August 2010, except January 2006 because of missing option exercise data.
Then, for each of the 82 months, an OLS regression is run with one- or four-factor abnormal returns
as the dependent variable and one or more dummy variables for early exercises on previous trading
days as independent variables. A fixed effect for DCBS, the integer score from one to ten for short-
sale cost, is included to take into account that returns and early exercise may both correlate with
short-sale costs. The subregressions result in 82 estimates for each dummy variable, one for each
subregression. The average of these estimates is then the estimate for the overall Fama-MacBeth
regression. The t-statistic for each dummy is the sample standard deviation of the 82 estimates
corrected for possible autocorrelation using Newey-West correction with automatic lag selection
with a Bartlett kernel (Newey and West, 1987, 1994).
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The results of the regressions, reported in Table 2.4, are similar for the dependent variable being
one-factor abnormal return (Panel A) and four-factor abnormal return (Panel B). As expected, a
highly significant positive abnormal return is seen for stocks for which an option written on them
have been exercised early the same day. On days with early exercise, one trading day before a
significant, negative abnormal return is observed. The same holds for stocks for which an option
written on them has been exercised early two or three trading days ago. The predictive power of
early exercises on days even further back are all insignificant, except one. However, they all have
a negative sign in the regressions with only one dummy variable. This is consistent with early
exercise predicting lower future stock returns due to private information, not price impact being
the driver. On the days after the days with significantly lower returns, the returns do not bounce
back and recover what was lost the previous days. This can also be seen in the regression with
a dummy variable for early exercise for each of the previous two to ten trading days. Abnormal
returns are still negative two and three trading days after early exercise. That underlying stocks do
not bounce back on consecutive days is evidence that the negative abnormal returns two and three
trading days after early exercise is not just a temporary price impact from stocks being sold.
2.5 The effect of agent type, size, and time to expiration
So far, the focus has been on the set of stock-days with early exercise without considering further
details of the exercises. This section looks at how the return of the underlying stock after early
exercise varies in different dimensions: the agent type exercising, the number of contracts exercised
for the given stock on the given day, the market capitalization of the underlying stock, and a sort
on both moneyness and time to expiration for the option at time of exercise. Finally, the calendar
time returns presented in Subsection 2.4.2 are controlled for stock reversal using the reversal factor
constructed by Nagel (2012).
99
Table 2.4
Abnormal returns after early exercise: Regression analysis.
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions with the dependent variable being abnormal
return from a one-factor capital asset pricing model (Panel A) and a four-factor model (Panel B). The four factors are
the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB), and high
book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)). The independent
variables are dummy variables equal to one if early exercise is observed for options written on the stock the given
number of trading days before. For each of the 12 Fama-MacBeth regressions, a subregression is performed for each
month from October 2003 to August 2010 (excluding January 2006 because of missing exercise data). The averages
of each of the time series of the estimates are reported in percentages, and the t-statistics for the time series corrected
for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. DCBS (Daily Cost of Borrow Score) is an integer score from one to
ten reflecting the cost of shorting the stock and has been included as a fixed effect in all subregressions.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: One factor–hedged returns
Early exercise
Same day 1.206%
(18.50)
One day before -0.037%
(-2.73)
Two days before -0.063% -0.053%
(-3.51) (-3.40)
Three days before -0.050% -0.038%
(-2.86) -(2.58)
Four days before -0.009% 0.015%
(-0.51) (1.02)
Five days before -0.027% -0.014%
(-1.28) (-0.73)
Six days before -0.012% 0.005%
(-0.70) (0.30)
Seven days before 0.000% 0.019%
(-0.01) (1.14)
Eight days before -0.021% -0.010%
(-1.11) (-0.62)
Nine days before -0.017% -0.006%
(-0.89) (-0.35)
Ten days before -0.009% 0.005%
(-0.51) (0.33)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Four factor–hedged returns
Early exercise
Same day 1.166%
(21.72)
One day before -0.033%
(-2.00)
Two days before -0.050% -0.035%
(-3.04) (-2.77)
Three days before -0.046% -0.029%
(-2.57) -(1.94)
Four days before -0.014% 0.014%
(-0.78) (0.92)
Five days before -0.030% -0.012%
(-1.68) (-0.78)
Six days before -0.028% -0.008%
(-1.48) (-0.47)
Seven days before -0.027% -0.006%
(-1.76) (-0.36)
Eight days before -0.032% -0.013%
(-2.35) (-1.15)
Nine days before -0.024% -0.006%
(-1.32) (-0.39)
Ten days before -0.017% 0.002%
(-1.18) (0.15)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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2.5.1 Return after early exercise by type of agent exercising
The data allow for the identification of the following three types of agents performing the early
exercise: customers of brokers, firms, and market makers. Does the predictive power of early
exercise over future stock returns depend on what type of agent is exercising? Table 2.5 shows the
results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions of four-factor abnormal returns with dummy variables
for previous early exercises by agent type. Panel A shows the results of the regression for which
only exercises by customers of brokers are included. Panel B shows the results for firms; Panel
C, for market makers. For customers, significant negative abnormal returns on days with early
exercise two and three trading days before are observed, both in the regressions with one dummy
variable and the regression with a dummy variable for each day two to ten days prior. The same
pattern is not observed for firms and market makers. One explanation for this finding could be
that customers have many more stock-days with early exercise than firms or market makers, c.f.
Table 2.1. It is not a trend that the estimates are closer to zero for firms and market makers than
for customers, which supports that the lack of significance could relate to lower statistical power
because of less data.
I test whether a real difference exists between the three groups. For each subregression in Ta-
ble 2.5, specification (3) (one dummy for early exercise two trading days ago), the market maker
dummy estimate is subtracted from the corresponding customer dummy estimate. This leads to a
time series with 82 observations of the difference. Taking the average of this time series and es-
timating its sample standard deviation corrected for autocorrelation using Newey-West correction
results in a t-statistic of 0.23 for the difference, i.e., insignificant. Repeating the procedure for the
difference between customers and firms, the t-statistic is −0.02. For the difference between firms
and market makers, it is 0.13. In other words, the average prediction for abnormal stock return
two trading days after early exercise does not depend significantly on the type of agent exercising
early, at least in this sample. This result is robust to using one-factor abnormal returns instead of
four-factor abnormal returns as the dependent variable. It indicates that private information is not
restricted to only one of the groups.
The tests of trading strategies in calendar time can also be performed separately for early ex-
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Table 2.5
Abnormal returns after early exercises by agent type: Regression analysis.
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions with the dependent variable being abnormal
return from a four-factor model, i.e., the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market
capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up
minus down (UMD)). The independent variables are dummy variables equal to one if early exercise is observed for
options written on the stock the given number of trading days before, and the exercise is performed by a customer
(Panel A), firm (Panel B), or market maker (Panel C). For each of the 12 Fama-MacBeth regressions in a panel, a
subregression is performed for each month from October 2003 to August 2010 (excluding January 2006 because of
missing exercise data). The averages of each of the time series of the estimates are reported in percentages, and the
t-statistics for the time series corrected for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. DCBS (Daily Cost of Borrow
Score) is an integer score from one to ten reflecting the cost of shorting the stock and has been included as a fixed
effect in all subregressions.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Customers
Early exercise
Same day 1.273%
(19.45)
One day before -0.030%
(-1.82)
Two days before -0.053% -0.040%
(-3.21) (-2.94)
Three days before -0.045% -0.029%
(-2.68) -(2.05)
Four days before -0.005% 0.024%
(-0.28) (1.46)
Five days before -0.034% -0.017%
(-1.62) (-0.96)
Six days before -0.031% -0.012%
(-1.58) (-0.69)
Seven days before -0.027% -0.005%
(-1.63) (-0.26)
Eight days before -0.037% -0.020%
(-2.78) (-1.87)
Nine days before -0.024% -0.005%
(-1.22) (-0.29)
Ten days before -0.019% -0.001%
(-1.32) (-0.13)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Firms
Early exercise
Same day 2.090%
(10.69)
One day before 0.008%
(0.11)
Two days before -0.056% -0.046%
(-0.73) (-0.64)
Three days before -0.065% -0.028%
(-0.87) -(0.41)
Four days before 0.054% 0.082%
(0.74) (1.08)
Five days before -0.066% -0.071%
(-3.91) (-1.92)
Six days before -0.147% -0.143%
(-2.16) (-2.03)
Seven days before -0.077% -0.064%
(-1.03) (-0.89)
Eight days before -0.023% -0.026%
(-0.34) (-0.38)
Nine days before 0.079% 0.095%
(1.25) (1.59)
Ten days before 0.034% 0.035%
(0.46) (0.50)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel C: Market makers
Early exercise
Same day 0.810%
(13.07)
One day before -0.047%
(-1.27)
Two days before -0.071% -0.057%
(-1.78) (-1.70)
Three days before -0.049% -0.017%
(-1.04) -(0.40)
Four days before -0.072% -0.056%
(-1.57) (-1.22)
Five days before -0.107% -0.109%
(-1.86) (-2.00)
Six days before 0.053% 0.104%
(1.18) (2.40)
Seven days before -0.052% -0.054%
(-2.88) (-2.09)
Eight days before 0.025% 0.047%
(0.81) (1.26)
Nine days before -0.049% -0.040%
(-1.11) (-0.93)
Ten days before -0.016% -0.015%
(-0.34) (-0.33)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ercises for each of the three types of agents. The cumulative sums of returns for such strategies
are illustrated in Fig. 2.4. The top panel illustrates the cumulative sum of one-factor abnormal re-
turns two trading days after early exercise. The bottom panel shows the corresponding cumulative
four-factor abnormal returns. In the final part of the sample, the returns of the strategies based on
exercises by customers and the one based on exercises by market makers are highly correlated.
One reason for this is overlap between the stock-days with early exercise for customers and the
stock-days for market makers.
For all three types of agents, a positive cumulated sum of abnormal return at the end of the
sample period is evident and the cumulated sum of returns is larger for the four factor–hedged
strategy than for the one factor–hedged strategy. No obvious trend difference between the returns
of the three strategies emerges, as variability makes the cumulative sum of returns fluctuate. Not
surprisingly, the fluctuations are largest for firms, the agent type with the least stock-days with
early exercise, and smallest for customers, the agent type with the most stock-days with early
exercise. The return of the strategy based on early exercises by market makers stabilizes in the last
part of the sample period, which is also the time period with the highest density of stock-days with
early exercise for this agent type.
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Figure 2.4. Cumulative returns for trading strategies in calendar time by agent type. This figure shows the
cumulative sum of returns of trading strategies in which stocks are shorted if an option written on the stock
has been exercised early two trading days ago by a customer, firm, or market maker. The stocks shorted on
a given day are equally weighted. Two strategies are reported. In the top panel, the market exposure of the
short stock position is hedged using ex ante estimated betas (one factor–hedged). In the bottom panel, the
exposures to the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization
minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up minus
down (UMD)) of the short stock position are hedged using ex ante betas (four factor–hedged). Short-sale
costs are not subtracted from the returns.
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2.5.2 Return after early exercise by number of contracts exercised
The set of stock-days with early exercises can be sorted based on the number of contracts exercised
for the given underlying stock on the given date. This way, what is tested is whether the number of
contracts exercised is correlated with the future return of the underlying stock and, thus, the level
of private information. Stock-days are divided into three groups: stock-days with one to ten option
contracts exercised early, stock-days with 11–100 option contracts exercised early, and stock-days
with more than 100 option contracts exercised early. Table 2.1 shows the number of stock-days in
each group.
For each of the three groups, Fama-MacBeth regressions are performed with four-factor ab-
normal return as the dependent variable. The independent variables are dummy variables equal
to one only if the number of contracts exercised corresponds to the given group. The results are
in Table 2.6. The estimated effects of early exercise two and three trading days ago are negative
for all three groups, but significantly negative only in some of the cases. Abnormal returns on
stock-days with 11–100 contracts exercised two and three trading days ago are significantly neg-
ative (Panel B). For the group with one to ten exercises (Panel A), a significant negative impact
is evident for early exercise these days in the regressions with only one dummy variable, but it
is no longer significant on a 5% level once all the dummies for early exercise two to ten trading
days ago are included. For the group with more than 100 early exercises, the estimates are not
significantly different from zero. The lack of significance may be attributed to the smaller number
of stock-days with more than 100 early exercises, c.f. Table 2.1. As for different agent types, I
test for a difference in the abnormal return two days after early exercise depending on the number
of contracts exercised. No significant differences between the three groups are found. However, if
one-factor abnormal returns are used instead of four-factor abnormal returns, the abnormal returns
two trading days after 11–100 contracts are exercised are significantly lower than when only one to
ten contracts were exercised. Going from four-factor to one-factor abnormal returns, the t-statistic
changes from −1.74 to −2.55, which indicates a difference. The evidence is, however, not con-
clusive, because the result is significant only for one of the two proposed measures for abnormal
returns.
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Table 2.6
Abnormal returns after early exercise by size of exercise: Regression analysis.
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions with the dependent variable being abnormal
return from a four-factor model, i.e., the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market
capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up
minus down (UMD)). The independent variables are dummy variables equal to one if early exercise is observed for
options written on the stock the given number of trading days before, and the number of contracts exercised is one to
ten (Panel A), 11–100 (Panel B), and more than 100 (Panel C). For each of the 12 Fama-MacBeth regressions in a
panel, a subregression is performed for each month from October 2003 to August 2010 (excluding January 2006
because of missing exercise data). The averages of each of the time series of the estimates are reported in
percentages, and the t-statistics for the time series corrected for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. DCBS
(Daily Cost of Borrow Score) is an integer score from one to ten reflecting the cost of shorting the stock and has been
included as a fixed effect in all subregressions.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: One to ten contracts exercised
Early exercise
Same day 0.884%
(15.09)
One day before -0.037%
(-1.96)
Two days before -0.038% -0.028%
(-1.97) (-1.60)
Three days before -0.042% -0.032%
(-2.04) -(1.73)
Four days before -0.014% -0.001%
(-0.73) (-0.05)
Five days before -0.027% -0.015%
(-1.76) (-1.15)
Six days before -0.027% -0.014%
(-1.40) (-0.77)
Seven days before -0.029% -0.018%
(-1.70) (-0.96)
Eight days before -0.035% -0.025%
(-3.06) (-2.57)
Nine days before -0.025% -0.014%
(-1.37) (-0.85)
Ten days before -0.014% -0.003%
(-1.07) (-0.30)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: 11–100 contracts exercised
Early exercise
Same day 1.297%
(21.58)
One day before -0.021%
(-0.94)
Two days before -0.070% -0.058%
(-3.46) (-3.25)
Three days before -0.053% -0.038%
(-2.77) -(2.51)
Four days before -0.018% 0.002%
(-0.88) (0.12)
Five days before -0.033% -0.019%
(-1.29) (-0.86)
Six days before -0.037% -0.023%
(-1.41) (-1.01)
Seven days before -0.015% 0.003%
(-0.78) (0.14)
Eight days before -0.038% -0.027%
(-1.76) (-1.40)
Nine days before -0.014% 0.003%
(-0.60) (0.12)
Ten days before -0.011% 0.004%
(-0.56) (0.22)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
106
Panel C: More than 100 contracts exercised
Early exercise
Same day 1.895%
(19.00)
One day before -0.048%
(-1.25)
Two days before -0.027% -0.012%
(-0.93) (-0.39)
Three days before -0.025% -0.021%
(-0.67) -(0.61)
Four days before 0.003% 0.033%
(0.13) (1.14)
Five days before -0.038% -0.028%
(-1.07) (-0.76)
Six days before -0.002% 0.021%
(-0.07) (1.45)
Seven days before -0.060% -0.053%
(-2.55) (-1.45)
Eight days before 0.010% 0.037%
(0.29) (1.12)
Nine days before -0.046% -0.040%
(-1.41) (-1.19)
Ten days before -0.053% -0.051%
(-1.49) (-1.50)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.5.3 Return after early exercise bymarket capitalization of underlying stock
So far, this paper documents that early exercises predict future returns of the underlying stock. But
one might be concerned that the results are driven by something else, e.g., unobserved illiquidity
of the underlying stock. As a robustness check, the Fama-MacBeth regressions are repeated on
two disjointed, restricted samples based on the market capitalization of the underlying stock.
To construct the restricted samples, I use the monthly median market equity breakpoints for
New York Stock Exchange stocks.5 Each stock in the sample is then assigned accordingly as
either low or high market capitalization. The abnormal stock returns are grouped into low or
high market capitalization based on which group the stock belonged to at the end of the month
two months prior. By going two months back in time, I avoid endogeneity issues between the
return, the previous early exercises (that goes up to ten trading days back in time), and the market
capitalization used to sort the stock. The Fama-MacBeth regressions are then performed for each
of the two subsamples of abnormal returns.
The results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions are presented in Table 2.7. The results for stocks
with low market capitalization (Panel A) are similar to those with high market capitalization (Panel
B). For stocks with low market capitalization, early exercise significantly predicts lower abnormal
5The breakpoints are downloaded from Kenneth French’s data library:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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stock returns two and three trading days later. Once controlling for early exercises for each of the
days two to ten trading days ago, the indicator for early exercise three trading days ago remains
significant on a 5% level and the indicator for early exercise two trading days ago becomes bor-
derline significant with at t-statistic of −1.96. The returns do not show any signs of bouncing back
afterward.
For stocks with high market capitalization (Panel B), a significant, negative effect of early
exercise is evident two trading days ago, both with and without controls for early exercises prior
to this time. The estimates resemble those for stocks with low market capitalization. The indicator
for early exercise three trading days ago is negative and borderline significant when not controlling
for exercises at other times. Once controlling for early exercises prior to this, the estimate does
not remain significant, however. Both for low and high market capitalization stocks, no systematic
positive trend is observed for the loadings on indicators for early exercise four to ten trading days
ago. A systematic positive trend could have indicated that stock prices bounce back after a price
impact from stocks sold. Generally, the results are consistent with the early exercises reflecting
private information among the option owners exercising early.
2.5.4 Return after early exercise by moneyness and time to expiration
Does the moneyness and time to expiration of the exercised option matter for the prediction of stock
return? This subsection presents results of Fama-MacBeth regressions in which option exercises
are sorted on moneyness and time to expiration. The median moneyness for all unique option-
days with early exercise is observed. Option-days are assigned to the group for high moneyness
if they have a moneyness larger than this median and to the group for low moneyness otherwise.
The option exercises are similarly sorted on time to expiration. Combining these sorts creates four
groups.
For the Fama-MacBeth regressions, the dependent variable is the four-factor abnormal return.
The independent variables are dummy variables set to one if an option written on the stock was
exercised a given number of trading days before and zero otherwise. Only option exercises for
the relevant combination of moneyness and time to expiration can lead to the dummy variables
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Table 2.7
Abnormal returns after early exercise, restricted samples by market capitalization: Regression analysis.
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions with the dependent variable being abnormal
return from a four-factor model, i.e., the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market
capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up
minus down (UMD)). The independent variables are dummy variables equal to one if early exercise is observed for
options written on the stock the given number of trading days before. The regressions are performed on two restricted
samples based on market capitalization of the stock. At the end of each month, all stocks with a market capitalization
above (below) the median market capitalization for NYSE companies are assigned to the bucket for high (low) market
capitalization. The abnormal returns for a stock in a month are then assigned to either the high or the low market
capitalization group based on which of the buckets the stock belonged to at the end of the month two months earlier
(to avoid endogeneity issues). The results for stocks with low and high market capitalization are shown in Panels A
and B, respectively. For each of the 12 Fama-MacBeth regressions in a panel, a subregression is performed for each
month from November 2003 to August 2010 (excluding January 2006 because of missing exercise data). The
averages of each of the time series of the estimates are reported in percentages, and the t-statistics for the time series
corrected for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. DCBS (Daily Cost of Borrow Score) is an integer score
from one to ten reflecting the cost of shorting the stock and has been included as a fixed effect in all subregressions.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Low market capitalization
Early exercise
Same day 1.411%
(20.89)
One day before -0.035%
(-1.91)
Two days before -0.049% -0.035%
(-2.38) (-1.96)
Three days before -0.053% -0.038%
(-2.93) -(2.71)
Four days before -0.011% 0.017%
(-0.52) (1.00)
Five days before -0.022% -0.004%
(-1.15) (-0.25)
Six days before -0.024% -0.005%
(-1.01) (-0.25)
Seven days before -0.022% 0.001%
(-1.21) (0.05)
Eight days before -0.040% -0.026%
(-2.41) (-1.60)
Nine days before -0.029% -0.014%
(-1.39) (-0.79)
Ten days before -0.006% 0.015%
(-0.41) (1.19)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: High market capitalization
Early exercise
Same day 0.777%
(13.08)
One day before -0.028%
(-2.06)
Two days before -0.044% -0.032%
(-2.88) (-2.00)
Three days before -0.034% -0.018%
(-1.86) -(0.88)
Four days before -0.012% 0.011%
(-0.78) (0.82)
Five days before -0.034% -0.019%
(-1.46) (-0.78)
Six days before -0.034% -0.017%
(-1.97) (-1.01)
Seven days before -0.036% -0.020%
(-1.92) (-0.95)
Eight days before -0.016% 0.005%
(-0.98) (0.25)
Nine days before -0.010% 0.014%
(-0.49) (0.70)
Ten days before -0.031% -0.020%
(-1.57) (-0.96)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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being one. DCBS is included as a fixed effect in all the regressions. Subregressions are performed
monthly. However, no subregressions in the Fama-MacBeth procedure are performed for October
2003. The return data start October 22, 2003, with the first upcoming option expiration date being
November 22, 2003. Hence, the model cannot be estimated for option exercises with short time
to expiration for October 2003. Therefore, the month is excluded from all four Fama-MacBeth
regressions.
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the results for early exercises with low moneyness and short time
to expiration. These exercises do not have a statistically significant effect on consecutive stock
returns. A possible explanation is that most of these exercises are unrelated to private information
but are performed by option owners who already hedge their option position by shorting the stock.
They optimally exercise their options once the stock price reaches the lower boundary, c.f. Sec-
tion 2.2 and Fig. 2.1. These exercises happen at the lower boundary, and those induced by changes
in the agent’s preference for the underlying stock due to private information happen between the
boundaries. All else equal, the exercises with strongest private information content would be ex-
pected to happen at higher moneyness levels. A counteracting effect could be that it might take a
stronger private signal to give up more optionality when exercising early. All else equal, optionality
is decreasing in moneyness (when in the money) and increasing in time to expiration.
Panel B reports the results for abnormal returns after early exercises of options with low mon-
eyness and long time to expiration. Here, more negative signs are on the indicator variables, con-
sistent with the idea that giving up more optionality requires a stronger private signal. However,
only the coefficients for early exercise five and six trading days ago are significant, and only when
not including other indicator variables in the regression.
Panel C shows the results for exercise of options with high moneyness and short time to ex-
piration. Here, the abnormal return two trading days after early exercise is significantly lower,
both with and without including indicators for early exercise three to ten trading days prior. This
is consistent with early exercises induced by private information being more prevalent among op-
tions with higher moneyness. Again, results are stronger when looking at options with longer time
to expiration (Panel D). Abnormal returns are significantly negative not only on days with early
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Table 2.8
Abnormal returns after early exercise by moneyness and time to expiration: Regression analysis.
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions with the dependent variable being abnormal
return from a four-factor model, i.e., the three Fama-French factors (excess market returns (MKT), small market
capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus low (HML)) and the momentum factor (up
minus down (UMD)). The independent variables are dummy variables equal to one if early exercise is observed for
options written on the stock the given number of trading days before. Panel A reports the results for low moneyness
and short time to expiration, i.e., the dummy variables can be equal to one only if the exercised option had moneyness
at or below median moneyness and time to expiration is at or below the median time to expiration of all options
exercised. The results for low moneyness and long time to expiration are in Panel B; for high moneyness and short
time to expiration, in Panel C; and for high moneyness and long time to expiration, in Panel D. For each of the 12
Fama-MacBeth regressions in a panel, a subregression is performed for each month from November 2003 to August
2010 (excluding January 2006 because of missing exercise data). The averages of each of the time series of the
estimates are reported in percentages, and the t-statistics for the time series corrected for autocorrelation are reported
in parentheses. DCBS (Daily Cost of Borrow Score) is an integer score from one to ten reflecting the cost of shorting
the stock and has been included as a fixed effect in all subregressions.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Low moneyness and short time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 0.908%
(18.56)
One day before -0.014%
(-0.61)
Two days before -0.017% -0.019%
(-0.66) (-0.98)
Three days before -0.001% -0.001%
(-0.02) -(0.03)
Four days before 0.029% 0.042%
(1.13) (1.94)
Five days before -0.008% -0.004%
(-0.37) (-0.20)
Six days before -0.020% -0.017%
(-0.86) (-0.81)
Seven days before -0.006% 0.005%
(-0.22) (0.21)
Eight days before -0.015% -0.013%
(-0.68) (-1.36)
Nine days before -0.006% -0.011%
(-0.20) (-0.40)
Ten days before 0.010% 0.007%
(0.41) (0.26)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Low moneyness and long time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 1.675%
(22.31)
One day before -0.028%
(-0.65)
Two days before -0.017% 0.001%
(-0.77) (0.04)
Three days before -0.035% -0.022%
(-1.49) -(0.74)
Four days before -0.026% -0.007%
(-0.81) (-0.25)
Five days before -0.067% -0.052%
(-2.10) (-1.70)
Six days before -0.043% -0.024%
(-2.24) (-1.28)
Seven days before -0.042% -0.025%
(-1.39) (-0.81)
Eight days before -0.012% 0.006%
(-0.60) (0.31)
Nine days before -0.037% -0.023%
(-1.57) (-1.15)
Ten days before -0.036% -0.025%
(-1.34) (-0.97)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: High moneyness and short time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 1.188%
(17.66)
One day before -0.104%
(-2.63)
Two days before -0.088% -0.090%
(-2.61) (-2.99)
Three days before -0.029% -0.020%
(-0.67) -(0.52)
Four days before 0.018% 0.034%
(0.42) (0.82)
Five days before 0.019% 0.027%
(0.60) (0.87)
Six days before 0.024% 0.039%
(0.57) (0.93)
Seven days before -0.014% -0.001%
(-0.32) (-0.01)
Eight days before 0.004% 0.013%
(0.06) (0.21)
Nine days before 0.009% 0.001%
(0.31) (0.05)
Ten days before -0.045% -0.071%
(-1.36) (-1.92)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Low moneyness and long time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 1.675%
(22.31)
One day before -0.028%
(-0.65)
Two days before -0.017% 0.001%
(-0.77) (0.04)
Three days before -0.035% -0.022%
(-1.49) -(0.74)
Four days before -0.026% -0.007%
(-0.81) (-0.25)
Five days before -0.067% -0.052%
(-2.10) (-1.70)
Six days before -0.043% -0.024%
(-2.24) (-1.28)
Seven days before -0.042% -0.025%
(-1.39) (-0.81)
Eight days before -0.012% 0.006%
(-0.60) (0.31)
Nine days before -0.037% -0.023%
(-1.57) (-1.15)
Ten days before -0.036% -0.025%
(-1.34) (-0.97)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: High moneyness and short time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 1.188%
(17.66)
One day before -0.104%
(-2.63)
Two days before -0.088% -0.090%
(-2.61) (-2.99)
Three days before -0.029% -0.020%
(-0.67) -(0.52)
Four days before 0.018% 0.034%
(0.42) (0.82)
Five days before 0.019% 0.027%
(0.60) (0.87)
Six days before 0.024% 0.039%
(0.57) (0.93)
Seven days before -0.014% -0.001%
(-0.32) (-0.01)
Eight days before 0.004% 0.013%
(0.06) (0.21)
Nine days before 0.009% 0.001%
(0.31) (0.05)
Ten days before -0.045% -0.071%
(-1.36) (-1.92)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: High moneyness and long time to expiration
Early exercise
Same day 1.608%
(23.12)
One day before -0.045%
(-2.03)
Two days before -0.076% -0.046%
(-3.13) (-2.22)
Three days before -0.084% -0.053%
(-3.24) -(2.95)
Four days before -0.047% -0.003%
(-1.53) (-0.11)
Five days before -0.074% -0.041%
(-2.79) (-1.78)
Six days before -0.073% -0.039%
(-2.48) (-1.36)
Seven days before -0.061% -0.024%
(-2.76) (-1.10)
Eight days before -0.038% 0.003%
(-3.12) (0.17)
Nine days before -0.065% -0.037%
(-2.33) (-1.55)
Ten days before -0.022% 0.015%
(-1.03) (0.82)
DCBS fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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exercise two trading days prior, but also on days with early exercise three trading days prior. The
significance is robust to including indicators for early exercise prior to that. This is consistent
with longer time to expiration requiring stronger private signals to make early exercise attractive,
as more optionality is sacrificed by the option owner. While the analysis is somewhat crude, as
it does not control for all relevant factors (e.g., volatility and interest rates), the results indicate
that exercises of options with longer time to expiration give stronger predictions for stock returns.
This is consistent with the idea that stronger private information is needed to compensate for lost
optionality.
2.5.5 Calendar time returns controlling for stock reversal
As a robustness test, I test whether the results are driven by stock reversal. A concern could be that,
if stock reversal is strong, a rise in the stock price could induce early exercise followed by a drop
in stock price, which is not related to private information but to the cost of providing liquidity in
the market. This concern has already been addressed by showing that early exercise is a negative
predictor of abnormal returns for stocks with both low and high market capitalization. A further
test would be to control for a reversal factor such as the one constructed by Nagel (2012). His factor
is based on strategies in which stocks are bought if they under-performed recently and sold if they
over-performed. Five reversal strategies are constructed. For each strategy, stocks are weighted
proportional to the negative of market-adjusted returns one to five days prior. The reversal factor
return on a given day is the average return of these five strategies.6
To test if early exercise predicts stock returns due to stock reversal instead of private informa-
tion, the calendar time regressions from Section 3.4, Subsection 2.4.2 are rerun, this time including
the reversal factor on the right-hand side. The results of the regressions are in Table 2.9. For the
trading strategy in which stocks are shorted two trading days after early exercise (Panel A), a posi-
tive loading is evident on the reversal factor. However, this loading is insignificant once the strategy
hedges its exposure to the four factors. The alpha declines relative to the results in Table 2.3 but
remains significant for the four factor–hedge without short-sale costs. For the strategies in which
6The reversal factor returns are downloaded from Stefan Nagel’s website:
https://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/snagel/data.
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Table 2.9
Return and factor exposures in calendar time with reversal factor included.
This table shows the abnormal returns of trading strategies in which stocks are shorted if an option written on the
stock has been exercised early two trading days ago (Panel A), three trading days ago (Panel B), or at least two but no
more than ten trading days ago (Panel C). The stocks shorted on a given day are equally weighted. Three strategies
are reported: the stocks are shorted and the proceeds invested in the risk-free asset (excess stock return), the market
exposure of the short stock position is hedged (one factor), and the exposures to the three Fama-French factors
(excess market returns (MKT), small market capitalization minus big (SMB), and high book-to-market ratio minus
low (HML))and the momentum factor (up minus down (UMD)) of the short stock position are hedged (four factor).
The returns after subtracting short-sale costs are also reported. The columns show the ex post alpha and betas in a
five-factor model: the three Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the momentum factor (UMD), and the reversal
factor (REV) from Nagel (2012). The estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressions with t-statistics
reported in parentheses.
Strategy Alpha MKT SMB HML UMD REV
Panel A: Two days after early exercise
Short stock 0.01% -1.12 -0.70 -0.03 0.02 0.12
(0.66) (-79.39) (-25.82) (-0.88) (1.10) (3.65)
Short stock with short sale cost 0.00% -1.09 -0.69 -0.02 0.01 0.14
(0.05) (-78.42) (-25.91) (-0.74) (0.81) (4.32)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.02% 0.10 -0.64 -0.05 0.06 0.08
(1.44) (7.40) (-23.99) (-1.77) (3.56) (2.51)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.01% 0.11 -0.65 -0.05 0.07 0.08
(0.36) (7.53) (-23.93) (-1.65) (4.08) (2.42)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.04% 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.04
(2.58) (2.25) (-0.42) (-3.84) (-0.97) (1.17)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.02% 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.04
(1.40) (2.12) (-0.40) (-3.58) (-0.89) (1.13)
Panel B: Three days after early exercise
Short stock 0.02% -1.14 -0.74 0.92 0.03 0.00
(0.82) (-82.70) (-26.59) (0.40) (1.79) (-0.00)
Short stock with short sale cost 0.02% -1.11 -0.73 -0.45 0.02 0.01
(0.74) (-80.70) (-26.52) (-0.20) (1.12) (0.34)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.04% 0.08 -0.68 0.43 0.08 -0.05
(1.32) (5.50) (-24.58) (0.19) (4.75) (-1.44)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.02% 0.08 -0.69 0.65 0.09 -0.05
(0.63) (5.58) (-24.59) (0.28) (5.46) (-1.38)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.07% 0.00 -0.05 -2.08 0.02 -0.09
(2.83) (0.28) (-2.08) (-0.96) (1.55) (-2.81)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.05% 0.00 -0.05 -1.67 0.03 -0.09
(1.97) (0.17) (-1.92) (-0.76) (1.70) (-2.60)
Panel C: Two to ten days after early exercise
Short stock 0.03% -1.16 -0.70 -0.37 0.04 -0.08
(1.80) (-140.71) (-42.12) (-0.27) (3.84) (-4.01)
Short stock with short sale cost 0.03% -1.15 -0.69 -1.72 0.03 -0.08
(1.99) (-138.17) (-41.33) (-1.24) (2.90) (-3.85)
Short stock one factor hedge 0.04% 0.06 -0.64 -0.70 0.08 -0.10
(2.38) (7.16) (-36.21) (-0.48) (8.33) (-4.60)
Short stock one factor hedge with short sale cost 0.03% 0.07 -0.65 -0.57 0.09 -0.10
(1.71) (7.74) (-36.92) (-0.39) (9.31) (-4.62)
Short stock four factor hedge 0.08% 0.00 -0.05 -3.07 0.04 -0.13
(4.64) (0.18) (-2.94) (-2.24) (4.70) (-6.32)
Short stock four factor hedge with short sale cost 0.06% 0.00 -0.05 -2.95 0.05 -0.13
(3.82) (0.43) (-3.08) (-2.16) (4.99) (-6.26)
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stocks are shorted three trading days after early exercise (Panel B) and two to ten days after early
exercise, the result is a negative loading on the reversal factor. In the latter case, the loading is
significantly negative for all strategies: non-hedged, one factor–hedged, and four factor–hedged.
This negative loading is associated with an increase in the alphas of the strategies. For example,
for the strategy in which stocks are shorted two to ten trading days after early exercise, four-factor
exposures are hedged ex ante, and short-sale costs are included, the t-statistic of alpha goes from
0.86 to 3.82 (c.f. bottom of Panel C). The alpha itself increases from 0.01% to 0.06%. These re-
sults are inconsistent with reversal being the omitted variable driving the result that early exercise
predicts stock returns.
2.6 Conclusion
I provide a theoretical foundation for how private information among option owners can make early
exercise a negative predictor of future stock returns. Consistent with the existence of private infor-
mation among option owners, stocks do in fact have lower abnormal returns after early exercises.
I combine data sources for call option exercises with sources for stock returns and short-sale costs
to test the predictions. Consistent with private information inducing early exercise, trading strate-
gies that short the underlying stock after early exercises of options are shown to yield attractive
risk-adjusted returns. Event studies show that stocks after early exercise have significantly nega-
tive cumulative abnormal returns over the next two to ten trading days after early exercise, using
a four-factor model to estimate abnormal returns. The result is also negative, albeit insignificant,
using a one-factor CAPM.
For every exercise, the type of agent exercising early is determined: customer of a broker, firm,
or market maker. I do not find significant differences of the predictive power over future returns of
the underlying stock between exercises performed by the three agent types, indicating that private
information is not restricted to only one group. Looking at the number of option contracts exercised
early and the future stock returns, no robust relationship can be established between them. I show,
as a robustness check, that the results do not vanish when running the tests on restricted samples
based on the level of market capitalization of the underlying stock. Furthermore, stock reversal is
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not found to drive the results.
Overall, the results serve as evidence that private information among option owners leads to
early exercise decisions and that early exercises related to private information are not concentrated
among any of the three groups of agents: customers of brokers, firms, or market makers.
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Chapter 3
Short-Sale Costs Predict Volatility
With Christian Skov Jensen.
Abstract
As a new test of models of differences of opinions, we study how shorting markets interact
with equity volatility. We identify positive (negative) demand shifts for shorting of stocks by
simultaneous increases (decreases) in short-sale costs and short interest. Consistent with an
increase in differences of opinions, a positive (negative) demand shift, on average, predicts a
volatility that is 2.8 (3.9) percentage points higher (lower) over the next quarter. Event studies
show that average volatilities of stocks hit by supply or demand shifts are higher than for
other stocks, and volatilities peak around the time of shifts. We also find that future volatility
increases with both increases and the level of short-sale costs and short interest.
3.1 Introduction
This paper presents results consistent with increases in differences of opinions leading to both
increased stock volatility and positive demand shifts in the shorting market. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and
Pedersen (2002) show how an increase in differences of opinions increases demand for shorting
the stock. At the same time, Andrei, Carlin, and Hasler (2014) provide a model in which higher
differences of opinions cause higher stock volatility. Furthermore, Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007)
directly use stock volatility as a proxy for differences of opinions. Combining these results leads
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to the prediction that a positive demand shift in the shorting market predicts higher volatility for
the affected stock. We provide evidence consistent with this prediction.
We use daily data on short-sale costs and quantities for the period 2006–2012 to identify shifts
in demand and supply for borrowing stocks and link the shifts to changes in volatilities. The
procedure for identifying the shifts resembles the one used by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007),
where a positive (negative) shift in demand is observed when both short-sale costs and short interest
increase (decrease). Likewise, a positive (negative) shift in supply is identified whenever short-sale
costs decrease (increase) and short interest increases (decreases) simultaneously. We find that a
positive (negative) demand shift in the shorting market predicts a 2.80 (3.90) percentage points
higher (lower) volatility over the next quarter. The average annualized volatility over a quarter is
48.2%. For this volatility level, 2.80 percentage points is an increase of 5.8%. We also test the link
between supply and demand shifts and consecutive volatility for three sub-periods: before, during,
and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. For all three periods, we provide evidence consistent
with our prediction.
Event studies show that supply and demand shifts are associated with higher stock volatility,
both relative to other stocks and to the same stock at other times. Also, many shifts happen when
the average volatility in the overall stock market is high. Furthermore, we find that the level of as
well as the increase in short-sale costs and short interest are positive predictors of volatilities.
Various papers study the relationship between short-sale constraints and differences of opin-
ions. Miller (1977) shows how differences of opinions combined with short-sale constraints can
drive up asset prices and reduce subsequent returns as the marginal investor becomes more opti-
mistic than average. Harrison and Kreps (1978) show that in markets for which short selling is not
possible and agents assign different subjective probabilities to the same events, agents buy stocks
above their own subjective present value of future dividends. The option to sell the stock in the
future increases the stock value today due to incomplete markets and the impossibility of short
selling. Along the same lines, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) present an equilibrium in which
overconfidence leads to higher valuations and bubbles. Short-sale costs and heterogeneity among
investors do not lead to overvaluation in the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model, where the
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agents’ information level differs. The agents realize the effects of short-sale constraints and adjust
their behavior such that prices are unbiased in equilibrium. A left-skewed distribution of returns,
however, is predicted on days where information is released. Short-sale costs slow down the ad-
justment to private bad news more than private good news, generating an asymmetric distribution.
Hong and Stein (2003) construct a model with differences in both information and opinions. Short-
sale constraints mean that prices sometimes only reflect the valuation of optimists. The optimists
are aware of this, as is a group of arbitrageurs. As prices decline, pessimists will at some point
start buying. A decline that does not lead pessimists to buy will reveal that pessimists assign an
even lower value to the stock based on private information. This revelation is informative and
drives prices further down, providing a mechanism for market crashes in equilibrium. Boehme,
Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) proxy for belief dispersion by idiosyncratic volatility of stock re-
turns and combine it with data on short-sale fees obtained from one broker for almost two years.
They test and confirm the hypothesis from Miller (1977) that stocks with both high short-sale con-
straints and high differences of opinions are overvalued. D’Avolio (2002) utilizes an 18-month
data sample to show that short-sale constraints are increasing in the difference of opinions. He
argues that short-sale costs increase with the difference in valuations between stock owners who
do not lend their shares and other agents, i.e., short sellers and stock owners who lend their shares.
Differences of opinions can also be linked to stock volatility. Andrei et al. (2014) build a
model with a single stock in which differences of opinions on the length of the business cycle lead
to higher stock volatility. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) show in a model with differences of
opinions how overconfidence can lead to increased stock volatility, while Shalen (1993) constructs
a model in which dispersion of beliefs related to private information increases return volatility.
Stock volatility is used as a proxy for differences of opinions by Chang et al. (2007). Karl B. Di-
ether (2002) show empirically that dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is positively related
to stock volatilities over the past period. Frankel and Froot (1990) report that dispersion in expec-
tations for exchange rates among forecasters Granger-causes higher exchange rate volatility. They
also show that volatility Granger-causes dispersion, although they argue that this may, in part, be
spurious. Carlin, Longstaff, and Matoba (2014) find that an increase in disagreement among Wall
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Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speed is followed by higher levels of mortgage return
volatility.
Other papers look at the relationship between short-sale constraints and stock volatility. Bai,
Chang, and Wang (2006) predict that short-sale constraints increase stock volatility when the in-
formation asymmetry among market participants is high. They also identify an opposing effect,
namely, that short-sale constraints can reduce volatility through a reduction in fluctuations of ag-
gregate demand. Cao, Zhang, and Zhou (2007) also present ambiguous predictions. Avellaneda
and Lipkin (2009) model how short-sale costs and constraints can lead to short sellers being forced
to close their short positions and increased stock volatility. Empirically, Chang et al. (2007) find
that allowing short selling of individual stocks increases the volatility of these stocks. Using yearly
estimates of stock lending supply and stock volatility, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) find that high
short-sale cost levels are linked to high levels of stock volatility. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009)
observe the daily size of short sales and the total trade volume. They proxy intraday volatility
by dividing the difference between the stock’s high and low price during the day with the high
price. Using this measure, they find that the daily number of short sales relative to total volume
is positively related to contemporaneous volatility which they associate with short sellers being
risk-bearers during periods of uncertainty. They link the uncertainty to asymmetric information
instead of differences of opinions because contemporaneous stock spreads are positively related to
short selling activity, however only borderline significant. Henry and McKenzie (2006) analyze a
small sample of 21 stocks traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1994-2001. They find
that stock volatility is higher after a period during which the stock was sold short.
We complement the literature by empirically linking demand and supply shifts in the shorting
market to the volatilities of the stocks. Our large data set, which includes daily observations, allows
us to study how both short-sale costs and short interest relate to volatilities. Examining 2006-2012
makes it possible to test the prediction under various market conditions.
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3.2 Data and sample characteristics
To test our predictions, we combine data sources and apply sample selection criteria. This section
describes our data sources and how the sample for the empirical tests is constructed. Finally, we
provide a variety of summary statistics.
3.2.1 Data and sample selection
The following two main data sources were combined to reach the results in this paper: a data
set from Data Explorers containing observations for short-sale costs and short interest, and an
OptionMetrics data set containing realized volatilities of stocks at different horizons.
The sample is constructed in the following way: Data Explorers data are observed on a daily
frequency from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012. For a given stock and time interval, Data Ex-
plorers report a Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), i.e., an integer score from one to ten, for
which a higher score indicates a higher cost of borrowing the stock. It also includes a Data Ex-
plorers Short Score (DSS), which is an integer score from zero to five based upon the total number
of borrowed securities net of double counting as a percentage of the shares outstanding. Zero is
a proxy for low short interest, five is high. The vast majority of observations for a given stock
have a time interval of either one or three calendar days. Three days is natural due to weekends,
but holidays can make the interval even longer. We exclude observations with an interval longer
than six days because this kind of interval seems to indicate that the data are not updated from the
previous trading date. We only include observations for which a CUSIP of at least eight digits is
observed.
These data are then merged with data from OptionMetrics matching on observation date and
CUSIP. OptionMetrics data include daily observations of realized historical volatilities over differ-
ent horizons for individual stocks. In the few cases for which various DCBSs or DSSs are observed
for an observation in OptionMetrics, we use the average of DCBS and DSS rounded to the nearest
integer. To obtain the future realized volatility for a given horizon, say 30 calendar days, we find
the first observation date in OptionMetrics at least 30 days into the future for the given stock and
look up the historical realized volatility. As a result, our data set contains both past and future
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realized volatilities.
We study changes in both short-sale costs and short interest. As a control in our empirical
setup, we use lagged DCBS and lagged DSS. For each observation, we look up the DCBS and
DSS for the previous day for the given stock. If the previous day is more than six days prior, we
set the lag to missing. We also observe the realized past volatility two days prior. This is important
since we want to see how volatility changes with short-sale costs when controlling for historical
volatility. Going back two days ensures that the historical volatility is not estimated based on the
return on the day for which we observe the change in DCBS or DSS. From this combined data set,
we exclude observations for which we do not observe DCBS and DSS, both current and lagged.
Realized past volatilities are at a 10, 30, 60, and 91 day horizon, both with and without two-day
lag, and future realized volatilities are on a 10, 30, 60, and 91 day horizon.
3.2.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the sample sorted into buckets based on DCBS and DSS.
Panel A reports the number of stock dates for each of the combinations and totals. A majority of
the stock dates have a DCBS equal to one. This reflects that most stocks are not expensive to short.
Panel B shows consecutive 30-day volatilities, which, as a trend, have a positive relationship with
DSS and DCBS.
One prediction in this paper relates to demand shifts. Supply and demand shifts are identified
by combined changes in DSS and DCBS. Table 3.2 summarizes a number of observations and lists
average subsequent volatilities for the stock dates for each combination of DSS and DCBS (up,
down and stable). We see that more than 90% of the stock dates have no change in either DSS or
DCBS. The data set, however, is large enough to obtain more than 13,000 observations for which
both DSS and DCBS change. These observations are relatively evenly distributed between the four
categories of positive and negative supply and demand shifts. Each of the four groups has a higher
average volatility than the full sample.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the distribution of the four types of supply and demand shifts over time. All
of the shifts spike during the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008. Table 3.3 reports the top five
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days for each type of shift. Three of the top five dates for negative demand shifts are one trading
day after a top five day for positive demand shifts. And three out of the top five dates for positive
supply shifts are one day after a top five negative supply shift. This could indicate that many shifts,
at least during the most heated times of the financial crisis, are responses to recent shifts in the
opposite direction.
Table 3.1
Summary statistics: Levels.
This table shows, for each combination of Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) and Data Explorers Short Score
(DSS), the number of stock dates (Panel A), and the average annualized volatilities for the consecutive 30 calendar
days (Panel B). DCBS is an integer score from 1–10 for which a higher score indicates higher short-sale costs. DSS
is an integer score from 0–5 for which a higher score indicates higher short interest relative to shares outstanding.
Data contain daily observations from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012.
Panel A: Number of stock days
DSS 0 DSS 1 DSS 2 DSS 3 DSS 4 DSS 5 Total
DCBS 1 649,117 1,556,169 738,360 303,578 128,845 84,874 3,460,943
DCBS 2 58,519 80,990 60,814 39,770 24,655 30,860 295,608
DCBS 3 31,532 43,657 28,490 19,908 13,090 20,329 15,7006
DCBS 4 15,425 25,111 18,914 13,330 8,644 14,767 96,191
DCBS 5 6,510 12,907 11,695 7,254 5,107 8,248 51,721
DCBS 6 3,567 11,170 9,573 6,768 4,570 6,851 42,499
DCBS 7 2,729 10,927 10,428 6,426 4,321 6,318 41,149
DCBS 8 1,132 6,574 6,195 3,623 2,462 3,229 23,215
DCBS 9 902 6,673 5,944 3,797 2,278 3,962 23,556
DCBS 10 1,088 9,132 7,465 4,846 2,721 3,099 28,351
Total 770,521 1,763,310 897,878 409,300 196,693 182,537 4,220,239
Panel B: Average annualized volatilities for the consecutive 30 calendar days
DSS 0 DSS 1 DSS 2 DSS 3 DSS 4 DSS 5 Total
DCBS 1 35.9% 42.3% 46.2% 48.0% 48.7% 47.4% 42.8%
DCBS 2 42.7% 57.7% 62.1% 61.2% 62.3% 57.5% 56.5%
DCBS 3 42.4% 59.3% 65.9% 65.7% 69.2% 60.9% 58.9%
DCBS 4 48.2% 63.8% 69.9% 68.7% 73.1% 64.6% 64.1%
DCBS 5 54.0% 65.9% 76.4% 73.8% 73.9% 69.1% 69.2%
DCBS 6 59.1% 69.6% 79.7% 81.3% 76.1% 78.8% 75.1%
DCBS 7 60.1% 72.5% 80.4% 88.1% 83.2% 75.7% 77.7%
DCBS 8 55.4% 75.5% 80.9% 83.5% 82.6% 73.1% 77.6%
DCBS 9 66.4% 77.4% 80.2% 85.0% 86.9% 80.7% 80.4%
DCBS 10 74.9% 75.4% 88.7% 93.6% 100.8% 92.5% 86.3%
Total 37.4% 44.7% 50.4% 53.7% 56.5% 57.1% 46.5%
127
Number of positive demand shifts
Jul '06 Jul '07 Jul '08 Jul '09 Jul '10 Jul '11 Jul '12
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
Number of positive supply shifts
Jul '06 Jul '07 Jul '08 Jul '09 Jul '10 Jul '11 Jul '12
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
Number of negative demand shifts
Jul '06 Jul '07 Jul '08 Jul '09 Jul '10 Jul '11 Jul '12
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
Number of negative supply shifts
Jul '06 Jul '07 Jul '08 Jul '09 Jul '10 Jul '11 Jul '12
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
Figure 3.1. Frequency of supply and demand shifts over time. This figure shows the number of daily positive and
negative supply and demand shifts. That is, the number of firms on a given day that experiences one of the events of a
simultaneous: increase in short-sale costs and short interest (positive demand); a decrease in short-sale costs and
short interest (negative demand); an increase in short-sale costs and a decrease in short interest (negative supply); a
decrease in short-sale costs and an increase in short interest (positive supply). Note that a firm can experience
multiple different supply and demand shifts on a given day. Our data show that the firms in this figure experienced at
least one of these shifts.
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Table 3.2
Summary statistics: Changes.
This table shows combinations of changes in Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) and Data Explorers Short
Score (DSS). For each combination, it reports the number of stock dates (Panel A) and the average annualized
volatilities for the consecutive 30 calendar days (Panel B). DCBS is an integer score from 1–10 for which a higher
score indicates higher short-sale costs. DSS is an integer score from 0–5 for which a higher score indicates higher
short interest relative to shares outstanding. Data contain daily observations from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012.
Panel A: Number of stock days
DSS down DSS stable DSS up Total
DCBS down 3,579 97,366 3,182 104,127
DCBS stable 85,981 3,841,174 84,987 4,012,142
DCBS up 2,800 97,089 4,081 103,970
Total 92,360 4,035,629 92,250 4,220,239
Panel B: Average annualized volatilities for the consecutive 30 calendar days
DSS down DSS stable DSS up Total
DCBS down 68.4% 63.7% 62.3% 63.8%
DCBS stable 48.5% 45.5% 47.8% 45.6%
DCBS up 69.5% 64.4% 64.5% 64.6%
Total 49.9% 46.3% 49.0% 46.5%
3.3 Predictions
Duffie et al. (2002) show that short-sale costs increase as differences of opinions increase among
market participants about future development of the stock. Furthermore, they also show that the
number of short sellers increases as differences of opinions increase, which implies an increase
in the short interest.1 We identify a simultaneous increase in both short-sale costs and the short
interest as a positive demand shift in the shorting market. Likewise, we identify negative demand
shifts for which we expect the opposite relationship to volatility. Positive demand shifts can arise
for other reasons than an increase in differences of opinions, which is why we do not expect a
perfect relationship between the two. Our prediction is based on differences of opinions but other
sources, e.g., asymmetric information, might lead to similar predictions.
Bai et al. (2006) predict that short-sale constraints increase stock volatility when the informa-
tion asymmetry among market participants is high. Diether et al. (2009) attribute high level of short
1Proposition 4 and Proposition 10 in Duffie et al. (2002) state the relevant results.
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Table 3.3
Days with most supply and demand shifts.
This table reports the top five days for number of shifts for positive (negative) supply and demand shifts. Most of
the days occur during the peak of the financial crisis of 2008. March 2008 was also characterized by financial turmoil
as Bear Stearns was taken over by JP Morgan Chase on March 16, 2008. Interestingly, three out of the top five dates
for negative demand shocks are one trade after a top five date for positive demand shocks. Likewise, three out of top
five positive supply shocks are one day after a top five date for negative supply shocks.
Date Number of shifts
Panel A: Positive demand shifts
March 20th, 2008 131
September 30th, 2008 39
November 1st, 2007 29
October 7th, 2008 28
October 3rd, 2008 18
Panel B: Negative demand shifts
October 10th, 2008 70
October 1st, 2008 60
October 8th, 2008 54
March 24th, 2008 40
September 16th, 2008 34
Panel C: Positive supply shifts
September 17th, 2008 52
October 1st, 2008 41
October 8th, 2008 29
March 24th, 2008 26
March 18th, 2008 23
Panel D: Negative supply shifts
September 15th, 2008 107
September 30th, 2008 87
October 7th, 2008 65
September 29th, 2008 34
March 17th, 2008 31
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selling on days with high differences between the high price and the low price of the stock to short
sellers being risk-bearers during periods of increased uncertainty and they link the uncertainty to
asymmetric information. Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) include the risk of stock borrowers being
forced to deliver the shares back in a model implying higher volatilities for stocks which are hard
to locate and expensive to borrow. These other sources are alternative explanations for our results,
but also leave room for differences of opinions being a driver.
In addition to our main prediction, we test the relationship between stock volatility and positive
and negative supply shifts. Supply shifts can be related to volatility through counterparty risk: a
higher future volatility of the stock can result in a higher risk for the lender of the stock. The risk
that a stock borrower who sells the stock short cannot deliver the stock when requested increases
if the stock value has risen rapidly in value, which is more likely with higher volatility. If potential
stock lenders’ anticipated volatility increases, they can become unwilling to lend out their shares,
resulting in a negative supply shift. If potential stock lenders’ anticipated stock volatility decreases,
it can lead to a positive supply shift.
Furthermore, we look into the empirical relationship between changes of either short-sale costs
(DCBS) or short interest (DSS) without the other one changing. Finally, we test if the level of
short-sale costs (DCBS) and the level of short-interest (DSS) predict volatility. For the levels, we
expect to see results similar to those obtained by Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), who find a positive
relationship between volatility and lending supply, as well as between volatility and short-sale
costs.
3.4 Supply and demand shifts
In this section, we study the empirical link between stock volatilities and supply and demand
shifts in the shorting market. Our main prediction is that positive (negative) demand shifts in the
shorting market predict higher (lower) consecutive volatility of the affected stocks. We perform
tests using regressions on the entire sample, event studies, and regressions on three sub-periods:
before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
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3.4.1 Regressions
In this subsection, we perform cross-sectional regressions to test how supply and demand shifts
affect volatility. We test the relationship between stock volatility and the supply and demand shifts
by regressing future realized volatility on our variable ‘Shift’ which captures the effect associated
with the four different possible supply and demand shifts. The dependent variable in our regression
setup represents realized volatility over the next 10, 30, 60, and 91 calendar days. ‘Shift’ is a
categorical variable with five levels, the four combinations of positive and negative supply and
demand shifts, and zero if no shift occurred. That is, ‘Shiftit’ takes on the category ‘negative
demand’ if both short-sale costs and short interest decrease from day t − 1 to t for stock i and,
correspondingly, for the other three levels. Notice this implies that a firm in our model can only be
subject to, at most, one of the four shifts on any given day. Using only price and quantity data, we
cannot disentangle if multiple shifts occurred on the same day, e.g., simultaneous negative demand
and positive supply shifts. If, however, we observe, for example, that both price and short interest
go down on a single day, then we know that at least a negative demand shift occurred (Cohen et al.,
2007). With this in mind, we set up the regression:
σit+1,t+s = Shift
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−31,t−2 + β3σ
i
t−61,t−2 + β4σ
i
t−92,t−2
+DCBSit−1 + DSS
i
t−1 + DFEt−1 + ε
i
t+1,t+s
(3.1)
The future volatility σit+1,t+s is the earliest estimated volatility for the stock that does not include
date t. In most cases, this means that it is from t + 1 to t + s, but weekends, holidays, and missing
observations, in some cases, lead to an estimate that is based on later days. The historical volatil-
ities are observed on the latest observation day of the stock prior to t - 1. Because we want to test
how volatilities change after the shift when controlling for volatilities before the shift, neither past
nor future volatility estimates are based on the returns of day t − 1 and t. We control for historical
volatilities lagged 10, 30, 60, and 91 calendar days. To make sure our results are not driven by
clustering of shifts around periods with particularly high or particularly low volatilities, we add
date fixed effects (DFE). We wish to control for the overall consecutive realized volatility in the
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stock market.2 Furthermore, to make sure that our results are not a consequence of the level of
short-sale costs and short interest, we control for the one-day lagged level of DCBS and DSS as
fixed effects. The reference level is when neither DCBS nor DSS changed. In other words, we
omit cases for which precisely one of short-sale costs or short interest changed because these are
ambiguous in our setup; i.e., since we cannot determine which shifts occurred, they are excluded.
This is consistent with the methodology that Cohen et al. (2007) use.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the regressions described by (3.1), including test statistics cor-
rected for autocorrelation and clustered on firm level. For all horizons, a positive demand shift is a
significant positive predictor of future volatility. The estimate increases with the horizon from 1.7
percentage points for ten-day future volatility to 2.8 percentage points for 91 days. This is consis-
tent with an increase in differences of opinions leading to both higher stock volatility and a positive
demand shift in the shorting market. The average annualized quarterly volatility in the sample is
48.2%. For this volatility level, a 2.8 percentage points increase corresponds to 5.8% higher volatil-
ity over the next quarter. The increasing positive predictive power of a positive demand shift with
the horizon supports that demand shifts have long-term effects on volatility. Negative demand
shifts are significantly negative predictors for future volatility. This is consistent with a reduction
in differences of opinions. The effect is, in absolute terms, economically larger than for positive
demand shifts.
For supply shifts, the effects are smaller. Negative supply shifts are insignificant in predicting
volatility. Positive supply shifts are significant negative predictors of volatility over the next 60
and 91 days, but insignificant for shorter horizons. The result for positive supply shifts aligns with
the idea that a lower expected future volatility, all else being equal, makes potential lenders more
willing to lend due to reduced counterparty risk.
3.4.2 Event studies
The regressions discussed in the previous section test how supply and demand shifts affect volatility
while controlling for date fixed effects, historical volatilities, lagged DCBS, and lagged DSS. In this
2We could have used VIX instead, which would, however, only capture the conditional expected future volatility.
Using date fixed effects, we control for both the expected and the unexpected future market volatility.
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Table 3.4
Do demand and supply shifts in the shorting market predict stock volatility?
This table shows the results of the cross-sectional regression:
σit+1,t+s = Shift
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−31,t−2 + β3σ
i
t−61,t−2 + β4σ
i
t−92,t−2
+ DCBSit−1 + DSS
i
t−1 + DFEt−1 + ε
i
t+1,t+s
where t is date and i is stock. The dependent variable, σit+1,t+s, is future realized stock volatility from day t + 1 to
t + s, for varying horizons, s. The categorical variable, ‘Shiftit’, can take five levels: the four combinations of positive
and negative supply and demand shifts, and zero if no shift occurred. Shifts are identified by simultaneous changes in
Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) and Data Explorers Short Score (DSS) from t − 1 to t. DCBS is a measure of
short-sale costs and has ten levels (1–10), where a higher score indicates higher costs. DSS is a measure of short
interest and has six levels (0–5), where a higher score indicates higher short interest. We control for one-day lagged
DCBS and DSS as fixed effects, date-fixed effects, and past realized volatilities on different horizons. All volatilities
are annualized. We cluster standard deviations by firm. t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation are in parentheses.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are shown with *, **, and ***, respectively. Observations for which exactly
one of DCBS and DSS changed from t − 1 to t are excluded. Data are from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012.
Shift type 10 day vol 30 day vol 60 day vol 91 day vol
Positive demand 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(2.07) (2.88) (3.61) (4.13)
Negative demand -0.021∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(-2.54) (-6.14) (-6.62) (-6.10)
Positive supply -0.011 -0.009 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(-1.44) (-1.31) (-2.75) (-2.90)
Negative supply -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.000
(-0.85) (-0.06) (-0.59) (-0.03)
10 day historical volatility 0.095∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(16.47) (14.31) (12.75) (12.40)
30 day historical volatility 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(9.91) (9.71) (8.38) (10.97)
60 day historical volatility -0.007 -0.023 0.018 0.017
(-0.21) (-0.58) (0.44) (0.41)
91 day historical volatility 0.434∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(19.28) (19.80) (19.71) (19.68)
Adj. R2 0.447 0.548 0.582 0.602
No obs. 3,854,816 3,854,816 3,854,816 3,854,816
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subsection, we show in event time, how the level of volatilities varies around supply and demand
shifts in the shorting market. Each supply and demand shift can be seen as an event. As in the
previous sections, supply and demand shifts are identified when both DCBS and DSS change from
one day to the next. We use realized volatilities over periods of ten calendar days obtained from
OptionMetrics, generating observations every ten calendar days in event time. Realized volatilities
are only reported by OptionMetrics on trading days, making technical adjustments necessary.3
Fig. 3.2 presents the results for demand shifts, while Fig. 3.3 shows supply shifts. Error bars of
plus and minus two standard deviations of the mean estimates are also illustrated. The illustrations
in Fig. 1 and 2 include an average of volatilities of all stocks. For each date in the OptionMetrics
database, we observe the average equity volatility. Next, for each event date, we look up the
average equity volatility, say ten days prior, and then average these volatilities.
For all types of shifts, the average volatilities of stocks experiencing a shift are consistently
higher than the average volatilities of all stocks. Stocks with higher volatilities seem more prone
to supply and demand shifts in the shorting market. Another trend for all four types of shifts is
the quite strong correlations in event time between the average volatility of affected stocks and all
stocks.
Volatilities are elevated just after, and especially just before, positive demand shifts, also by
more than the overall market trend would suggest, c.f. upper part of Fig. 3.2. If increases in
differences of opinions drive elevated volatilities both before and after the shift, it requires that in-
creased differences of opinions drive up volatility before inducing the demand shift. An alternative
mechanism could be that sudden uncertainty and unexpectedly high levels of volatility increase
differences of opinions among market participants, inducing the positive demand shift.
The trend for negative demand shifts is also high volatilities just before the shift. When the
3The way in which the sample is constructed means that there is always a volatility estimate for time t − 1 based
on returns t − 10 to t − 1. Prior to that, the optimal days to observe volatilities would be t − 11, t − 21, ·. We observe
volatilities the closest possible days to the optimal days for the given stock. If two available observations are equally
far from the optimal day, the earlier day is chosen. If no observations are available from five days before to four days
after the optimal day, the observation is missing. After the event, if no volatility estimate is available for the stock at
time t + 9, we use the earliest later volatility estimate but no later than t + 14. In the rare case that none is found, the
value is missing. By not observing volatilities prior to t + 9, we avoid using volatility estimates based on return days
before the event as volatilities after the event. For consecutive days we observe volatilities as close as possible to the
optimal days (t + 19, t + 29, · · · ). If two available days are equally far from the optimal day, the later day is chosen. If
no observation is available from four days before to five days after the optimal day, the observation is missing.
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Figure 3.2. Event study for demand shifts. This figure shows two event studies on realized volatilities. The dots
represent the average of realized volatility over a range of ten calendar days. The events are positive and negative
demand shifts in the lending market for the stock. For comparison, the crosses show the average realized ten-day
volatilities observed for all equities in the OptionMetrics database on the same dates. The error bars represent
plus/minus two times the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3.3. Event study for supply shifts. This figure shows two event studies on realized volatilities. The dots
represent the average of realized volatility over a range of ten calendar days. The events are positive and negative
supply shifts in the lending market for the stock. For comparison, the crosses show the average realized ten-day
volatilities observed for all equities in the OptionMetrics database on the same dates. The error bars represent
plus/minus two times the standard error of the mean.
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negative demand shift is a reversal of a recent positive demand shift, it is not surprising that high
levels of volatilities occur just before the negative shift. The dates in Table 3.3 indicate that many
shifts could be responses to recent shifts in the opposite directions. Three out of the top five dates
for negative demand shifts (Panel B) are one trading day after a top five day for positive demand
shifts (Panel A). Looking into the data, 20% of the negative demand shifts occur four calendar
days or less after a positive demand shift for the same stock. Based on the event studies, it is hard
to detect long-term effects of the demand shifts.
When comparing the event study results to the previous regression results, it is important to note
that the regression results do not necessarily imply that volatilities increase (decrease) in absolute
terms after positive (negative) demand shifts, but that the predicted volatilities are higher (lower)
compared to predicted volatilities without the shift. The event studies reveal that both positive and
negative supply and demand shifts are more common during times, when the stocks experience
higher volatilities than usual. In addition, they show that shifts are also more common for stocks
with higher volatilities than average.
Turning to the supply shifts illustrated in Fig. 3.3, some of the same trends found for demand
shifts are evident. There is, especially for negative supply shifts, for example, a build-up of volatil-
ity before the shift, which reflects the overall market trend. The average of the last ten-day volatility
before both positive and negative supply shifts is higher than the consecutive volatility, contrary
to the market trend. Volatility building up before negative supply shifts and staying relatively high
after is consistent with stock lenders reducing supply due to increased anticipated counterparty
risk. Higher volatility increases the probability of extreme positive returns such that short sellers
cannot deliver the stock back to the lender due to insufficient margins.
Average volatility around positive supply shifts is lower than for negative supply shifts. In
cases where a positive supply shift is a response to lowered counterparty risk, we would expect
to see a downward trend after the shift. Even though the volatility peaks just before the shift, the
trend after the shift is not clear.
Supply shifts can also be linked to volatility by large trades. If stocks are traded between
two parties with differences in willingness to lend shares, it can result in a supply shift. Gener-
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ally, a positive correlation between volume and volatility has been documented (see, e.g., Karpoff
(1987)). This correlation could lead to supply shifts being more prevalent in times of high volatil-
ity. Delayed settlement in the stock market can increase this effect for negative supply shifts. If a
stock lender sells stocks, the seller cannot lend out the stock from the time of the transaction. The
buyer will not be able to lend out the stock until after the trade has settled, often three days after
the transaction date (Duffie et al., 2002).
3.4.3 Regressions in sub-periods
To investigate if our results are driven by extraordinary market circumstances in a small part of our
sample we rerun the analyses for sub-periods. The concern arises because 19 out of 20 days in the
four top fives for days with most demand and supply shifts are during times with extreme financial
turmoil in 2008, c.f. Table 3.3. Also, during the fall of 2008, a ban on shorting of financial stocks
was suddenly implemented and lifted again around three weeks after, see Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2013) for further details. To address the concern that our results stem from such special
conditions we test our predictions for three subsamples, i.e., before, during and after the financial
crisis. We repeat regressions of the form stated in (3.1) for three sub-periods: pre-crisis (July 3,
2006 to November 30, 2007); crisis (December 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009); and post-crisis (July 1,
2009 to December 3, 2012). Table 3.5 reports the results.
The supply and demand shifts are spread out across the sub-periods, with more than 600 shifts
of each type in each sub-period. Positive demand shifts are estimated to be positive predictors of
volatility for all sub-periods and all horizons. The estimates are statistically significant for longer
horizons, for pre-crisis and crisis. Negative demand shifts are significantly negative predictors of
volatility for all horizons and periods except ten-day future volatility during the crisis. Combined,
the results for demand shifts are evidence that demand shifts predict volatility under different mar-
ket conditions, i.e., consistent with differences of opinions driving both.
Both positive and negative supply shifts are insignificant during the crisis. Positive supply shifts
are negative predictors of volatility before and after the crisis, and a majority of these estimates
are significant on a 5% level. Negative supply shifts vary, but two of the estimates before the crisis
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Table 3.5
Do demand and supply shifts in the shorting market predict stock volatility in different periods?
This table shows the results of the cross-sectional regression:
σit+1,t+s = Shift
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−31,t−2 + β3σ
i
t−61,t−2 + β4σ
i
t−92,t−2
+ DCBSit−1 + DSS
i
t−1 + DFEt−1 + ε
i
t+1,t+s
where t is date and i is stock. Regressions are performed on three sub-periods: pre-crisis (July 2006 to November
2007), crisis (December 2007 to June 2009), and post-crisis (July 1, 2009 to December 3, 2012). The dependent
variable, σit+1,t+s, is future realized stock volatility from day t + 1 to t + s, for varying horizons, s. The categorical
variable, ‘Shiftit’, can take five levels: the four combinations of positive and negative supply and demand shifts, and
zero if no shift occurred. Shifts are identified by simultaneous changes in Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) and
Data Explorers Short Score (DSS) from t − 1 to t. DCBS is a measure of short-sale costs and has ten levels (1–10),
where a higher score indicates higher costs. DSS is a measure of short interest and has six levels (0–5), where a
higher score indicates higher short interest relative to shares outstanding. We control for one-day lagged DCBS and
DSS as fixed effects, date-fixed effects, and past realized volatilities on different horizons. All volatilities are
annualized. We cluster standard deviations by firm. t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation are in parentheses.
Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are shown with *, **, and ***, respectively. Observations for which exactly
one of DCBS and DSS changed from t − 1 to t are excluded.
Shift type 10 days 30 days 60 days 91 days Number of shifts
Panel A: Pre crisis
Positive demand 0.011 0.022∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 1113
(1.27) (2.51) (2.93) (3.30)
Negative demand -0.040∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 791
(-2.97) (-4.09) (-4.77) (-2.97)
Positive supply -0.020∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.018∗ 905
(-2.00) (-2.46) (-2.05) (-1.86)
Negative supply -0.027∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.017∗ 0.003 665
(-3.06) (-1.41) (-1.89) (0.28)
10 day historical volatility 0.080∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(12.14) (11.61) (11.82) (12.94)
30 day historical volatility 0.061∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(4.74) (3.87) (3.55) (5.85)
60 day historical volatility -0.033 -0.022 0.043∗∗ 0.009
(-1.61) (-0.94) (2.25) (0.37)
91 day historical volatility 0.383∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(10.68) (10.23) (10.61) (10.70)
Adj. R2 0.258 0.344 0.379 0.408
No obs. 745,275 745,275 745,275 745,275
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Panel B: Crisis
Positive demand 0.018 0.022∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 1602
(1.22) (2.01) (3.11) (3.36)
Negative demand 0.006 -0.027∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 1576
(0.40) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-2.69)
Positive supply 0.000 0.012 0.002 -0.005 1232
(0.02) (0.99) (0.15) (-0.46)
Negative supply -0.004 0.010 0.008 0.008 1305
(-0.27) (0.66) (0.60) (0.57)
10 day historical volatility 0.128∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(15.11) (13.25) (12.76) (11.91)
30 day historical volatility 0.101∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(8.34) (10.15) (10.61) (12.94)
60 day historical volatility 0.064∗∗∗ 0.031 0.050∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(2.82) (1.34) (2.27) (2.60)
91 day historical volatility 0.391∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(25.79) (24.61) (24.22) (26.30)
Adj. R2 0.479 0.572 0.597 0.604
No obs. 890,446 890,446 890,446 890,446
Panel C: Post crisis
Positive demand 0.023 0.012 0.010 0.011 1366
(1.62) (1.18) (1.09) (1.09)
Negative demand -0.047∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ 1212
(-4.47) (-6.47) (-7.38) (-7.17)
Positive supply -0.011 -0.019 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 1045
(-0.77) (-1.62) (-3.47) (-3.32)
Negative supply -0.001 -0.010 -0.020 -0.020 830
(-0.04) (-0.63) (-1.46) (-1.57)
10 day historical volatility 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(8.10) (7.38) (6.34) (6.48)
30 day historical volatility 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(4.48) (3.69) (2.86) (4.51)
60 day historical volatility -0.059 -0.069 -0.019 -0.016
(-0.89) (-0.94) (-0.25) (-0.21)
91 day historical volatility 0.465∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(12.96) (13.30) (13.00) (12.72)
Adj. R2 0.298 0.389 0.422 0.448
No obs. 2,220,373 2,220,373 2,220,373 2,220,373
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are significantly negative, i.e., the same sign as positive supply shifts. The unclear results could
relate to large trades and delayed settlement with no persistent predictive power for volatility. As
mentioned, a large trade can matter if the buyer has a different willingness to lend stock than the
seller. Delayed settlement matters, especially after large trades, since a traded share cannot be lent
out before the trade settles.
3.5 Changes and levels
In the previous section, we have focused on supply and demand shifts in the shorting market. Our
rich data set allows us to study how changes in either short-sale costs or short interest with the
other one constant predict volatility. We also test if the level of short-sale costs and short interest
has predictive power for future stock volatility. This section provides results for how such changes
and levels predict stock volatility.
3.5.1 Changes in short-sale costs or short interest
In this section, we regress future realized volatility on a categorical variable indicating changes in
either DCBS (measuring short-sale costs) or DSS (measuring short interest). We define a categor-
ical variable, ‘Changeit’, which takes five values, one for either DCBS or DCBS going up or down
from t − 1 to t, and zero if neither DCBS or DSS changed. We omit cases for which both DCBS
and DSS changed. Like the regressions for demand and supply shifts in the stock lending market,
we include controls for past volatility, level of DSS, level of DCBS and DFE. We want to purely
test the marginal effect of short-sale costs and short interest and not their joint effect. This leads us
to the regression:
σit+1,t+s = Change
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−31,t−2 + β3σ
i
t−61,t−2 + β4σ
i
t−92,t−2
+DCBSit−1 + DSS
i
t−1 + DFEt−1 + ε
i
t+1,t+s
(3.2)
Table 3.6 reports the results of (3.2). An increase in short-sale costs is a highly significant
positive predictor for future volatility. A decrease is a significant negative predictor. The effect is
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not exactly symmetric, with the effect of increases being largest in absolute terms. The estimates
increase in absolute terms with the horizon, indicating that it is a long-term effect.
Table 3.6
Do changes in short-sale costs and short interest predict stock volatility?
This table shows the results of the cross-sectional regression:
σit+1,t+s = Change
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−31,t−2 + β3σ
i
t−61,t−2 + β4σ
i
t−92,t−2
+ DCBSit−1 + DSS
i
t−1 + DFEt−1 + ε
i
t+1,t+s
where t is date and i is stock. The dependent variable, σit+1,t+s, is future realized stock volatility from day t + 1 to
t + s, for varying horizons, s. The categorical variable, ‘Changeit’, can take five levels: four for either a decrease or
increase in Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) and Data Explorers Short Score (DSS), and zero if no change
occurred. Changes are identified by a change in either DCBS or DSS from t − 1 to t. DCBS is a measure of short-sale
costs and has ten levels (1–10) , where a higher score indicates higher costs. DSS is a measure of short interest and
has six levels (0–5) , where a higher score indicates higher short interest relative to shares outstanding. We control for
one-day lagged DCBS and DSS as fixed effects, date-fixed effects, and past realized volatilities on different horizons.
All volatilities are annualized. We cluster standard deviations by firm. t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation are in
parentheses. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are shown with *, **, and ***, respectively. Observations for
which both DCBS and DSS changed from t − 1 to t are excluded. Data are from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012.
Horizon 10 days 30 days 60 days 91 days
Increase in short-sale costs 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(6.83) (8.71) (8.80) (8.87)
Decrease in short-sale costs -0.010∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(-9.21) (-11.64) (-11.02) (-11.54)
Increase in short interest 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(2.00) (2.78) (3.19) (3.56)
Decrease in short interest -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(-9.21) (-11.64) (-11.02) (-11.54)
10 day historical volatility 0.097∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(19.46) (18.74) (15.83) (16.16)
30 day historical volatility 0.073∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(10.60) (10.61) (9.91) (13.20)
60 day historical volatility -0.002 -0.018 0.020 0.017
(-0.07) (-0.53) (0.57) (0.49)
91 day historical volatility 0.423∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(21.54) (21.98) (22.00) (21.96)
Adj. R2 0.450 0.551 0.586 0.605
No obs. 4,206,597 4,206,597 4,206,597 4,206,597
D’Avolio (2002) argues that high short-sale costs relate to differences of opinions. Stock own-
ers not lending their shares must assign a different value to the stock relative to short sellers and
to stock owners lending their shares and earning lending fees. The result is consistent with an
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increase in differences of opinions causing both higher volatility and higher short-sale costs. For
short interest, an increase is a significant positive predictor for future volatility, and a decrease is a
significant negative predictor. Interestingly, the effect of a decrease is more significant and roughly
three times as large as the effect of an increase in absolute terms.
Compared to the results for supply and demand shifts, we generally see higher levels of sig-
nificance for the changes in short-sale costs or short interest. This can be attributed to the sample
having more observations for shifts of either DCBS or DSS than for both of them at the same
time, c.f. Table 3.2. The estimated effects of positive demand shifts are larger than for increases
in short-sale costs or short interest alone for each of the horizons. In absolute terms, the effect of
negative demand shifts dominates the effect of decreases in short-sale costs or short interest alone
in a similar way.
3.5.2 Levels of short-sale costs and short interest
In this section, we test if the level of short-sale costs (DCBS) and short interest (DSS) has ex-
planatory power for future volatility. DSS is an indicator for the relative level of short interest,
i.e., relative to the number of shares outstanding. We regress future realized volatility on the level
of short-sale costs and short interest, i.e., DCBSit captures the time t level of short-sale costs and
DSSit captures the time t level of short interest for stock i. Both DCBS and DSS are integer scores,
allowing us to estimate separate coefficients for each level. The regression is:
σit+1,t+s = DCBS
i
t + DSS
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−29,t−1
+β3σ
i
t−59,t + β4σ
i
t−90,t + DFEt + ε
i
t+1,t+s
(3.3)
Table 7 shows the results and includes regression results of specifications where some of the
independent variables are dropped. The reference level is DCBS equal to one and DSS equal to
zero.
Strikingly, all estimates for other levels of DCBS and DSS are positive and highly significant.
The vast majority of observations have DCBS equal one, c.f. Table 3.1, which can be interpreted as
the stocks that have short-sale costs close to zero. DCBS equal to one is the reference level, hence,
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Table 3.7
Do short-sale costs and short interests predict stock volatility?
This table shows the results of the cross-sectional regression:
σit+1,t+s = DCBS
i
t + DSS
i
t + β1σ
i
t−11,t−2 + β2σ
i
t−29,t−1 + β3σ
i
t−59,t + β4σ
i
t−90,t + DFEt + ε
i
t+1,t+s
where t is date and i is stock. The dependent variable, σit+1,t+s, is future realized stock volatility from day t + 1 to
t + s, s being 10 or 30. Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS) is a measure of short-sale costs and has ten levels (1–10),
where a higher score indicates higher costs. Data Explorers Short Score (DSS) is a measure of short interest and has
six levels (0–5), where a higher score indicates higher short interest relative to shares outstanding. They are estimated
as categorical variables with one as the reference level for DCBS and zero for DSS. Regressions leaving out either
DCBS or DSS are also reported. We control for date-fixed effects and past realized volatilities on different horizons.
All volatilities are annualized. We cluster standard deviations by firm. t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation are in
parentheses. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are shown with *, **, and ***, respectively. A permutation test
based on Spearman’s rank correlation indicates whether DCBS and DSS are significant predictors for volatility. Data
are from July 3, 2006 to December 3, 2012.
Horizon 10 days 10 days 10 days 30 days 30 days 30 days
DCBS 2 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(8.76) (8.68) (10.38) (10.19)
DCBS 3 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(8.23) (8.20) (9.70) (9.58)
DCBS 4 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(9.89) (9.66) (11.41) (11.08)
DCBS 5 0.063∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(9.35) (9.06) (10.83) (10.46)
DCBS 6 0.081∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(9.24) (8.91) (10.56) (10.12)
DCBS 7 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(9.14) (8.82) (11.09) (10.67)
DCBS 8 0.078∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(8.06) (7.70) (9.26) (8.79)
DCBS 9 0.067∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(6.25) (5.87) (7.35) (6.92)
DCBS 10 0.102∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(8.08) (7.86) (8.80) (8.53)
DSS 1 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(10.27) (10.72) (10.27) (10.96)
DSS 2 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(11.94) (12.08) (12.09) (12.30)
DSS 3 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(11.92) (11.88) (12.72) (12.57)
DSS 4 0.043∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(11.12) (10.58) (12.20) (11.51)
DSS 5 0.048∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(10.87) (8.91) (11.99) (9.49)
10 day historical volatility 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(23.97) (23.63) (23.97) (21.84) (21.15) (21.91)
30 day historical volatility 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(11.17) (11.10) (11.14) (10.18) (9.99) (10.16)
60 day historical volatility -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.021 -0.023 -0.021
(-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.63)
91 day historical volatility 0.421∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(21.39) (21.04) (21.45) (21.94) (21.87) (21.99)
Adj. R2 0.456 0.455 0.457 0.555 0.552 0.556
No obs. 4,220,239 4,220,239 4,220,239 4,220,239 4,220,239 4,220,239
Rank test DCBS (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Rank test DSS (p-value) 0.003 0.06 0.003 0.02
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the conclusion is that a stock being costly to short contains information on the future volatility of
the stock. If the stock has a DCBS of ten the consecutive volatility is around 10 to 12 percentage
points larger relative to a stock without short-sale costs. The results are not only statistically but
also economically significant. Likewise, a DSS larger than zero has positive predictive power. If a
large fraction of the shares outstanding are lend out, it is informative about the future volatility of
the stock.
The statistical tests, reported by t-statistics, all test for differences to the reference level. To
test whether the effects of levels of short-sale costs and short interest are increasing with DCBS
and DSS we also perform permutation tests based on Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.4
P-values from the permutation tests are reported at the bottom of Table 3.7. Again, we get sig-
nificant results, especially for DCBS. The permutation test has much less power for DSS than for
DCBS given that six levels have 720 unique permutations only, while ten levels have more than
three million unique permutations. Both short-sale costs and short interests predict higher volatil-
ities. Our results are consistent with Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), who find a positive relationship
between volatility and both short-sale costs and lending supply based on yearly data. We provide
further evidence from daily observations over a longer period. The regressions were also run with
quantitatively identical results for a subset in which DCBS and DSS had not changed from the
previous day; that is, we removed observations with shifts and changes on the previous day (not
reported). These regressions indicate that the level alone is informative about future volatility, also
when there is no contemporaneous shift or change in any of them.
A possible explanation for the predictive power of short-sale costs is that high short-sale costs
reflect significant positive demand shocks further back in time. Stocks have positive net supply,
implying that at any time a fixed number of stocks are not lent out. If short-sale costs are high,
fees can be earned from lending the stock and competition should drive short-sale costs to zero.
Duffie et al. (2002) model allows for positive short-sale costs due to frictions in the form of search
costs. But over time, as stock borrowers and lenders are matched, short-sale costs vanish. Thus,
4Under the null hypothesis, there is no relationship between future volatility and short-sale costs or future volatility
and short interest. The permutation test calculates the correlation between the rank of, e.g., the DCBS levels, when
sorted on their estimates and the perfect sort. The likelihood of obtaining such an extreme correlation from a random
permutation is then calculated and a two-sided p-value determined.
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high short-sale costs must reflect recent shifts in the market. We already control, however, for past
volatility, which is also affected by recent shifts; still, the level of short sales still has predictive
power.
Furthermore, stocks with high short-sale costs could resemble stocks for which short sales are
restricted, which potentially can increase volatility. Bai et al. (2006) predict that a high level of
information asymmetry can create a positive link between short-sale constraints and stock volatil-
ity, even though their general result is that the link is ambiguous. Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009)
show how stocks which are very hard to borrow can have higher volatility. Empirically, Chang et
al. (2007) show that allowing the short sale of specific stocks increases their volatility.
3.6 Conclusion
We document that demand shifts in the shorting market are predictors for future volatility of the
affected stock, consistent with increases in differences of opinions driving both demand shifts and
increased volatility. Duffie et al. (2002) show how higher differences of opinions are associated
with higher short-sale costs and higher short interest. Andrei et al. (2014) build a model in which
higher differences of opinions yield higher stock volatility. Empirically, Carlin et al. (2014) find
that disagreement about future prepayments predicts higher mortgage return volatility. Combining
these relationships leads to the main prediction of this paper: positive (negative) demand shifts for
lending a stock are positive (negative) predictors of the stock’s volatility.
Daily data from 2006 to 2012 of indicators for both short-sale costs and short interest allow
us to identify supply and demand shifts in the shorting market for individual stocks. Inspired by
Cohen et al. (2007), we identify a shift if both short-sale costs and short interest change the same
day. The pairs of simultaneous changes can be translated into positive (negative) supply or demand
shifts.
Cross-sectional regressions with controls for past volatility at different horizons, short-sale
costs, short interest, and date-fixed effects confirm that positive (negative) demand shocks pre-
dict higher (lower) volatility. A positive (negative) demand shift significantly predicts a 2.8 (3.9)
percentage points higher (lower) consecutive volatility of the stock. Regressions on sub-periods
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(before, during, and after the financial crisis) show that the effect cannot be contributed to a partic-
ular sub-period.
In an event study, we show that supply and demand shifts are generally associated with tem-
porary higher volatility of the affected stocks. The shifts are more prevalent when overall market
volatility is high. Also, we find that increases in short-sale costs and short interest are positive
predictors for volatility. Finally, higher levels of short-sale costs and short interest predict higher
volatility.
In summary, this paper links individual stock volatility to the shorting market. We find that
positive demand shifts in the shorting market are a positive predictor for volatility of the affected
stock. This is consistent with increases in differences of opinions causing both positive demand
shifts as well as increased volatility.
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Proof of Proposition 1
If the agent wants cash and exercises to immediately sell the stock in the market, the net proceeds
would be S 0(1−λi,S )−X. If the investor instead places X1+r f in the risk-free asset and sells short the
stock, the cash flow would now be S 0(1 − λi,S ) − X1+r f (as there are no funding or short-sale costs).
In the next period the option can be exercised paid by the money from the risk-free asset and the
received stock can be used to close the short position. This has a net payment of zero. Thereby
the cash flow of the strategy dominates the one created by exercising and selling the stock (since
r f > 0).
If the investor wants the exposure to the stock and exercises to get the stock, the cash flow is
−X. The alternative dominating strategy is to place X1+r f in the risk-free asset and wait and exercise
later. This costs less today (as r f > 0), and the stock purchase can be made cash flow neutral at
time 1 by the money from the risk-free asset. No value is forgone by not owning the stock in the
meantime as there is no lending fee, li = 0, and no funding costs are incurred.
Consider (ii) where the sale revenue of the option is above the intrinsic value for agent i,
C0(1 − λi,C) > S 0 − X. If agent i wants cash, exercising the option and selling the stock obviously
gives less than selling the option. If agent i wants stock, selling the option and buying the stock
has a net cost of S 0−C0(1−λi,C) which is less than what it costs to gain the stock through exercise,
X. Hence, no matter if agent i wants stock or cash, early exercise is dominated.
A sufficient condition for C0(1 − λi,C) > S 0 − X is that agent i faces no option transaction
costs, λi,C = 0, and the existence of another type of agents j with zero short-sale costs, funding
costs, and stock transaction costs. We have just shown above that for an investor without short-sale
costs, funding costs or stock transaction costs the value of the option will be at least S 0 − X1+r f . If
such unconstrained agents j exist, the option price must be at least S 0 − X1+r f to avoid arbitrage. If
λi,C = 0 we get: C0(1 − λi,C) = C0 ≥ S 0 − X1+r f > S 0 − X.
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Proof of Proposition 2
This proof shows that there exists a strategy involving early exercise that is not dominated by any
strategy not involving early exercise if frictions are large enough. We introduce the following
notation for the initial portfolio held by an agent: The number of stocks, α0, the amount invested
in the risk-free asset, β0, and the number of options, γ0 > 0. Similarly, we use the subscript 1 for
the portfolio that the agent trades to (e.g., α1 is the number of stocks held by agent i after trading).
Consider an agent who wants as much cash as possible at time 0 without any negative cash
flow in any possible state at time 1. One way to do this is to exercise the option position early
and close the positions in stock and risk-free asset. If stocks needs to be sold to close the position,
stock transaction costs apply. However, in the event that more can be earned through lending out
the stock and borrow the present value of the future earned lending fee than through selling the
stock, this is done instead. If stock must be acquired this can be done either by buying stock or
buying options and exercise immediately. The cheapest way is chosen. The cash-flow at time 0 of
this “liquidating early exercise strategy” is:
CF =

(α0 + γ0)S 0(1 − λS ) + β0 − γ0X if α0 + γ0 ≥ 0 and 1 − λS ≥ li1+r f
(α0 + γ0) S 0l
i
1+r f + β0 − γ0X if α0 + γ0 ≥ 0 and 1 − λS < l
i
1+r f
(α0 + γ0)S 0 + β0 − γ0X if α0 + γ0 < 0 and S 0 ≤ C0 + X
(α0 + γ0)(C0 + X) + β0 − γ0X if α0 + γ0 < 0 and S 0 > C0 + X
(4)
We want to show that this early exercise strategy is not dominated for agent i.
Any strategy without early exercise is identified by the allocation of wealth between the three
assets.5 This allocation can be denoted by (α1, β1, γ1) for the number of stocks, amount invested
in risk-free asset, and number of options respectively. The cash-flow at time 0 for an arbitrary
5Admittedly, the same portfolio can be obtained through several ways of trading. E.g. the number of stocks held
can be reduced by 1 either by selling one stock or selling two stocks and buying one back immediately, corresponding
to money burning when stock transaction costs are positive. For our purpose it is sufficient to consider strategies with
the cheapest way to obtain the portfolio. If such strategies cannot dominate early exercise neither can strategies in
which money is given up for nothing.
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strategy not involving early exercise can be described by the function J1 where:
J1(α1, β1, γ1) :=(α0 − α1)(S 0 − 1(α0−α1>0)S 0λS ) + (β0 − β1)
+ (γ0 − γ1)(C0 − 1(γ0−γ1>0)λi,CC0) − F i(α1S 0, γ1C0)
(5)
In order for a strategy to dominate the liquidating early exercise strategy, the strategy must have
non-negative values at time 1 in all possible states and at least as large a cash flow at time zero.
To ensure a non-negative value at time 1, for every stock agent i is short, agent i must also be long
at least 1 option and have no less than X+S 0L
i
1+r f in the risk-free asset (the stock has unlimited upside
so the option is needed to secure a non-negative payoff, and the cash is needed to pay the possible
future exercise of the option and the short-sale fee of the stock). Similarly, for every option that
agent i is short, i must be at least long 1 stock, and not use the risk-free asset to borrow more than
S 0li
1+r f (where the stock is needed to be able to honor a possible future exercise of the option in all
states and, since the stock could also turn out to be worthless at time 1, there cannot be borrowed
more than S 0l
i
1+r f , the present value of the only secure income raised from lending out the stock in
the period). The maximal cash-flow that can be obtained at time t = 0 without early exercise and
with non-negative value at time t = 1 is therefore the solution to:
max
α1,β1,γ1
J1(α1, β1, γ1) (6)
s.t. α1 + γ1 ≥ 0 (7)
β1 + 1(α1<0)α1
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+ 1(α1>0)α1
S 0li
1 + r f
≥ 0 (8)
The early exercise strategy cannot be dominated by selling the option due to the premise of the
proposition that doing so is less profitable (C0(1 − λi,C) ≤ S (1 − λi,S ) − X). Not selling the option
corresponds to γ1 ≥ γ0. Combining this with (7) we get the inequality γ1 ≥ max(−α1, γ0). This
inequality must bind since J1 is decreasing in γ1 for γ1 ≥ 0. Likewise, J1 is decreasing in β1 which
means that (8) must bind. We can now substitute both β1 and γ1 and reformulate the problem as:
max
α1
J2(α1) (9)
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where we define the function J2 by:
J2(α1) :=J1(α1,−1(α1<0)α1
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
− 1(α1>0)α1
S 0li
1 + r f
,max(−α1, γ0))
=(α0 − α1)(S 0 − 1(α0−α1>0)S 0λS ) + β0 + 1(α1<0)α1
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+1(α1>0)α1
S 0li
1 + r f
+ (γ0 −max(−α1, γ0))C0 − F i(α1S 0,−max(−α1, γ0)C0)
(10)
We are ready to show part a. in the proposition under the condition that Li > Xr
f
S 0
. We show that
the optimal cash-flow (9) is smaller than the cash flow from the liquidating early exercise strategy
(4), regardless of funding costs. Recall that the early exercise strategies incur no funding costs
and funding costs for other strategies are non-negative so in the following we consider the case in
which F i = 0. Then, J2 is piece-wise linear in α1 with kinks at {−γ0, α0, 0}. So a global maximum
for the J2 will either be at −γ0, α0, 0 or at plus or minus infinity. We check the last first:
lim
α1→−∞
J2(α1) = lim
α1→−∞
[
(α0 − α1)S 0(1 − λi,S ) + β0 + α1 X + S 0L
i
1 + r f
+ (γ0 + α1)C0
]
=α0S 0(1 − λi,S ) + β0 + γ0C0 + lim
α1→−∞
[
α1[−S 0(1 − λi,S ) + X + S 0L
i
1 + r f
+ C0]
] (11)
It must hold that C0 + X ≥ S 0(1 − λi,S ), otherwise there would be an arbitrage strategy by buying
options, exercise immediately and sell the stock. Given this and that Li > Xr
f
S 0
the entire expression
(11) is diverging to −∞. We next check α1 → ∞:
lim
α1→∞
J2(α1) = lim
α1→∞
[
(α0 − α1)S 0 + β0 + α1 S 0l
i
1 + r f
]
=α0S 0 + β0 + lim
α1→∞
[
α1(−S 0 + S 0l
i
1 + r f
)
]
= −∞
(12)
since no-arbitrage implies that S 0 > S 0l
i
1+r f (otherwise an arbitrage gain could be made through
buying stocks and lending them out). We now evaluate the expression in α1 = α0 ≤ −γ0:
J2(α0) = β0 + α0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+ (γ0 + α0)C0 < CF (13)
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using that Li > L¯ = Xr
f
S 0
and α0 + γ0 ≤ 0. Next, evaluate where α1 = α0 ∈ (−γ0, 0]:
J2(α0) = β0 + α0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
< CF (14)
using that α0 + γ0 > 0 and Li > L¯ = Xr
f
S 0
. Evaluating J2 where α1 = α0 > 0:
J2(α0) =β0 + α0
S 0li
1 + r f
< CF (15)
Next, we evaluate where α1 = 0:
J2(0) =α0(S 0 − 1(α0>0)S 0λS ) + β0 < CF (16)
The final evaluation of the expression is where α1 = −γ0:
J2(−γ0) = (α0 + γ0)(S 0 − 1(α0+γ0>0)S 0λi,S ) + β0 − γ0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
< CF (17)
since Li > L¯ = Xr
f
S 0
. Hence it has been proved that for sufficiently high short-sale costs, early
exercise is not dominated regardless of funding costs.
Next we show that a similar result holds for sufficiently high funding costs. Specifically, we
consider funding costs with F i(x, y) ≥ F¯(|x| + |y|) where F¯ > r f X(1+r f )(S 0+C0) . Under this condition, J3
is greater than J2 where:
J3(α1) :=(α0 − α1)(S 0 − 1(α0−α1>0)S 0λS ) + β0 + 1(α1<0)α1
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+ 1(α1>0)α1
S 0li
1 + r f
+ (γ0 −max(−α1, γ0))C0 − F¯(|α1S 0| + max(−α1, γ0)C0)
(18)
and we seek to show that J3 is smaller than (4). Clearly, J3 is piecewise linear with kinks in
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{−γ0, α0, 0}. We first consider the extremes:
lim
α1→−∞
J3(α1)
= lim
α1→−∞
(α0 − α1)S 0(1 − λS ) + β0 + α1 X + S 0L
i
1 + r f
+ (γ0 + α1)C0 + α1F¯(S 0 + C0)
=α0 + β0 + γ0C0 + lim
α1→−∞
(
α1[−S 0(1 − λS ) + X + S 0L
i
1 + r f
+ C0 + F¯(S 0 + C0)]
)
= −∞
(19)
since the expression in the squared brackets is positive since no-arbitrage implies that S (1 − λS ) ≤
C + X (otherwise, an arbitrage strategy would be to buy options, exercise them immediately and
sell the obtained stocks). Similarly:
lim
α1→∞
J3(α1)
= lim
α1→∞
(α0 − α1)S 0 + β0 + α1 S 0l
i
1 + r f
− F¯(α1S 0 + γ0C0)
=α0 + β0 − F¯γ0C0 + lim
α1→∞
[
α1[−S 0 + S 0l
i
1 + r f
− F¯S 0]
]
= −∞
(20)
since, as before, S 0 > S 0l
i
1+r f . Next, we evaluate J3 where α1 = −γ0:
J3(−γ0) =(α0 + γ0)(S 0 − 1(α0+γ0>0)S 0λS ) + β0 − γ0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
− F¯(γ0S 0 + γ0C0) < CF (21)
since F¯ > r
f X
(1+r f )(S 0+C0)
. For α1 = 0 we get:
J3(0) =α0(S 0 − 1(α0>0)S 0λS ) + β0 − F¯γ0C0 < CF (22)
since S (1 − λi,S ) − X > 0. Next, evaluate where α1 = α0 ≤ −γ0:
J3(α0) = β0 + α0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+ (γ0 + α0)C0 + α0F¯(S 0 + C0) < CF (23)
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Evaluating where α1 = α0 ∈ (−γ0, 0]:
J3(α0) = β0 + α0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
− F¯(−α0S 0 + γ0C0)
= β0 + α0
X + S 0Li
1 + r f
+ α0F¯(S 0 + C0) − F¯C0(α0 + γ0) < CF
(24)
Finally, we evaluate where α1 = α0 > 0:
J3(α0) = β0 + α0
S 0li
1 + r f
− F¯(α0S 0 + γ0C0) < CF (25)
Proof of Proposition 3
Both the problem for the lower boundary (1.6)–(1.7) and the problem for the upper boundary (1.8)
are mathematical equivalent to problem of pricing American call options in the BSM model with
continuous dividend yield, allowing us to utilize results established when proving (ii) and (iii).
Kim (1990) shows that the exercise boundary is increasing in time to expiration, and, in accor-
dance with Merton (1973), identifies the closed-form limit value of the exercise boundary as time
to expiration goes to infinity. For a positive dividend yield this limit value is finite, and hence the
enitre boundary is finite as remarked by Dewynne et al. (1993). So if what corresponds to the divi-
dend yield in our model (i.e., Li +ψi(mi,C + mi,S ) in part(ii) or li¯ +ψ(mi¯,C −mi¯,S ) in (iii)) is positive,
the exercise boundary is finite. If what corresponds to the dividend yield is zero or negative, then
Merton’s lower bound still holds and early exercise is always dominated, implying infinite exercise
boundaries for t < T .
Next, we prove (i). If S (t) < B(T − t) then C > S (t)−X so it is dominated for agent i to exercise
early and (1.6) must hold. We next consider any other agent i who owns one option, showing that
his valuation must be above C and, therefore, above the intrinsic value, leading us to conclude that
exercise is dominated. Suppose that i assigned the same value to the option as i and also hedged the
option by selling off CS stocks and financed the equity amount at r
f + ψi. The risk of the strategy
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would be zero, leaving only a deterministic dt-term times this value:
Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − [Ki(x −CS , 1) − Ki(x, 0) + C](r f + ψi)
+ CS S (r
f − l˜i) + [Ki(x −CS , 1) − Ki(x, 0)]r f
(26)
where x ∈ R is an arbitrary number of stocks held by i, and l˜i is equal to Li if x ≤ 0, equal to li if
x ≥ CS , and otherwise equal to xCS l
i +
CS−x
CS
Li if 0 < x < CS . The final term [K
i(x−CS , 1)−Ki(x, 0)]
represents the increase in required amount on the margin account (relative to not holding and
hedging one option), and we add C in the third term to capture the change in required equity (as
the hedge must have the same cash flow as if the option was sold for C). Because of (1.4), the drift
(26) is greater or equal to:
Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − [mi,S S CS + (mi,C − 1)C]ψi −C(r f + ψi) + CS S (r f − l˜i)
=Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − [mi,S S CS + mi,CC]ψi −Cr f + CS S (r f − l˜i)
≥Ct +
1
2
σ2S 2CS S − [mi,S S CS + mi,CC]ψi −Cr f + CS S (r f − Li)
=0
(27)
Here, the inequality follows from ψi ≤ ψi, Li ≤ Li, Li ≥ li ≥ 0, ψi ≥ 0, and r f > 0. The last
equality follows from (1.6). This non-negative drift means that i must assign a value to the option
no smaller than agent i does, because the option could be hedged and generate a risk-free payment
of at least C while for sure not give any negative cash flow in the future; i.e. Ci ≥ C. Hence,
exercise is dominated for any i.
Turning to the upper bound part of (i), we first note that failing to exercise is dominated for
i¯ := i¯ψ
i
when the stock price is above the upper bound. We show that failing to exercise is not
dominated for i then the same is true for i¯, implying that it is dominated for i not to exercise
whenever S (t) > B¯ψ
i
(T − t) (proof by contrapositive).
At any time for which it is not dominated for i not to exercise early, i can hedge the option
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position by selling CiS stocks, leaving a deterministic dt term that must be equal zero:
Cit +
1
2
σ2S 2CiS S − [Ki(x −CiS , 1) − Ki(x, 0) + Ci](r f + ψi)
+ CiS S (r
f − l˜i) + [Ki(x −CiS , 1) − Ki(x, 0)]r f = 0
(28)
If i¯ assigned the value Ci to the option and also hedged an option by selling off CiS stocks, then the
corresponding drift for i¯ can be seen to be non-negative using (30) below. This non-negative drift
implies that i¯ must assign a value to the option that is not immediately exercised no smaller than
the value assigned by i, C¯ψ
i ≥ Ci. Hence, it is not dominated for i¯ not to exercise the option early
when it is not dominated for i not to exercise the option early.
Derivation of PDE for agent i¯ψ
For any ψ ∈ R+ we consider agent i¯ψ with ψi¯ψ = ψ, who we show have the highest exercise
boundary and option valuation among all agents with ψi = ψ. Agent i¯ψ is always long stock. Let
the function for the required amount on the margin account have the form
K i¯
ψ
(x, y) = mi¯
ψ,S S |x| + (mi¯ψ,C − 1)C¯ψy (29)
where x ∈ R is the number of stocks held, y ∈ R+ is the number of options held, and C¯ψ is i¯ψ’s
valuation of the option. Also, mi¯
ψ,S ∈ [0, 1] and mi¯ψ,C ∈ [0, 1].
Let li¯
ψ
= mini∈{ j:ψ j=ψ} li and for i ∈ { j : ψ j = ψ} let
Ki(x2, y) − Ki(x1, y) ≤ mi¯ψ,S (x2 − x1)S for x1 ≤ x2 and ∀y ∈ R
Ki(x, y2) − Ki(x, y1) ≥ (mi¯ψ,C − 1)(y2 − y1)C¯ψ for y2 ≥ y1 ≥ 0 and ∀x ∈ R
(30)
The first line expresses that an increase in the number of stocks does not increase the required
amount on the margin account for agent i by more than it increases the required amount on the
margin account for agent i¯ψ. The second line expresses that an increase in the number of options
increases the amount i¯ψ can borrow through the margin account by at least as much as it increases
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the amount agent i can borrow.
Next, we want to derive the PDE for agent i¯ψ exercise boundary, B¯ψ, and option valuation, C¯ψ.
Consider the portfolio dynamics for agent i¯ψ of buying one (additional) option at price C¯ψ, hedging
by selling (additional) C¯ψS shares of the stock, and fully financing the strategy based on margin
loans and the use of equity capital. The value of this fully-financed strategy evolves as according
to: (
C¯ψt +
1
2
σ2S 2C¯ψS S
)
dt + C¯ψS dS (t) − (1 − mi¯
ψ,C)C¯ψr f dt − mi¯ψ,CC¯ψ(r f + ψ)dt
− C¯ψS dS (t) + C¯ψS S
(
−mi¯ψ,S r f + mi¯ψ,S (r f + ψ) + (r f − li¯ψ)
)
dt
(31)
The first two terms simply represent the dynamics of the option (as seen in Eqn. (1.2)). The
next two terms represent the funding of the option. Specifically, (1 − mi¯ψ,C)C¯ψ can be borrowed
against the option at the money-market funding cost r f . The remaining option value, the margin
requirement mi¯
ψ,CC¯ψ, must be financed as equity at a rate of r f + ψi.
The second line of (31) represents the terms stemming from the stock position and its financing.
The first term is the stock dynamics, given the C¯ψS number of shares sold. The last three terms
capture the various financing costs. The stock sold to hedge the option decreases the long stock
position thereby decreasing the required cash on the margin account by C¯ψS S m
i¯ψ,S which earns the
interest r f . This cash can instead be invested at the rate r f + ψ. Agent i¯ψ reduces the cash that
it borrows on the stock lending account by C¯ψS S thereby saving the interest paid on this amount.
The interest rate on the stock lending account is r f − li¯ψ . The stochastic terms cancel out. The
fully financed strategy with deterministic drift must have drift equal zero for the option valuation
to be correct. This leads to the PDE stated in (1.8). The conditions follow from the fact that the
option is an American call option and ensure that the solution will entail the exercise boundary that
optimizes the option value, c.f. Merton (1973) and Kim (1990).
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